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.REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
O:f

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
Hr. Wade, from the Joint Committso on the
Couduct of the War, submitted the followillg roporl, w ith tho accompanying testimony:
CO.'.\-OUCT OF T IJE WAR.

In December , 1861, a joint commutoe of tho two

bou.eea of Congreoa, coDBiating of three members of
the Sel\llte and four membera of the House of Repreaentativea, was appointed, with mstrnctiorui to inquire iuto tbo conduct of the present war.
Your Committee proceeded to the dischsrge of the
duty devolved upon ther::1, and havo labored zealously, and tbey trnst, fditbful:y, for that pn:-poae.
.u evidence of thut, they would refer to the large
maa.s of testimony taken by them, opon mBlly subjects, and herewLh reported.
The subject of inquiry referred to tbem was one
of tbe utmost imi;ortnnce and magnitude. Upon
" the conduct of the present war' depended the
iuue of tLe experiment iuaugnrated by onr fatbcrs,
filter so cnuch ex~euclitnre ot blood and t reaaurotbe estahlishmeu, of a. n• tion foundeJ upon the capacity of man t'or eel!"-government. The nation was
eugaged in a contebt fo,• its very emtence; a rebellion, nnparaUele 1 in hiatorv, threatened the overthrow of our free in,titat,ons, and tlle most prompt
and vigorous mrnsur.s were demanded by every
consideration of honor, patriotiem, and n due regard
for the prospenty a~d bsppnes, o( the people.
Yonr Gommiuee could perceive no neoos&ity for
:recommPnding any particnl.r legislation to Congreaa. Its previous course sbowoct that no ancb recowweodahon wue reqaireJ, \Vhen Cougre,s met
the precedin!{ J illy, treah from tbo P•Oplo-called
upon to provide tor t.ht, safety of the Government
&D<l the maic.tenance of the nation~! honor and existence-the re?resenratives of tbo people gave fall
evidence that tbeycomprebended tbe duty devolved
upon ibem, nnd bad tbo courage nod will tc fally
disebarge it. Tbe ada,ioistrnthm cnllsd by tte people to t1Je bead of tlle Government. in tlus tbe most
critical pe, ioJ d tlle nation's hfitory. wru, more
promptly and folly snpported than ·th.at of :J.Dy
other Governmen. ot which liistory bn, pre•
eerved any rtcord. Th, call of the !'resident tor
m<.>ney aud me?? had been u,ore tlao c omplied
w ith; uc kJ15latw:i wllicb lle bad d<>emed
necessary naJ been denied by Coug,e,a. and the
peopl~ Lad mo,.r no!>ly and generously 6apported and
~n&tfil!l~<l wl1at t u1 repre.~•mtativer baa promised
1D their name. Tbe s.,.Lu.• Oon!l'resa. fi·eah from their
conetit aeuts. bad aP,r.iu met. and tlleu could be no
don~t t ha~. ar u,ey bad hefort acted. ec 'IVonl<i they
conttnur t <' ><Ct. I I needr but tc re'er t.c, the history
o l tbi Conjll'8l!l jn,t cloi<!O, i t! prompt and tbor<>W!'b
action , c,Nbin,i the E xeeutiv, with th, foliest
rcwe,, placinp at his diepoeai all the re•<>nrco~ of
men and money .,..1;1~t t hie nation roaeeeeed, to
p~ve that yoU1C Commi~t«:j 11<igeo. rightly t ha~ Cou.-

greea needed no prompting from them to do its en•
.
Not upon t hose whose duty it was to provide tho
means necee,ary to put down the Rebellion, but
upon those wh088 duty it was t-0 rightfnlly apply
t hose mean,,, and t he agents they employed for tha\
purpose, r ested t he blame it any, that the hopes of
tbe nation bave not been realized, and its expectations bave so long been disapoointed.
Your Cowmutee therefore concluded that they
would best i:ierform their duty by endeavoring to
obt-ain such 1a1ormation in respect to the conduct of
the war as would be~t eual,le them to nd,'ioe what
mistakes had been made in the past, and tile proper
conrse•tO be pursued in the future; to obtain such
information as the many and laborioas duties of tbe
President, and bl8 Cabwet provented_ tl'.lem from acqniriog1 acd to lav it before them Wl.th such recommend&uons a:id suggee1ions 88 seemed to be ll.lObt
imperatively demanded ; and the journal of tile proceedin11a of your. Committee sbowa_ th~t, for.a long
time they were m constant commumcauon w1tb t be
P~dem and bill Cabinet, and neglected no oppor•
tnnit,y of at ouce laving before them the information
ac<i,n11ed by them "in tbe conroe of the1t invesugat1ons.
Many specific subjects of investigation pro~ented
themselves for the consideration of your Comm:tule,
auy one of which might well require tbe nction of a
committee for itself; and all 01 which, if fuUy investigated, would demand Lhe attention of nil t ae
representativ,s in Congresa. It. wa.s apparent from
the fuet that your Commit~ee would be compelled to
confine their attention to a tow ot the more prominent anbjocts of inquiry; to those tile iuves~igution
of whi~h would be3t enable them tc comprt:bend
the cause@ and necessity, if any. for the <Jday au<1
inaction characterizing the operations of our araue~
m the field.
And while each of tho.e sobjecte ha, receiven
from tllem \ be attention whicb 11~ i1:1portance
IJlerited, so far ae they were able tc g;v~ it the ut•
tenhon of your Committee bar been turned irou
part.cnlarlv to the history of the Army of the 1'010mac. In t be history or that army i.a tc be fouud ail
thet is necess!II'V to en::ble yonr Committee tc rerori
upon " the conduct o! the war. · l.iad that n , mv
fulfilled all thnt e generollf and confiding ptO} le
were jnstified ia ex;,eoting from ii. tbfa rebell,ou
hutl loug since 1,een ernsh•d. aud tb• bleesillg, of
peace restored tc tbit nation. l'ht fai;ure of 1ba1
urmy tc fulfill tb011e expectation, bar proloo11l'<l t Li,
contest tc the present time. with aU it, exp;,ndlnre
of life an<i trei;sure, fo, ii hllf tc s grea1 exrent ueu
trnlized. if not enurely deetrcyeo, th< leJi iu:ate
fruite which woald otherwise han been reaped
troa: our glorionf victorie, iF tbt We.t.
T t•erefore, wbil• vow Comrni ttoc have not faileo
tc i nkt t he tei,timoi:y ol witneB11e•,m rehtiou to uuli tary operation~ 10. otbe1· part,. of the cow;try , ano
alee, upon vario'Ot ei.t>jectu t o 'IVticb t heil· anentioi:.
batJ beeo epecialiv a1rected bv CougreSll &Lil ~ho
W ai· Depttrtwen1 oince th£ Cou:.iuit= wao fr,t ap•
poinkd, tbe principal part ·o1 the test~lllony takou

tire duty.

3

•
by them relates to tho Army of tbe.Potomae1 ond
tlioooenbjecte more immediately connectell with its
operRtion~. They havo taken the tlllltimony ofnenrly
200w1tncnee, rum0&t entirely men in the mil,tnry
umc:a of the Govt:rnment, inc,udiog about 100
genera!J.
•fbe die:a.ter nt Bnll Run in July. 1861, waa folly
inveeti1111ted by yonr Committee, RB being tho fint
conflict of tbe national troops with ormc-d treoaon
uwn the field of bat1!e; and alM> because tho tr<tOpa
there enga1tell formed Lhe naclew, aroand which bu
moo boon collected tbe ,aat and ma~ceot .Army
of the Potomac. The result of theu investigation
your Committee submit in a sepo, nte report.
Your Commttee have a.l.8o investigated the daa81er
at Ball's Dlotf, that battle being tb11 first conllict of
any e.uent in whlcb any of the troope of the army
of i.he Potomac wero ongalled niter its re-organization. A separate report. ofthat dlaaster ia alio eubmitted.
Immediately up<,n the organization of your Committee, and before proceeding to I.be takuig of llDY
tel!timooy1 they addtteeed to Gen. McClelliin, wbo,
by the retirement of Gen. Scott, had become Gen•
e:ral-in-Chief of the Army, the !ollowing commnoi•

catiou:

",vAe11nro1',0!", D. O., Deo. 21, 1861.

0
Snt: Yoo N'Oawuo tbato. Joint
bten appointed by the Senate and Bo..e of lt•prue»latlno to la·

:l,=1::1~•t~f::.::~1
~ho~~,l~o:J,:'~
..
bero,..
to
l.nterriow
!'roe<edillg la their ot!!c!al dQtieo,

!Jave en

with you•' our room at tho Capit.0J 1 al. each time u m1y
,-our couventence, lo vtow otyoot ))tu.111nleD~ieU1.oott.
~~:~~•!t~eS~~t'! h t.lie room of 6 ommiltoo on
,• 1 remaia, .,,,ery r ~ s . Joarti

·•B. I. W.AJ>E,Chaln,w,• .,.
" MoJ.•Geo. Oao. B. llcCuu.cr, Oenenl Collllll&lldb>;
Army Uoi1ad St&teo."

While falJy apprecinting the dignity and power
with which they were clothed by the concurrent
action of both house• of Coogn;u, tbe1, deemed i,
bui jol$ to award to bb posit1on the connderatlon of
aelriog him to confer witb them in relation to the
beat method of fnlfilline th066 o:iipectationa which
tbe _people had a nght to hope for 1rom an admiuia•
lrati<>n upon which they had, through their reprosentativo1, conferred each plennry poweni. A reTorence to tile journal of your commlttee w-Jl ehow tba\
ill health prevented Gen. McClellan !rom immediately complying with this invitntioo. Tb11 noceeeitiea of Ibo ca•e, bowover, wore eo pre.aaioa nnd
nrgent thn, your committee cooclndcd to proceed et
ODllO to the Lnkiilg of tlllltimolly.
ARlIY OP THE POT03UC.

Soon after tbe battle of Ball lloo, in July, 1861,

Gen. McDowell was superseded, and Gen. McClel-

lan w111 coiled by tho Pre1ideot. to the command o!
lbe ara,y otthe Potomac. The campaign in ·w estern
V-u¢oia, tbe crcdh of whicb ba<I been generall,sacribed to Gen. llcClcilan; the fa'l'or wi,h whlch u
wu uoderatood he wae regarded by Gen. Scott, tbsn
general-m-chief at tbe nrmy of the United States;
evoo Wu comparative youth, lloldinR out ibe ]'romi.ee
of aoth·e nnd rigoroc.9 measures; nU these coDSidcrationa tended to WllllO hare into the pnblio milld, and
to remo,-e the gloom and decpondeocy which bad
followed the cliw!l.1'0111 lssne o/ tho campaip jw;,
ended.
Every energy of Ibo Government nod ell tbe re•
•oarce1 of a genero111 and patriotic peoylewere freely
B11dl8' iabl7placed at tbedi!poliJ ol Geo• .McClellan
loenahle bini to gather together another nmry and
pat h in the most complete etato of dl!cienoy, 1111 that
olfeneivo operations wight be reaamed at tho earlieat
practicable moment. 'J.'he Army of the Pot0IIID.Cl
became I be object of special care to every doparsmont ot the Governmenl, and nll ott,,,r mill!Aly
monm,nt. and organl%ationa were madeeubordloat.3
to the one greatpnrpotieof collectmqnt WatJrlngton,
and·o ~ g there, an army which should over-power the forces of the enemy, and torover
<1rll8b ont any hope of sncce11B which the
Bebrll might clierieh; Even whon tbe lll'lllY of
0

the Potomac had attaillell di:neol!iona never before
cont~mJ)lated in the cour•o of military oporatlona
npon this continent, and seldom, if ever, e(\ualed in
modern tiniea, no portio:i of Its rapidly ioc..-.mg
numbers wa, permitted to be diverted, e'l'~n for a
brief petjod, to the accowpl,ahmont of other enterprieee. Tho general.a in charge of tb11 v11rlou1 expeditions from time to time in\lngurated, and from
whlob 60 mnch benefit wea anticipated-Oen. Bot.
ler, Gen. Sherman, <kn. Duro.ille, nnd othar&wero compelled to look elsewhere for the tr<t0pa to
compose their commands, to rely npon the c,nhnaed
patrlotwn oftbe people, and tbe zeal of tbe E.xocntives of tile various States for the raising of those
regiments-which would enable them to depart for
the fields of duty 11>1Signed to them. No coosideration was for a momen, allowed to duuinish or imF
the efficiency of the Anny of the Potomac, and the
nnexampled spectacle was presented to other Dationa,
wbo were intently watching tho couree of events in
this country, of tlie largest nrru,: of tho prcaont ceo•
tury beiug raised entirely by voluntary ~nlwmeuwi
in the brief period of a few month,.
When Cong- nasembled ln tbi.B city, in tbs be•
ginning ofDec:amber, 18611 so aucceaeful bad been.
the exertions of tbe nutbor1tice, and 60 zealously bad.
the people responded to their country's call, that the
comoliuated moming reportti, furnished your Committee by tbe Adjutant General of I.he an:u,: ebowed that, excloBJ.ve of tbe command of Gen. Dir. P
Bnhimore, the Army ol tho Potomac conamod of
about 185,000 men.
Duriog tile time tbia l arge army bad been oolleetin(I' and organizing, nothing ofimportance bad tranapired in cOllDection with ii, cxcer t the clOliog oftlu1
navi1111tion of the Potomac by the Rebels, whica
your Committeo treat of moro nt length in auolher
port of tlm report1 nod the melancholy diaartor of
Ball's Bluff', whicn ie mallo tbo subject of a Nparate

1e.P9.n.

'J'ho WC1l\ber during tbe Fall

and for -

wceka after the convening of Coogrcee, contiwied
uoaaually: favorable for acth·e military operatiou.

AB month after month passed without anyt~
b eing done by the .Atwy of tho Potomac, tbe people
becnmo moreuod more 110.'Cioue fortbe llllD0DDcement
that the work of preparation bad been completeel
and ac1ive operations woulll eoon be commenced.
From the 1e,stimony before your C01Dmittee it ap.
peared that tbo Army of the Potomao wu well
armed nnd eqrJpped, nod had reached o high state
of dieoipline by tile last of Soptewber or tho 11m of
October. '1.'he men were ready and easer to commeilce active operations. 'Ihe generala m comlllllDd
of tbe varioaa divisions were oppoeod to going into
winter qaarters1 nod the mo,4 of them doolared Ule;r
bad uo expectation of doing so.
CORPS OROANIZATION.

ea~•

In referenoe to the proper or;:amzation of
on army es tbat abont \V11811iugton, in order t.bn 1'
mlgbt be tho bettor able to net roost; etrectivel'I' in
tbe field. the testimony of the WitnelS6C8 oxamfu&d
nppn that point h remarkably unanimous. The
genemla m011t familiar with the eubjcct
to
regard of the ut.m011t i mportance tha division of the
army iDto corp, d.'armu, and thnt, too, iu tlme tor
tbo lostroction of the
in the movement•
neces,ary t-o rend~r eucb 110 organization tbe moat
elfoctive. Your CommiLtco deemed It so vitally
neceuary tbat they repeatedly brought the eabjed
to the attention of Uta aatbori iea, and urged itil
immediate adoption with all tho nrgument1 ill their
power. 'Ihe Prceident and tile Secret;iry of War
concurred with them in tbo i,eCM&i&y of aucb a
measure; bu IL did not l!CCm to be regarded with
muob favor bJ Gen. lllcClellan. ltidoed, GilllMcrClcl.18Jl atateu to yonr CommiUce, al \be tllllO of
their conference with him, tbat1 altbo!J8b h mi~
at eome time bo oxpedieot to divide tlie army into
army corp!, the snhj_ect was ono of great <llilfoolty.
He aaid 1t w1111 a dolicnte matter to appoint ll!lljorgenerals beforo they lllld beon tried by actaai
eernce, 111111 !lad mown
lltUII

4
be selected to comn1nnd 30,000 or 40,000
JlleII,
A major-general coold not be Qtowed
away in & pigeou-no!o, if ba should provo incompetent, so t>aSily as a brigache:r-zeoer~l. lie proposed,
therefore to W.mself ruw·,g e t hla eutire urmy in
some batile or ca.mpai$ln, and t hen select from tho
brigadier•ganern!a iu
ench na prova t bemeelves
eompeten, for Jrlgbcr co=nc!s. Cous~qucntly,
the divifion of tho nrmy into crwy cJrps was uot
oven begun until after t Ue movew,nt o_rtbe army in
March I.tad comDlcnc~d, au<l \hen oaly 1a pur3UlDce
of t he dil'Cllt nnd r ~_pc:i;ed orderJ of tha President.
Gen. McClellan, ho~cver, co..i~w.ned to ou;.,osa
the organization of the nrmy io to nrm_y corps, as
b" seen fro:n tho following dilip:itcb to bi!ll
m the Secretary of War, date!l May 9, 1862:

1,

,. Tho Prc,idct1\ i.a uawllliog. to have lha urmy corps org:at>·
b:ition b rok.eo uy, but a!uo uuwil1iog th1t. toe commandiug

general •htlll Uo t:acux:elcd cud embarunoed in ~cmal aklr-

·~- - -• i:uithing, coUbio.n \9Ub tbe eaemy, and on \he evo or nn ex-

pectfld"reat b~Ue. ). oa, therefore, ma.y temporarily au1:Pecd

!!:!d~;~!di2~~;1:nn, ~boea ~fi~.u~t~ rI.~t~/:a1:r~it.c!i'!1;
writes yoa. l)tivatei.y."

Tha provisional corps of Gen. Fitz.Jolin Porter

aud Gen. Franklin wero thereupon formeu_ 1),: re-

' ducing the other corps from. tbree to t \VO diVll!l.On~.

I Yonr Commi,tee
sTRENG'rB oF TOE E..-raMY.
endeavored to obtain ae accurate

information as posl!ibie in relation t-o the strength
and position of iue enemy in front of Washin,;ton.
The tesdwony of tbe oflicera in our army here upon
tbat point, however, wruJ far from sat.isfactory.
Early in December -0.n order bad beea issued from
heaaqn!ll1,era prolribitinit the commanders in the
front irom examining 11n7 peraoWJ who should come
int-o our lioea :from t ne direction of the enemy, but
all anch persona were to be sent, without examination, to tne headquarters of tho =Y• R estrictions
were olso placed upon the movements of scouta.
The resuU waa, tbat the Genoralscxo.mfueil appeared
to be almost eatirely ignorant of the force of tile
eoeJD.y opposed to tbem, llavmg only such information 811 they were allowed to oli,ain at headquarters.
The strengt,h of the enemy was variously estimated
a$ from 70,000 to 2101000 meu. Those who formed
the his-best estimate based their opinion npon in•
formation received at headq,uarters. As to tho
atrength of tne enemy's JJO!lltiou, t_he gene!"8,1 improsaion seemed to be 1ouuded upon informatio~ obtained from tile same source, th1u 1~ was excesdiogly
formidable. Subrequent events have proved that
tho fOl'ce of tho enemy was below even tile lowe&t of
these es~imates, and ihe strength of their :fortJ.lica•
tioDB very greatly overestimated.

I

DEFENSES OF

wASHD1GTON.

Your Committee 11120 sot1ght to W!cerWn what
number of men coulu be spared from this e.rmy for
otfuns1,e operations elsewhere, r.seuming tbat the
workll of the enemy in front were of sucli e character that 1t would not be adrt.able to move directly
n1><1n them. The e,timate of the force necessary to
be left in and ero11!ld Waehingt-0n to act entirely on
&be defensive, to r ander the c~pitnl secure against
any attack of the ene,ny, as stated by the witnesses
enmined upon tlu:.t pomt, was from 50,000 to 80,000
men, leaving lOJ,COO or upward that coul..: be naed
for expeditions nt other poilltn.
~n C!)ane.ctio~ with tile samo s:ibject, yO!ll ComlDllteo 1Uq01red m reference to whnt had boon done
"to render t ho fortifications here, wWch had beon
constructe4 at snch e:-tpense and with so great labor,
most clfec,wa tor tte llufenso of Vfasl.tiugton. Your
Com!D~-tce :i..o constrained to say that nrleqnate
J)rovL.1on never w.1s mado to properly man Uloiie
fortifi~tions 2nd cxerci:e mm in the manaaement of
&be gu.Wl, Several of foe witne~ea testified that
tbcy hac1 r.:ipe.itedly called tue attention of the
authorities to tile matter, but without snccess. And
when the movement of the Rrmy com=nced in
Jrum:h, the few rcgi:nontn that bud boon placed ill.
tho forts and p3rt.iiilly instTuctcd in t!lo nsG of the
iQIIS, were al!llost entirely withdro.WD, loaving tho
\

fortifications to be manned by row witl iuexporienoeli
troops.
THE BLOCKADE OF TH£ POTOMAC.

The l!Ubject of the obetrnct1on ot the navi~tion
of tile Potomac naturally den1anded tbe co11sidera•
tion of your Commie tee. Upon that point your
Committeo would call tbe attention of Congress to
tbe testimony of Cant. G. V, 1,'ox, Aeaiatant Secre•
tary of the Navy. Upon reference to bi.a testimony,
it ,v'ill ,tppeai·tbat, in Juue, 1861, the Navy Department propo~ed to tlie \Yur Department tba.t mesaurea be adopted to tako possession of M:ittbiaa
Point, ill order to secw·e tlie navigation of the Potomac from any danger of being ioterrnptcd. l!'rotn
some c:Iuse, no steps were lben taken for that purpose. The subject was again brought to tlie utten•
tion of the War Depariment by the Navy Depart•
ment in the month of August, sboitly after tile hat.tie of Bull Run. Nothing, however, was done at
that time in regard to it.
In October, 1861, the Navy Department again
urged the matter UJ>On the cons1derat10n of the W~
Department. The Port Royal ei,.-pedition wae then
in preparation, and would soon be ready to start.
The Navy D epartment represented that it wonld be
absolutely necessary to send w ith tbat expea.ition,
in order to i.ru!ure its succeee, the greater portion of
the Potomao flotilla, because, bemg very powerful
vesse!l!, of light draught, with their machinery prowcted, they were betLer'll.ttedfor that service than.
any other veSBels in t he J>OS5easion of the Navy
D epartwent; and it anyibmg waa to be done by
tbem to eecure the uninterrupted navigatio11- of the
Potomac, it must be done before they1 eft. It waa
proposed to the President ai.:l the W Bl' Departme11-t
that th& gunboats should take and destroy the Rebel
batterieB which bad then begun to make their eppearnnce upon tb.e river, and which even then en•
dangered the s!lfety of v61sels passing up and down
the Potomaa. Wben that bad been done, it wu
proposed that a snffi.cient number or troop• should be
landed at Matthias Point, &c., to iru;rencb. them•
selves, und11r the protection of the ~uboata,
until thev should be nble, with the asSlotance of
the smalfer boate of the Potomao tlotilh\, to hold
their position against any force the enemy woold be
likely to brlng agnins, them. It waa represented
that uulesa some such steps were talrnn tbe departure
of those veBSelB upon t he Port R-0y11.l expedition
would be the signal for the closing of '1,e uav,gat.i.on
of the Potomac, which representation the reaalt
proved to bo correct. AawaewellnrgedbytheNavy
D epartment, the whole question amounted simply to
thiB: Wo11ld the a.r:my cooperate with the rur.vy ill
securing tbe unobstracted navigation of the P otolillO,
or, by withholding that cooperation at that time,
pemut eo import.an, a channel of commwrication to
be cllll!ed.
WHY 1T WAS ).OT RAISED.

After repeated effortg, Qen. McClellan p1'omised
that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to
proceed down th• river, 'fbe Navy Department
vrovided the ne<:eei!aly transporta for the troops, and
Capt. Cr:iven, commaniling the Potumao Jio,illa,
upon being notified to that etreot1 collected at
l\1attbia!I Point all tile
of his tloillh at the time
named. 'fhe troop, did not arrive, and tile Navy
Department \Vllll informed of the fact by Co.pt.
Craven. Agsiijtant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring
of Geo. :M:cClellan why the trOOj/• had not beea oont
according to ng1-cement,
in1ormed by him tllut
hia engineers were of the opinion that so large a
body o! troops could not be landed, and therefore he
b:id coucluded uot to send them. Capt. Fox replie'1
that the tandiog of the troo,is wa.111 matterofwhicb.
the NuvyDepartmsnt had charge; thut they had
provided the necess~ means to accomplish 1he laud•
iDg snccewfully; t bat no inquiry bad beon wade of
tbom in regard to that matter, and no noti.ficatiun
t!J.ut tho troops were no~ to be sent.
It wns then 11grooo. that the troops ebonlu ha t<eot
the nel-t night, Capt, Crave11, W411l again 11otilied,

wu,

5
and again hod his flotilla. in readiness for the arrival
of the troops. But no troops were 111mt down at
t hat time, nor w&re any ever sent down for that
pnrpoi<!.
Capt. Fox, in e.nswer to the inquhy of the Committee as to what :·eason was 11Slligoed tor not eendiDg the troops uccordiog to tile eecondagreement, re•
plied tbat tlie oolv 1·eason, so far as he could ru;certaiu, was, that ~n. McClellan fee.red i ~might bring
on n genen1l engagement.
T be Preilidem, who bad u:uited with tbe Ne.vy De,,
pa.r1ment in uri,'lllg their proposition1.firat upon Gen.
Scot~ and thep. upon Gen. McCleuan, m11oifested
great disa11po10tmeut wbn he learned tbat the plan
had failed in consequence or the troops not being
sent. And Capt. Craven threw up !no command on
the Potomac and applied to be eeu1 to sea, E&ving
thatJ by remaming 1Je1·e and doing nol.hiog, be·wa11
bnt oalng his own repnta1ioo, n~ ~lie blawe for permitting the Potomac to bo blockaded wonld be imputed to him acd tbe flotilla under hia command.
Upon the failure of thia plan of the Navy Department the cff'eccive Yessels ot'the Potomac ilotilla
l e!S upon the Port Royal expedition. '.l'ho navigation of the river was almost immediately ttiereafter closed, and remained closed until the Rebels
volnnwily enenared tueir liaueri.,, iu the March
following, no steps having been takoo, in tile meantime, for reopening communiuatioo t,y that route.
ORDERS T O JIIOVE,

On the 19th of January, 1862, the Pre.eident of
the United States1 aB Commander-in-Chief of the
.Army and Navy, 1BSned ord~r• for a genel"Jl move•
mont of all l he armies of tbe United S,ate~, one resnlt of wLich waa the series of victories at J,' ort
H enry, Fort Donelaon, &c., which so el~ctrified the
country and reviv~d tue hopee of every loyal man
in the land.

tllis long period of inaction of tho Army of
ItheAfter
Potomac the PreSident ef ihe United States, on
LIME OF OPERATJONS.

tbe 31Bt of J auuary, 1862, iasned the following
order:

I,. 1-Te-sldent'•
"EncuTJVB :r.1ANs1ox, \VAS.mKGros, Jan. 31, 186'2.
Special \Vaz Ordc,.r No. 1.

r~~~::-::Ae;b~!~~~:
~y18r;: f~!~~1e!i1!: !?r-J~~~
ton, be fotrued ~to nn e~pdditlon fo.r tbe 1mm.edLI.W ol>jeot of

sebiug ond ooeupylDg n polo\ upon the r ailroad oootoweat,vard ot wbat i1 knowa 81 MattA.11u Junction; all detaili to
be in the diacretion or ti.Jo Ge~ral•iu.•CWet.
and e-bo e-a.•
pedltion to move before o, on tht11 22d d.ay_of li1cb1uary n ext,
I
"ABRAHAM LlNCOU,."

To this order Gen. AfcClellan wrote nn elaborate
reply of the same date, objectiog to the plsn tbertin
indicated as involving " the error of dividmg ow·
ermy by a very difficult obirtacle (the Occoquan)
and by a di&tance too great to enable tho two portions to l!Dppon each other, sbonld either be at•
tackea by tile malY!eB of the en.e my, while the other
is held in check." lie then proceeded to argue in
favor of a movement b:f way of the Rsppaltaunock
or Fortress .Monroe, g,ving tbe preference to the
Rappahannock route. He stated tllat 30 days would
be req_nired to provide tile necessary means of trauaportauon. He stated that he 1-ei~rded "success as
certain, by all the chances of war," by the route l:L'l
proposeJ, while 1t was " by no means cer~ tbat
we can bea~ them [the enemy) 1111\lanassas."
To thls the President made the following reply:

I

•

Enr.currv.& ?!UN110.N1 Wuhingtou, Feb. 3, 1862.

1

Dua bm: Yoo. end l line dL.dact nnd diBOrerit

£!:To~ UJ:c1e::~ak~,t~~t'::lla~i!t~~~~m:-tht::O~
1

'

MT

and acron lan'1 to lho termioo.a of tbo 1allrot.d, on York. ll.ivcr;
inine to anovu dlrceUy Jo 11 poiut on the railroad •out.uwou
of 1,1.,...,.., Ir you will
we ••li>factory onower1 to the
follo"'i!'i 4uealio111 I ,ho.11 glldly } leld my plan lo youn:
0 L Dou uot yoar i>hn involve a acead.y ta.raer ez:ponditwo
or ti'l7U end tn•MeJ/ th~n ~o1
"2. WherelA la a Tictocy more certail1 by you: plan Ulan

ct••

millet
" 3. ~'herein u a victory_,, Nliuwl• by your pbn lhm1
mlno1
u ,. In fact., would H cot be len "VIWlc.ble io t.bi1, th11t U
;~~;1uid1reat. lme of the ®?WY'• ooap,.n
_~~~Uo~. ..

=~~d

11

6. Tu ea.. of Afsuter, woatd not. a aaf'e ttf.reat be

c1llliculi by your_pl•n lbm b;y mlnet
"Youn, 1rul.1,
' ' Major-Oen. M0OLJU,LAK.''

m.on

"A LINCOLN.

Yo.u, Committee have no eV1dence, either oral or
doGumentar;r, of tho dieCtJs6ionlf tbat ensned or the
nrguments t uat were submitted to the consideration
of the P resident that led him to relinquish hie own
line of opemtirn,s and consent to tho one proposed
by Gen. McClellnn, except the result of a council of
war, held in l 'ebrm,ry, 186'2. That council-the
first, so far rui yonr Committ<le have been able to
ascertaiu, ever called by Gcn. l\IcClella11 nnd then
by the <lirection of the l'ree.ident-was co'mposed of
twelve i;:euerale, as tollows: McDowell, Sumner,
Heinlzelwun1 K eyee, Fitz-Johu Porter, Fronkhn,
W. :F. Smitn, l\lcC:iJJ, Blenker, Andrew Porter,
Barnard, and Naglea (from Gen. Hooker's Division).
To them was snbmilted the question whether t hey
would indoroe the lliie of op~rutious ,vbich Gen.
McClellan desired to adopt. T ho result of the deliberation was o ,·ote of eigb\ to four i n favor
of t bo movement l!y wav of Anoapoh, , and thence
down the Chesapeake B"ay, up the Rappabannock,
funding at UrballllS, and across the country 10 Rieb•
mond. 'l'he fonr Generals who YOted agai1111t the
proposed movement were Gene. .lllcDowell,Sumner,
Heintzelman and Barnard. Gen. K eyes 'i'Olud for
it with the 9ualificanon that no change sheul<1 bo
made until tlie enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac.
At tlna point it may be well to consider the princip!!l nr~tnents for nnd 11gaiost tbe movement upon
Richmond direc~ from Washington, and the movement by way of the Lower Chesapeake, including
that first proposed by way. of the R appalumnoclt
river, and the one iiually adopted by w ay of Fortress Monroe and the peoinsnla.
ln expre&liug opinions upon this and other subjectij relllt.iug ruore immediately to military operations in tbe tield, your Committee do not undertake
to form and oxprera opulions of their own, but
content themselves with ee~ting- forth those expressed in their testimony by military men whose
education and experience entitle them to speak oon•
fidently upon those anbjects pertaming to ihetr pro- ,
,
fe&flion.
WHY THE DfilECT ROUTE WAS BEST.

The arguments in favor of the direct and against
the l ower route to Richmond were mauy and
weighty. Some of thew are most tersely expreB&ed
in the l etter of the Preaident to Gen. lllcClelJan. of
February 3, 1862, before referred to. Beside t bOIIOt
the dh-ect movement enabled the l argest amount 01
troops to operate actively in t he field, QB the urmy
in its movement i mmediately coverw W asbin~ton,
and thereby 1·endered tbe prtleence of a Llrge t orce
here DDnecei;aary, Dy the adoption of tho lower
route a divi.slon of the army wae rendered imperative, in order to provide for the eafety of tb.e Capital
against any attack il'om t be euemy. Th1111, to lll!6
tue Jruiguage of Gen. McClellan hlm,elf, m refer ence to tho movement proposed against the enemy
while at .Mllll&s,as, •• committing the error of divid•
ing our army by a very dlllicnlL obotaclo, and by a
diatance too groat to ennLle tho two portions to support each other, sbonld 1,illler be attaelu,d by toe,
masses of the: enemy while the other is held in
check."
Tho army in moving direct from W11l!biogton
avoided ull the delays aud dii!ol'der consequent upon
the embarkation and clij8lllbi?.rkation of so large a
force with all its mQteri~l. And by investing Rich•
mond on t he no.th and nor..h-wllBt, we cut U,em oft'
from ono of their great eonrees of supply, th9 Sben•
audoah Valley, and at the 6ame time 11revcnted their
raids through tbat region of country, which so paralyzed all efforts to eend the few troops lei, i n
Washington to tllo oseilltance of the army en the
peninsuh.
Gen. McClellan ~tatce in his t estimony tllat by
adopting the ronto by w e.y ot Annapolis aud tho
Ilappnhapnock, he hoped, if propor seereJy was pre-

6
aerved, to be able to reru:b tbe vicinity of Richmond
be.fore the Rebel armv at l\Ia.nassae could bo ooneentrsted tbere for its defeo,e. Wbatever probability
there may have been for the realization of snob a
hope at the time tbe Rilppabanno()k route was de·
cided opou, it was e"tirely removed when tho enemy
ovacoatetl MaoassaM, before any actual movement
WIUI made by our army. And Gen. lieCleUan at
once relinquished the Ri.ppabannook route, and decided, witn the concurrence of his corps commanders tog> by way of Yorktown and the peninsula.
One great O~Jection to the peninenla route us in«1.icated by the te,mmony of all the witness~s who
tealify upon that point, incl urliug Geo. McClellan
himself, was the tot,il want of information fa reference .to the natnre of the country theie, the kind and
cond1t.Ion of the roads, the preparanoua for defense
&c. 'l'he di.fficnlti,s and embarrasijments our army
labored nnder from t~e begiuu_iog of that campaign,
from tbat want of mfornu,non, are very evident
from tbe teatiwony.
DECISION OF THE COUNCIL.

The deci•ion of the council of twelve Generale in
February wns to move by way ot' Annapolis and
thence to the Rapoabannock. The question of
reoP<'nias- tbe navigation of the Potomac,
by drivmg the en~my from their batteries
upon the river, waa dil!cus~d. lt was, however,
finally d~cided that the enemy should be left in poslMl1Bion of their batteiiee, and the movement obould
be made without disturbtng them. This iij proven
by the te&Lunony, aod abo l>y the ,econd paragrap_b
of the order of tbe Pr8ijil1ent, dated M1.1rcb 8, 1862,
aafollowa:

11
EXJ.:CUT1-vx MAJ:!10::r, March 8, 1362-.
,. Pnl{d.enV• General U·ar Qrder '};o. 3.
'• Ordertd. Tt:,, no chi:u,gu of t..htt batie of ooeration• or the
Arm{ of the l'otowa.o ash11t lJ& uud., wi,bou~ l,:,:aviug iu Glld
aboa Waab.iDgtoa 1u.ch a oreo as, tu tho opia.ion otthe G~uo,.lill
Anuy Oo1p11
11
That-no more tbui 1.wo Arwy Oorsn (about li!ty thou1and

=~i:·ti:i~~u:1:;:~ir~i;':,!~~~f tDe

lihall

troop,) of aaid Arm, oft.he rot-0mJ.o aaa 1 ua wovttJ ea routt5
for a now btu& of operaticri, uut1-i th.i;, 11a~-atiou of the Poto•
mao frotu \Vmhioirtou to ,tie Cilesa~11ke tsw.y tihiiU be £rood
from. t.be enoo-.! 1• bacterlea and otUt;t' Ob:ritruotiYwi, or until I.he
l're-iudent 1ho.U hereafter "Ive cxpre•~ J>,;fl.l.11.»l"lOn,
"That any wovem~ut at'oru•.J.J en rou.te ( e>r a.new hue ot
o~ration,. which way be ordtm~d by thtt Ut-nuui.In-1..:JJief
and which me.1 be iutenied to moYe upon tbe, lihe:H;,oat8
.,tJa.y, &hall be~ to move upon tbe Oa.y art 0-!tl.Y e.21 i..u.o 18th
March Ulll., n.nd tbe GenMa.1-in-CW.ef lilball Uo t~pou..dhle
U.ot II oo mo•e"" o&rly,.. that cloy.
" Or<UTtd-, Tba~ Uu, Army IUld Navy co--ope1'1lte iu lln im-

mediate offort to C-\ptttt& \ho enewy'd, t>at.unie.a llpou lhe

l'oton.ac between Walllililaton
"L. TnoJUS, AdJt.-Oen.0

~it~h~~iITt!Jl~y.

l.iVL.-,; •

Before the movement by way of Annapolis could
be executed, the euewy abandoned their batteriqs
upon tbe Potomac, and evaco~ted their posuion at
Centreville and Mallll8S11e, retitinl( to tho lin'l <>f the

'Rappaluumock.

MOVE?llllNT OF THE AR.:Wi.

When Gen. McClellan, then in the C11y of Wash•
ingtou, beard t hat the enemy had evacuated Manas•
11811, be proceeded across the river and ordered a
general movement of the whola army in tho direction of the p08ition lately occupieti by the enemy.
The army DJoved on the morning of tho 101h of
Maroh, the greatt>r pa.r t of ii proci;e<iin<> no fur1ber
\ban Faina.it Court;Hotltle. A email iorce of th~
army proceeded to Mana8Sal! and beyond to the line
of the Rappabaunock, ascertaining that the enemy
bad retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge across it.
On the llth of March Gen. McClellan ordered by
~legraph, the tr~!ports from Annapolis to
lllgtOn (.Alexandria 1J, to embo.rk. the army f:rom
there, nnd informed the Department that be pxoposeo. to occopy :Uanll8oll8 with a portion of Gen.
Dauks'a colllllllllld, aud throw all the force he could
concentmte upon the liti.e previonaly determiuod
upon. Subeeouent eventa iu the valley of tho Shen•
an~oab, terminating, for a tiwe, in the batUe of
IWmchceter, of Marob 23, preventoo tho force under
,Gen. &Ilka f.rom leaving thRt vlllJe;r.

,vw-

I

.\NOTBEII. COUNCD,,

On tho 13th of March Gen. McClellan convened at>
Fairfax Conrt•House a coun,il of war, consisting ot
four of tho five commanders of army corps (Gen.
Banlu being ab\entl, and informed them that be
propol!'ld to abandon bis plan of movement by way
oftlie Rappatumnock, and submitted to themin1teaa
a plan of movement by way of York aod Jamea
lhve.11>. The result of \be deliberations of that counctl wBB as follows:
.Bli.DQUARTBU AJtlCT O> 'l"II& PM'OXAC.

1

l!AJK1'A.X COURT-HOU@B, Af&TOh 13, 186Z. j
"Acouuen oftbeOeue.r&Ltcommaudingarmycorp1 at. the
hsadqu.arwn of tbe Army of the rotoma.o were o! the

op1Diou:
•• Ffrd: That the enemy. haviog retreated from Manauu

to GordoDsvl)le. b•hlnd tho RappabanDook and tho llapidan,
1' t. the opio.ion of tb.e aenetaJ,. comm•odiD11 army corps tbat.

gi.d~~t~;~:T~~b°::!:::n ~:ei1~1tb:O~e;::i::~:, : 00r:

Ricbruoud; provided, fiut. that tbe eoemy•11 ve..uet, the Yer•
rlmao, cao b& nuuttal.ize.d.;
the meana oftr&D1portatio11
,aflicientfoz a.n imOJ.edide uanitfer ot tho (oroo to lt1 Dew
basecau be re.dy-at ,vu1un;tou and Alexandria to moYe
down the Pototuac; third, that a naval auxiliary force can be
bad to 1\leoce or aid in Ola.ucio1 the enemy'•
tq

f~::!re:~1rlo~ :::~:e.lOc::oat!i::~~e feeli.Da of 1eearity for
York !tiverhfourth. tbac tho force to bo lento cover
11

Socorrd: If th& foregoin1 cannot bl?, the army ebouU then

be moved ogalnsl tb& enetoy beblDd lae ltapwnooct al th&

::~r:u:irc:;:i1;1!~

earltu~ po1sibl& moment, aod the meaoa tor recou1truct1n,
0

:;!y~t::!!rl !~::ic:l~he1::'~~

~~::t~~~&i}:'~~~Ddrla tlDd ths Aequla ODd Rich•
~:,

.. .NoTA -That ,,..ith tllo f1,rts on the right. bank of th• Po,.
tomao fully gart'Uonod, and tho,e oo the le.Ct bank ocoo..pied, a covering force in front. of the Virctnla lioe o/25 000
men wooId •allice, (Key••· aeintiel.mOD and McDowell.>' A
men for the dofe111e of Ibo city would ,wnee,

ls;:!,::/~000

The same day Gen. :McClellan ~oformed the War
Department that " the Council of Commanders of
Army Corpe have nnnnimonsly agreed upon a plan
of operations, and Oen. MoDoweU will at once proceed with it to Waahlogton nod lay it before y__2u."
To tbie ibe Secrntnry ofWar replied: "Whit.
ever plan hll8 been agreed upon proceed at once to
execute, without l08ing nn hour for my approval."
TllE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS.

The v1an of operations was sublnitted to the President on the en1De day, nnd be approved the same;
but l!!'ve tbe following directions u, to its execut.ion,
.. .l, Int: Lea.vs 1ucb force a.t :Mall.&UU Juuetio.n uehall
make it enlirely cenaio tha.t tbe enemy
not. repo1Hu
him'"'lf oftbal poaltion and liDo of oomml11Wl&doD.

;: ~lfi;://l£!!!~~~~::J!~r'":~u:~~ force down the .Poto-

n:u1.c1 ohoo1in1 e ne:w bue a\ Forlreu MonrQ&i or o.uy,...bue--

betwee.n here &nd th&re i or1 et all eTeuts, move 1ucb re:!i~~r of the anny at OACo, in punuit. of the oaemy. b110.m.e

EMllA.RKATIO:ll OF TRll ARMY.

The army wns directed to return to .Ale.xa.ndria to
be embarked for the peniusnla; previous to tbeirembaTl<ation all the corps to be concentrated upon
tho di vision nearest Alexandria. The transportation not proving sofllcient fer immediate embarka•
lion, ~he tr(!Op8 were, for se"!eral days, o x ~ to
the rwne wb1cb then set 1n, bemg deorived of their
former camping nccommodation.e, although, ia many
instances, not far dfatant from thom, having only
shelter tmits to 1>rotect tllom from tile iuo!emenoy of
tho weMbcr.
To Gen. McDowell was at flrst assigned the advance of the e.xpedition. D11t when it was found
that there was not transport-ation enoagh tc embark
at once bh "ntire corps, be consented, in order to
util.ze whnt was there, to allow bis troops to remain
nnttl snch time ns they could be moved together,
wi,h the understanding that the troops i,receding
him ehonld not operate upon his proposed field of.
labor. 'fbe resnlt, however, was, that ilie corpa of
Gen. McDowell waa put o.ff till wie last, wbicb, in
pursn.ince of sobeequent orders, led to bis col'J)1
being retained llere for tile <lefense of Waabini:ton.
HOW WASJllNGTON WAS LEFT UNDEFE.'IDED.

Br reference to ibs Prcsimmt'a general war order,
,No .ll qf Marcil 3, 1862, it will be Reell that no

'i
change of bMe of operaliooe of the army of the Potome.c was to be made without leaving in and 11bout
WSJ!biog•_on snch n force ne in tbo opinion not only
of Oen. McClellan, but or "the commandert of nil
the army corpe," was
to render the capital
entirely ,ecure. And by rererence to the report of
the ccuncil of war held at Fairiax Co!U't,Ilouse, on
the 13th of March, 1862, consiBtlDg of Gen~. McDowell, Somner1 IIeintzelman, and Xeyes, it will be
seen that t11ree
memben of that council deemed
neceuary for the &afe1y of WMhingtou "that the
forte on the right banli. of the Potomac should be
folly garrisoned; those on the lea bank occnpied,
aDd n covering forco of 25,000 mou.'' The other
General (Sumner) deemed 40,000 raen in all enfficient.
Notwithstanding thil order of tbe President, and
the deoioion of the council, when Gen. McClellAn
himself left .AI,xandr111. for tho penmenls, he ,cnt
back ordtr&, ,,,.tlwut conftr~nce tttlh tM commander, ofcorpa,for all ti~ corp, oftlie Army ~ftlte l'o-

tomac, but tltat of Oen. Ba11Ks, to tmbarli at once
fur tte prnin,ula. Juet Dre,·io1111 ·10 Jeavinp:, Gen.

:.IcClellan cddressed tbe following communication to
the Adjutant• General of the anny:

"~t~~~~;t•~:~:!1~
l~dl~~}~f0' l
Oxs.sn.&L: I hno lo
tnat )'Ou will Jay the roHow•

11

!!i~o~r:~~1~ef!~e!'!~Vt~

Inf,
r~

()~~~•ot;m[~~~;u~=re
te:u:..ti!!.~,"!~der hla
chaT1e,
troot11 1o
\1u:1 5.0uO ror tbodefeoto or
0

glT"&

Jlall.imore, aod 1,988 avallable for tLc Ea1tem Shore. AD.u.apo.

11.o, &o. Fort Delaware i. very well

by about coo

men.
u 'the pniJom of the f'ort1 around \\"t1biagton amoant to
10.000 i,,fD; other diai,o,aole troops, w!U> Oen. \Vod,wortb,

belr.10:.0.. 1!1,'°'-'.

1.lleve,
;.•~ !!!~~~
C::!~ J,~o1:n~~b~.!tbTt:1~!4!!lfo~:
bi,luit old re:-rlmtnL••· l,y di1mot111ted C&Talry, aud to ,end
1

0

tb.t m !orw,ud to Manaua1.

'' Oen. Aberoombie occuplea \.Va.n-e,ntonwitb a forcewblcb,

!nclodh I <.:ol. Les:y at\\ bile Plain., on'1 tb6e&nl'7 lo be u
hu d.:.1foe.J, wlll amOUJlt to some '1,':at) m••• wuh U ptecu of
...uflery.
1
• I have the hllnorlo requ~R that ,a the
org1nl%ed

"HILl.DQIJ'UTLU Mrtt'U.R1' DIITRICt' o• WAID l?fOTOlf,}

•::t~I ~; ~!:'.:!::5r.:t:::i:

•' W,UB.JNGTQN, D.

C., April 2, J8b2.

ot~i..~!,;1! ~c'°~!h1o~~rl~
CeaMa otWuhwpm:

~ii{,7i:::
:::::::::::::Olll7
:.:::::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::1!;~
Canl17, ai.l<
moo111M,,. •• • •• ••• •• •• •• • • 11'8
Total •••.••.••••••••• •••.••.. ••••••• ••••.••••••••••••

Deduct ale.Jr. &DJ. ta. arre.1t and 0~1Jlloomoat •••••••••••• , • l,'55

Total - n l for daty• •••••••••••.••..•••••••••••• .

~}Jt~~,'•;!~~1:rti~l!r;!~bam~,.

}!:,:~C:.&o

:: ~:~i°:o:;:f:
ot
aro adll here, but ool uoder m7 comm.a.nd or fit

•· J,'ron,
force I am ordered by <nn. McClellan to detail
two rt&lmenll
(Jood one•) lo Julu JUchard.01111 di"Titiou
(Su.maer11 CO!P) u it 'PUl8 ttJt-,\l&b Alrn..udrta; one re~•
ment. to repla~• lb• 37th New•Yor& Yoloa.Led't hi HelnUH·

u:~.,;!ddi~:~:iB:ddr:f~~~,!~1:el::1~~~!~:,tmotof

"hmfortherordoredthlamorolua by tew~,p~ to oe11cl
4,000 meu to relfova Oen, Sum1Jt0r&t Mana.eau a.ud Warren•
t.ou. llii.t ha may e11>bllk forthw!l.h.
11
Iungmitolhec4anaeterandcme1ency ottbttroop1under

:~
f!';..d~id~::,~~iD!d~~;t!!':::!r:l1J.:~!;;:,~-::,1:
fn a Ytry diaor;aoi.t:J c:ondllion from va..-iou1cau,.u, which

it ii not necu.ary to ata!o Lero; 1c.,ven.l red.meat, havina
bten relh,ved from brtcdJo-t, wWcti ba•e goa'e tuto the field,
io oonuqutt.oca ot tbtlr uoJh-ue 11 f1>r tarvice-the belit Te,ii•
mout1 temahliu1 buln1 been 1td~ct.:ul to take their piece..
" Twu heavy u lllt:r,: re;lmeutt,
one tufa.utry ffc:i•
mout, v.·hicb Lael b~•• drilled (Jr •ome month, tn arc:Wuy
Nr-ric., ha"Te been '\\·ltbdn.wnfrom the forta oa u,.1011,b 1icle
of t Potomac. •od J h~•e only Ll"t'n able to OJI their plb.Ce1
wllb ·very naw 1.ofuu.:ry regtmeot1, cotirely
wltb tho dotiea ot
&Dd or Ult.la or no valuo in tho!,
pre1 eot po$1t,ion.
•
I aoi ootSnform,ecl at to the ~IUon wb1eb M-.Jor-Oen..
!IIU.I it directed c.o like; bot •t. th.la ~ e he lt, u J. oode.r•
a:aud, om the '-ther 11.d.o ol the Jla:t Ru• mo11;ut&Su1, leari.D1

J•

C::d'ril!:.:::{i/A~o~Cr!!~ Gap

~ioC:t't::u~,the

11
I deem it my luty to atato that, look.wg al. tho namerioal
ltreD&:th and chan,,otl'tot the fareti uud:er my oonm11nd, it ta
la wy tudsmrnt ruthely toadequate to, BDd unfit tor, tbe im•
portant du,y to ll'L.h:b b ii o.uianeJ. l 1e1.11d h ver7 Sm~bable Ualtbe ~uem7 will ata&.!1
thi• p..lal, bLl thia

\t°/=b~:~!°4":E~'[;;:

U:X'
E~!!~~
St:~:•ii!:;uto
a:!d!:;;j~:,i:~titu,to:,~
~•r;.::
from Oov. Carlin that t bero ar11. .-orue 3,600 ml!n now read, io

f.Oter ot lbo force lei\ htto.
"1 have the h?~jAt~
'• llrlr.·Uen. llQ.d Military OoTemot.

~d~t;:1E::c~•mt~:,•·ro:2~!t~;hk;1f3~
~Jr~~~:i:!1,!~iiE~.t.b.fr;~a
Ji:!·h~J1tl~~llld~~~!.l~~i
too,
to allow m:itteu to 11.a1uwe o dctiDite JurUl in tbat re,toa.
~Core 1>roettdlrg to bla ultiiuatedeotlolltlon.

Tbose commnnk:irions were brongM to tbe coneideration of tbe Pre.ideuL 1.,y tbe Secretary or War.
The gabject was ct once refem,d to tbo Adjntant.Ooneral of tho Army, aud ?tlujor-Gen. E. A. Ilitcbcock, with iuatrurhons to reporl at _once whether
tbo orders of the Pre,jdent bud Leen complied with.
Their report i• Ill follow!:

1

p..,..,11,anla. Thu t,rco l ahoold b• ,114 toba••••Dl&t
<i~o to 61•111&1&!. I- JUr 1bou..ud au·o r,om Gen. \\ ad..
worth l d...-lre to be ordered to )!,.,,au. 'l:lloae lroope. ,.w,
up• roiu,

"Tbe '<""Is lu l~ \°>,lle7 ct tllo fibe=<loab wl'.I

~::;~

be.

,t~n~~-tlt~N.'antj

., Boa.

61tCJLa;'HRT

o• \V:..x ''

w .nn1.:c0To!f. n: c., .April 2, 1862-;:,o detoe.t.
!~t:
K!t~~ "Jo compliance
whb your 1,nuucLioMw l hav• tixamiuod
!!•f"lh:U-:!~o:X'~a:fu~:~Jo•~o':,fJ•<,!!:,1~~':i\ :::.t1!!i }!)~~f.~:•r::~rt:tt41d to me, ud L11vo the boour to UW:e the
11

0

~~t~d=.ftdH~::1!:i~
~n~!!:&~:r l~Js:i:,~•~::::
L-ower r,t.omac.
~S.157 1000.

., To tt-01y,Uula.te:

"AL \VaneTJton there h to be......... 'f.780 meo..
•• At. ?ibmw.n thero b to be •••• ,., •.•• 10.659 moo•
.. Ju the Vllliey ofthtt 8henaudollh •••• a5.4G7 tn!ln.

•• On tho Lower F',>&omac••.•••••••••• 1.360 me.A.

"In 1111••••••••••••••.••••••••••54,4.50 i::m,.

" Th ore will lhu• be Jen for the nrrlooua md tho front ot

Wubii.1lon. uncler Oen. t'Vadnvortli, 18,000 m.aG, t.1.c.l1J.•he
<Jt tbe l,ittkdet IJ.Dder la1t1·ucllon.
.... Thutroop1 or;.\Dl.tlnt, er res.dy(or 1erv\ce in New•York,

u·::.':tu:r0~~~~:D~~bj~,Ql~~~t-:·:c::
mOII. ni:>edtJJ.

lam, 'Yory rctpect(a1J7, J'ODr obedlcnlHn"mt,

•• OEOIWE B. ?JcCLt:LLAN, .lbJor•~n. Commai,diJII.
" Bric-Ota. Tn•.JLU, AdJataut-Gao.,.J U. S. Anay."

Thi, etutoment, to use the expreS!lon of one of the
witneace1 wna ·•v•ry indefutito.'' Gen, \Vadawortb, wno bad been orderd to tako charge of tho
defeDNB of Wtshi.u1,-ton, upon loll1'niDg tho diapoai•

tions of troopil tiropoe~-d by Gen. McClelwi, •nd
feeling tbe great UDportance of tbe trust committed
t o hi.I charge, and the total inadequacy of tho moans
provided him !or that pnrpose, acfdrellllod to tho Sec•
retary of W at tho follo~fug commur.icarion:

"Fint: Tbo rr"lde,,1'1 war ord•r. No. 3, daud March 8,
l't'(l.uirtil that <111 hk.lcJ t.p any UfW L&hse of o~ratlons, th_.
Cityot ,vuhioGtbu 11.b:a'.J be Id\ t·alinl,- air:cwt-. 'J. he other
polr.ta ot the ordf'r h.
tm.0"ct1a.ry to coatlder, u lhe
snemy, 1i.Jlce Ila date, haTe •~doo~d their ioa,illon1 and

k!!;:'.:!t~ on tLo l'olomac, m,<i ro11nod bch!JI tbo Rappa•
"8,...,,4: 'Ihe council of a•n•ral omceu b•IJ ot Fllrl'u
fe~'(.'!;N:o':''i~!.1!'..A°~~.,';~';:d"{I:,; .!!'1~~•~]'l~

rev. Tho couae'.l decl.ded. u.oaoimt,Qi]y to take tip a new
bl.Mor cpeT&don1 t.om 1-~ort. Monroe, and lhrre at tho geu•
eral._a m~jorlty--dfl\:~~d t!:rn\ ti.lo force uecooary to be
lei\ •houJJ be '1dllcl,ol, t.o fully 1urh1on. tbe fui ti un the rUh,
bau~ or the 1,otoJ.Uo.o, au.d •tooccupJ' tho,e on the fen
buk, wtth a coyerill1 force ol 2~ OUO. n l•t we thiot. t be
judauitnt o!o!li.cen. to,taome !lO 000 ami ..-ool'1 be ne,:eoa..-y
tbo1 to man tbele forta. which, with thuauwber ~ft.be coTU•
1D1 fore,>. would nab a tol.&lor W,O<O.
·• Third: Tbe rreeldent'o dlrecllona of .Morcll 13 to Ou.
l1oClollan dl.tect, tint, to l~v• &.uc.b • forco u.&. AlanldU
JancLiou u 1ball make U- ontircly certain tbat t he enemy
may uo, 1epoucutr.11eco1:1d, tbd \ Vuhlllgtoo 1baU be loR
eutlrtl.1 1tc;;ite; tblrd, that t.110 ram•tcder 01· t ne army mOT•
down tho .Potomac, er move I.a punuit of Uae e oem1. 1G.
nprd t o GCCOPJ'lDII MU&UU JUDCtlon, u Ille co.omy haYe
d ..1,u7eJ the rallroado laadlus to It, ll ma1 be Cal, to Ufll/D•
that ttioy have no loLeutton ot retornla& for tbe ic-oocupauon
or tbel.r !•ta 1io1ltJ.ool &11d I boN1fore no vary ]&IJlo foroo wow
bo noceaaarr to ~old bat pori1lun,
"l•'""'"': M'l)or•O•neral McU•llc'• n,port to tho Adjo·
taut,Oeoenl, or April I, after ,t.101 lbeaeHnl poelLlon• ot
tbe troopo propottJ to be left for Ibo llole111e of '\\ iubiuJtoa.

s
1lTe! a reprcaent.ci.t:on

111

!ollo,n: AL '\Venonton th.ore

fo bo 7,780; et hfana, ..a,, s:1y, 10,853; In tb.o v.nlloy ot
the Shen1udoah, 3.j,167; on tho t o\vo.r F'otomr.c,
1,350.
Totllll in all, r;S",456.
And
tbero would
be left. for tho ,gnrriaous atid the fJont cf W ashiogton1 under
Geu. \Vad.tiwonb, 11omo 13,000. In the cbovo onumoraUon,
Oen. Bauk:11'1 Army Corps ia-ioola.ded ; but whethe.rthi,corva.
operating ill t.be Sbenand03h Vmlh·y 1 sh ould bo reg11rdoJ 0,9 a
put of toe (orco u·siJab•-, for tho protection of tho lrumo•
diatG front or \Vuhio:to:J, tho uodenigned e:z:_prou n.o

oplllloo.

" F/.ftlt, Oen. Wa<hworth'• r~ort of April 2d i;ivea hi•

t

·•

-..

\

totea u follows: iafantry. 151 335 ; ortWery, 4,4.91i cavalry,
858-slx comp1nies ooly belni;- m ou.ntbd. 'l'ouiJ. 20,(77.
" Deduct 11ck, in orreit Bl.Id confinement, 1,4"'5. Total foe
dut,:. 19,0-22·,
"From thl1 force Oen. Wadsworth 1a directed to dotach
two good rt-glme.nts to Ricbndton'• dt,.i1io1, Sumner'& eorps,
which •bonld, b-, dedllC~d from hi1 commttnd1 ooo TetllllODG
to.replace th~ 37th Now.York, in Heiatzelmtm'• old divhion,
and one to reHevo n Tegimeut. of Hook.er'• Wvlaioo. at .Budd'•

Ferry-tot-al~foor 1"',;f;went-.

' ' lt ia a!so ordnrcc.l t.> tumd 4,000 men b relievo Sumner at
MaabSla.a ODd \Varrenton. OeIL W4dawortb reprcaenU that
be bu uo mounted l ight o.rtillcry und~r hit command; atate•
that tbne wcro uvoral e,owpan'ie.!1 of Tcseno o.rUllery it.ill
he.re. b11t. n oc und~r Ws comoulld, or flt. for servico.

U
::::~~~~;:r1~~~1; di~1;u~:s~~h~~~;;~e::r~ :? a:: r:::i
menh ere 111 a ~ery di,orglnized coodiUou. tome of them ba.v•
0!} :i~!1~~~fi~:J;: /i;~:)~~:.1:;}: bt:i~
:e,d~';~~:1~!~~v:e~f!
regiments remaioillg bllvin; lJeen Kel.ccted tc> take their place;
~ic~e::J1,~i:!1~:if1ed°f!~:i!~u~:!
~~Uu~:;n~~;!~tn;:?uti:
be.ea. v.rithdrawu from tbo
03 tl.1.e south 11ido of the Poto0

0

mac. and thelr ,place, aurplitd nic.h oow infantry re;iment1,
entirely uuacqt1:.duted with tho d.oties of tli:it nrw, and of little or no ,•1llue ia t.bc-.r pre1e nt. vo~i tfon. lf the10 wu need

~tbhi1!~~~i~~!.
:~:~~r!rr:i tt~ ioc:~~;;:.:a:r~~~~
Wad.i~orth would et:em to bo entirely i ne.doqoate.
8

"ln vi~w of the opinion exprei.sed by tho coancU ot tho
commanden o( army corps ot' the force neco&i;ary for tho de•

fen10 of the capital, though not nt1merieally- atated, ond ottho
force represeowd lJy Gen. McClella11. a~ ltifc. for tbat pO.tpOi&,
we are of tbe opinion that the Tcqaireweotl of tho PrMident.

tbat the cU.-y 1b:alt be ten 'entiroly i.ecure.' not only in the
o'p1oi.on of t be gencraJ.in~hief. bot thstot t ho
ol tho ormy corl' • also,
tJot
fulll complied with.
if All of whic .•
"E, A. HITCHCOCK, llhj,•Gen. U. S. A."

been
Ji.,~~H8~~~.·i~rtliee~.

TIIE l'RESIDENT l'R OTECTS T HE CAl'rrAL,

The day after this report was written, tho Preti•
dent directed the Secretary of War to order one corps
ol th, .A£my of tue Potomac to remain ia front of
W asbiagtoa until fo.rtherorders. ThecorpsofGen.
McDowell, bein!l tho only corps remaicang intact
here, was selected to remain, wi~bont tho knowledg"
of Gen. JIIcDowell, he being eogaccd, at tho time of
:receiving this order, in making preparatiorus to immediately follow tho rest of the army to the penin-

sula.

T IIE P fil\LNSOLA CAI\IPAIGN.

Geo, Heintzelman, who commanded the first
troops of the arm'l of the Potomac tbut landed on the
peninsula, arrive at Fortress Mooroa on the 23d of
lllarcb, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas.
Re tmuorders to encamp Ull near Fortress Monroe
ae possible, in order that tbe enemy @bould have no
idea of tho direction fa which the army was to
move, whether toward Yorl.."town or Norfolk, Gen.
B eintzelmnu states that shortly nfter landing he obtained information t hat the enemy had not more
than 10,000 t roops at Yorktown and on tho Peoiosu•
la, aad i! satisfied that he could have advanced and
isolated Yorktown, in which case tbere would have
b<Jen no serious obstacle in tho way of proceeding di·
:rectlv to R ichmond. Ou the 27th of ll1arcb he oont
ont ieconnoiteriug parties os far as Dig B othe! ond
Watt's Creek, aud went near the Half-w ay Ilonse,
w hero about 40:l of t he enemy, nnd a little artillery
were seen. He telegraphed to Gen. McClellan what
he was doing, and received a dispatch, in roply, Lha\
he {Gen. McClellan) bopad ~bat nothing had been
done t o give ihe enemy i nformation of the lino of
o_perationa of the = Y• The reconnoi88auco waa
then withdrawn.
Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe,
a_nd on the 2d of April Gen, McClellan himself nrnved. 01) the 4th of April tho nrmy commenced its
111ovement in the direct.il>1. .?f YorktoWll, awi on the

5th appeared before the enemy's lines. Gen, · l\IoCJellan states that he moved from Fortress Monroo
sooner than he otherwise would have done, upon
hearing that the enemy ,verc sending down ro•en-

forcc111Gnt.11.

DELAY BEFORE YORKTOWN,

All tho testimony goes to prove that when onr
troops first lruldetl ou tbe Penio.mla the force of the
e nemy there consisted of Magruder's com.tnand, vllri•
onsly estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except
by Gen. McClelliln, who estimates it from 15,000 to
20,000. Tho Hoa. Lemuel J . Bowden, United States
Senator from Vll'gillia- thenlivingwitbin the Rebel
lines, near Williamebnrg-testi.fies that t lu Rebel:,
did not determine to re-enforce Magruder until it
tMS apparent t4at our forces intended to stop before Yorktown, and commence a re{(ular siege of tlte
place. It is now cvidant, whatever may biive been
tile opio~on of ourofficera at the time, that our jorcul
when tltey first appeared before Yorktown,, coul/J,
4ave p ierced the li1te of work1 across the Peninaula
there wit//.out much dijf1,C1,1lty, isolati11g Yorktown,
anrl cutting off re-enforctmeuts, token the place must
have folle,. ;,. a very short time. Some of Olli' General,, expected and desired that that should be done.
Gen. Heintzelman forwarded t o Gen. McClellan the
11,Pplication of Gen. Ifamiltoo, comm!lllding a divi&ou, for permission to force t he enemy's lines. No
answer waa received to t he application.
now MAXY TROOPS M'CLELLA,.'i HAD.

InRtcad ohhat, however, a siege -was determined
upon, contr1ry to tho desiro of the Presitle'!_tJ wbo,
as early ns the 9th of April, wrote to Gen. lllcClel•
lau as follows:

"Tbt,ro ii a ca.rloa1 m11tery about the nnmber of troo-p•

hi:~~bl~,~ ~;i~:~r:E.ht:jfi:3 J:i;!b:bf~ei{fr1:!t,t";S::.

i0i.0008~~ ~~lth a;;a0 :~:- !:~ol:~! ;:vu~
tderstaud
~ b-::~:~~::J~:r
r:'\o ~e':. ~~ot~:1=:riyo.:!
le. t, d oiua: for )'on pr&ei.tely w hat. a lite nWllber of
You now HY that. you will bavo uoc. 85,M, wheo all en rout•
0

11

1

your own would have to do if that command WIii away.
u l euppoaa lllo w bole force whlch has gone forward to you

h with )•oa by thi, Ume, a:idtf 1 0, 1 tbio.~ it ia t ho vreclro
tiwofot )'Oil'° atrik.e a blow. By deby tbe eae.my wlJJ
ateadily gaio on you- ~ Lf. be ,viil gUll !ute r by rortifications a.na: re~Ollforceme.Ata ib&u ]OU can by ro-euforceme~
alone.
.. ADd, onee more, 1oL me t ,U you U fl indupenu.ble to you
tbr.d you ,trlke a blow. I am powe.rlou to help tb.1.1.
Yon will do mot.be Jae.Lice to rcwe1ober I
wished not

~:~:3~M~=:a.~:{ :bm~~aa~i :~f:~!:!n~~u:a~=
8
~01;

1

ficulty i that 'li'Ve should. find the 1am.G enemy s ud tho aanto or
e qoal intre.11cluncut1 r.t either place. '11h11 country willnolfa.iJ
to noto-i, 11otina ®w-ihat the prucnt he-fit.ati-7n to
ttpon. an. inlr e11ched po,jeion i, bul tM •'°111 Q,f Manana., .,...
peaud,.U

mci:•

And tho repetition was made complete nearly a
month later, whon tho enemy, in the faco o! a 811•
perior force, ovacnated their works without loBS and
without tho knowledge of tho general commanding
0111' army.
M'CLELLAN WANT S MORE TROOPS,

I

Gen. McClellan, however, did not deem Ws force•
snfilcient, nod objected very strongly to the order of
the President detaching :McDowell'a corps for th&
defenae of W asbington, aa " imperiling tbe ancooss
of our cause.'' Ho called again and again for re.
enforcements, aak:iug for Franklin's and McCall's
Divisions of McDowell's corps, to be u.nde.r com•
mand of Franklin; insisting that Franklin'a D1vlaion, at least, should bo soot to him. On the llth
of April Frauklin'R Division was ordered to Alexandria to embark for For, Monroe, On the 14th,
Gen, Fralllilin r eported t o Gen. McClellan near
Yorktown, bnt bis troops remained on board th&
trnnsports until after th11 enemy ovacnated the pl.e.ce,
w hen they were ordered to Wea, l'oint.
.
HE W ANTS TIUNSPORTA.1'ION".

1
\

On the 6th of April Gen. l\IcClellan t elegraphed
t o t ho President, " I hav e by n o means tho transportation I mllllt have to m_ove my army even o ~ew
miles;" @d Bllke that all his ordol:9for W9og'Oll tram,,

9
&c. may nt on~e be comnlied wilh, Ail

wa9

ecnt

1
to bim
es di:ell'OO, until e,;en Gen. McDowell found

himself eo atripped of tho tran&porrnlion ~e,igoed
for biJ! cor111, ttut when ho moved to Fredcnckaburg
it wse with the greateet diJlicul1y be could move
enppliea fOJ' lis sm:lil furce from AcqniA toFalmonth
notll tbo rmlroad w1111 completed.
A month was spent before Yorktown, our nrmy,
in tbe opinion of •owe of our ablest ofllcera, becomioct more demoralized liy the !abora of o. l o ~ e
tuan it would have been even by an nosn
ul
ft!.!l&nlt.
1'he retuma in the Adjntant-General'e office,
&gned by Oen. McCl•llan and his Adjotaot-Geocral,
eliow thnt on the 30tb of April, 1862, the forces on
the Peniosola nuder Oen• .McClwbn amounted to
112,392 pre.cot for duty.
BE W A.'-TS GUNS.

On the 1't of Mel tbe Pref.ide11t telegrapbs to
Gell, llicClellan: "1:onr call for Parrott guns from
'Washington al arms mo, chiefly becnneo it nrgncs Indefinite procrastioalioo. Is aoytbiog to be aono1"
YORKTOWN

EVACUATCD-l11CLEI,LAN
Gnl:SED.

CHA•

Oo the night of tbe 3d and the morning of lbe 4tb
of Mnv, the enemy evacuated Yorktown without
l oBI!, Ono of the witnceaes t estifies that Gen. McClellan wne ver.v mllcb cbagrioed nod mortified nt
the evacuation, rui he bad made bu preparations to
open from lie 1:ntterica on lllonday, t~e 5th of May.
l'LnSUJT OF TUE REBELS,

The cvacnation was diacovered by daylight on the
morning ofthe 4th, Between 10 nud ll o'clock,
Gen. Stoneman, with the cnvslry and nome tl;zht
horse arlillery, started in pursuit. About 1 o'clock,
Gen. Hooker, with Lill divi,,ion, lei\ Yorktown, with
orders to ropport Gen. btoneman. Gen.. Sumner,
H eiotzelmun nnd K eyes uleo moved out during tho
day, with t,J,e wbolo or portion a of lbeir corp,.
About five miles from Yorktown tho dl'l'isionof Gen.
Hooker was delayed for liOme tllD~ ill consequence ot
other troopA, coming from another cbrection, getting
into tbe road before h\m.
In the meantime Gen. Stoneman ha.d overtakell
tbe rearohbo enemy with bis cavalry, nod followed
them up clOl!ely, keeping up a ruooivg fire all tbe
time, until tho enemy 1-ellcbed. tbeir works in the
neighborhood onnUJ.Bmahurg, when tbepureni, was
checked. Gov. Sprague wna £en, back to hurry up
t he infantry support under Gen. Hooker. After considerable delay, findmg it imposailllo to plll!a tbe
t roops ahead of him, Oen. Hooker turned oft' and
proceeded by another rood, of which ho bad obtained
information from some of tbe :inbabitanta; marched
till ll o'clock t hat night, rtnewed t!lo march~ dnvligbt, and came up w the advanced works of tbo
enemy n little c.fter 7 o'clock, about bnlf a mile from
Fort Magruder, and at once engaged tbs enemy.
D.\TTLE OP WILLI.uISDURG,

There r;ooms to ban been great mbapprehcnsion
&nd confruion ID rela~ion to lbe wanagement of the
troops at Williamebnrg. Wbcn tbo pursuit firat
commenced on Sunday, Gen. Heinlzelmuu was ln•
structed by Gen• .l!IcClellnn to tako clinrge of opcr•
nticns i3 front. On the morning of .Monday orders
were sent to Gen, Samner to uiko the command;
Gen. McClellan rema111cd btlund ,,. Yorl:town tb
superi>,temi the tendfrlg of trco dioisious up the
York Rit•cr to fVe&t Pornt. .A heavy rem set in on
Sonday, rtndoriug tbe ronds al1t10P1 iwprnclicalllo
for the pa,11011e or troo(>I, 'fbe troopa of tho drlf.,rent comwanda becan;e mi.nsl•d- dh uioua lilld brigade@, lo eome extent, were sep&rl!ttd from each
olber-:i.nd it scemt to have be,;o <ii.lllculc to i;ct tho
troops up in time.
Dm-ln:r Monday forenoon Gen. IIooker, findinii
hilmeU Lard p,e;t,,ed by l.!Jc enemy, utd uucentanU•
ii:g tb•t Gev, Sumner bnd aJ,Wil troc,pa witli Llm,
teus 1-er,-:atedly for n~nforcelll1!..tt, :s, <lid Geu.
l:ltontm~ll n~J Giln. lltiu,zelm:m, liut no rc<i:rl'orce•
menta nrilved, Gen. Sumucr etutca that b:iviog
aent Gen, lluncock to tho 11,;ht, be !md nt tho coutor

only about 3,000 infantry-tho cttvahy there nnt be-

ina fitted for operations against the enemy, ou account of the country being 80 wooded, Upon re-

ceiving lbe coll for relJuforccmenta to be eeot. to tbe
lei\ to Gen. Hooker, ho sent alaft' officera to burry
np troore from the rear, bis own corps being eome
ten u,ile,, otr, nod ordered Kearney to re~nforce
Hooker. Re-tnforcemcnts not coming up to Gile.
Hooker 1111 soon ns needed, or perhaps ~ecled the
Prfoce do Joinvillo and Gov. Sprague weut to Yorktown to urge Gen. McCldl:in to como up to the
front, nod take cbnrge of matters tbere. Gov.
Sprague arrived at Yorktown ubont 1 o'clock, having been about an hour in goinil' down. llo testifies
that tDi1e11 Gen. J,JcC/ella,. tDaa told the condition of
affair, at tl,e front, he rema~ked th.at lie had, 1uppo1etl "th.o,e in front covld attend-to that littlematur." Aftu ,ome time Giln. McClellan 6ta?ted from
Yorktown, and reached tbnicinity of W-t lliamabarg
about 5 o'clock ID the afternoon.
1
BOOKER DOES TIIE FIOBTIXG.

Dy that timo Gen. Kearney bad reached the
field and re-enforced Gen. Hooker, taking command,
being tho senior in J'3Jllt to Gen. Hooker,
Hancock bad been engaged on the right but, upon
being re-enforced, bad succeeded inre_pu,!i.og the enemy, lolling about forty men. Tho prmcioal Jl~btinJ
was done by the troops under Geo. Hoo~er, bia diviaioll soataining o. loes of abont 1,700 men. Befon1
be wu re-enforced, bis troops were obbged t o hold
their J)(N!itioll with tbe bayonet and such ammlllli•
tion ne tho men conId obtain from the bodies or-thoee
who bnd fallen, tbo roads beiug 80 mnddy that it
was impoeeiblo to bring up fresh nmmnoitioo.
RETREAT .um PURSUIT.

Tbat nigh\ tbe enemy evacnat.ed their position aL
Williamsburg. Gen. llfoCJetla11 etntes tliat after be
arrived on tlie fiel:i ho was eo f;llt!Bfied that the enemy bnd been beaten and would 1,e compelled to evacunle their position tba, night or be taken at a great
disadvantage, thllt be conntermanded orden to the
diviaiollll of Ricbnrdton and Sedgwick and aellt them
back to Yorktown.
1'bo next day t.bo pursuit was continued for a
short distance by Geo , Stoneman ond tho cavalry,
with n small body of iJlfantry. Se11eral of the Ge~
erau u,tify that, had the emm31: bun promptly follou,ea t1.p ofter tlu batik of Willian,.burg, tltey
could /,a~e ken ful/ov;etl right into Rich.mo11d-cn4
nf then, 1ays ,oitl,out.firing a {ltm, Geo. McClel•
Ian says tba, t he road's were so bnd, in collllOquence
of the r.tlns, that 1t was impracticable to mu:o i.
vigoroaa pursuit.
Tho battle of Williamsbmg apoears t-0 have been
fongbt under many and eoriona disadvantages.
No bing was known of tbe nMure of tbe conntry or
the dokos1vo works of the enemy unt il our troopa
arrived before lbcm; there waa no controlling
miad in cbnrge of tho moveu:enta; there was nncertmty in regard to ,-.ho W:1J1 iii commnnd; each ~neral foagbt as he coD6:dcred be...; and, by t 4e time
the Ocueral Cdmmand,ng appeared 01& tl~field1 the
principal part of tMfi;t/1ti11g wo1 o-,1er,
I
FURTHER DELi\Y.

Some tbrce or four ~:iys wcro apent nt Williamsburg for the purpooo of briogiog up snprlies, &c.,
and l!Jcn the Jme of r.:nn:b uaa lilt.en up for the
Chickahonriay. I I was about tbo timo tbnt the
army le't Willlowsburg th11t Norfolk was taken
11.nd tho Merrimac destroyed. Bat pre-p:iratior.1 bad
been rualle beforo tl:o~ c ~cots occorrcd to bove 611ppl:ea root t:p Yorl!: n1~£r i~atead of the Jame,, ond
the lino &tte,wartla followed '\781 &dopred. 'l'he
collscqucnce waa thnt tlle i;a.obo:tte were of little or
no u•,rvlco in tho opc1·!1lioue against lliobmoud, ru>.d
rcm1,:ncJ clltircly rnuctive, ucept iu so01e opera•
tioua ug1Uc$t Po" l)..rlint?, until they wero clilled
npoll to J ro:ec Ibo nrmy wb<.'ll, in Joly, i~ !dl L:;.ck
to tllo J ..~.,s River,
T ..e (h l:tnce bu,weon Willhmb'Jurg and tbe lin.e
of opcr,1tione on I bn t..:bickahounny W.JB from forty
to titty miles, ancl tbo army woa 111os1, two weeks

10
in moving that distance. The fir.t troopa thM
Cbickabominy wero the corps of General
X:eyee, whiuh croesed on the 24th of May, followed
by the corps of Geu. Heintzelman on the 25th.
The rest of our army remainecl on the left bank of
the Chiokabomioy until tbe bnttle of Fair Oaks,
wbeu tbe cJrps of Geo. Sumner crossed to the a11mtance of Gene. Heintzel man and Keyes.

Cl'()6l8d the

M'CLELLru.~ STJLL CALLING FOR MORE TROOPS.

Gen, McClellan continued callillg for re.-eniorcemen(s J'epresentiog that the foroo of the eoemy in
his fr~ut wue ~uperior t-0 Iris own, and that the
force nuder Gen, llfoDowell would do more for the
protection of Washington, if sent to hb army, than
many other position io wbioh it could he placed.
In a letter written on the 2ht of May be :111b that
Gen, McDowell's corps 1.,e sent to him by water
rotber than by land as the more e.."l:peditione mode,
and that he and hie forcet be explicitly placed nnder
his orders, "in the ordinary way." l:lo closes hia
letter by eayillg:

r=fo~b:! !~::~;1::;d~~~~::'1·ev~~1•i ~h:f{ fi~fe~
'' I belie'f& therira i1 a are.l t 1tr1.1Jgle before

umy, bnt l
0

with all tho 1kill1 and c,utfon, and letermlnarlo11 tbat, poa•
.A.nd I troa~ that the reaolt may eithor obt.atn for me tho
l)etm.aneut coD6.de.nce ofmy Gonmme.D.t. or t!utit. ma7oloae
my caree:r.•'

In reply to the request of General McClellau that
General McDowell should j niu nis forces by water,
the l'resident states, on the 21st of May:

., lfcDoweU cm reaoh you by land 110011.er than h.e could gel
abo.ardof boatsiC tho boat.a were read.7 at F1ederfobburg.
unleu bit march 1ha.ll bo reriated. in which case tho force re-

f:~b~~Y:~t
r: t~~~=~Yt:~ ~~!:~u:0:,~e~la:.·b;
water, hewoult.111otrcach you io t"'o weeb, lud.PJJgbyl)ed
uperlence. Franklin'a •lnile diriaion did not. reacb you iD
ten day, after I ordered. it.''

JACKSON I:S TllE SlIENAl\'DOAH.

Preparations were accol'dingly made for General
McDowell to laa\'e Fredericksburg on tho 25th of
M~y to join Gen. McOJellan. Juat at that time,
however, Jackson commenced his erpe<liLion doWD
tho Shenandoah V1llley, and Gen. McDowell, together with Gen. Fremont, from W05tern Virginia.,
waa sent to the ns•ietanco of Gen. Eanks, and to in•
tel'<lept J acbon in his retreat. Upon being informed
of this, Gen. McClellan replied that the movement
of Jackson WM probably intended to prevent re•
enforcements bcinll eeot to him, The President re•
plied.l s;iving him iull information ns to the condition
of amms in the valley, aud closed by saying:
"IJ J,1c1JoweU'tf01'CftJ:Q.,t nou, bevcmd- our rtaih ice 1hould
b• ulkrlll Adpl,t,. Apprehe111!ou.o of
llJte th!e,
and no unwilllllgneH to aostain you, haa alway• been my reaaou for withboldlog MoDowelPa force lrom you. l'leue UD•
Uw, and do tbe best you can ,v1.u, the force., -yon now

g;~d

BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES,

On tile 31st of May aod lhe 1st of J aue the bat
tie.a of Seven Pines nod Fair Oaks wero fought. As
there hilll been so mu~h controversy in regard to the
con_dnct of aome of the troops engagod in thnt bat
tle, your Committee will refer more particularly to
the testimony of Gen. Caser, who commanded the
advanced diviaion, npon whicli the attack was first
made. Gen. Cll.Sey st:ites that., when the campaign
oftbe Peniosnla commenced, bis• division co!lSist.ed
principally of raw and inexperienced troop@. 'l'bey
had l!lllfei-ed greatly from tho labors and oxposnree
incident upon the aiego of Yorktown and tho nd1 vance of the troops up tbo Peninsula. Some of them
bad been for week_s without s~elter, being com•
}lelled to !eave their camp eqmpage hehind when
ordered on the puranit of the enemy after tbe evacuation of Yorktown. Tbat division took the lead
acl'O!II tbe Cbickabominy, taking up n position
at Seven Pines, wbereit esmblished itself by th.row•
lDg up intrencbmeota and cutting abatis.
A tew days bofore tho battle of Seven Pines, contrary to tho 11.dvice lllld opinion of Gen. Keyes nnd
G8ll. Casey, the division WWI ordered t!Jree-qoart-era
of a mile to the front, wilhm six miles of Richmond
bia picket-a extending within fivo milee. 'lhey had
no support on their right or thmr left, tbo remainder
~ r p ~ ~ o o g e d _<Keyes's) being
4

f°f~

i~ their rear.. Tbey ~t once ~mmcneed digginJ rule,.,

pits and cuttiug abatia, the pickets at night bemg attaell:ed by the enemy, wbo were repulsed. Abont
11 o'clock on the morumg or the 31st the picket~ reported the euemy approo.cbing, and nn ai<l. of Gen.
Johnston was captured and brought io witll important papers upon him, Geo. Casey, with ttilii aid
and bia gener.1 officer of tbe day, went to Gen.
Keyes and reported the cironmstances to him. Gen,
Koyea testifies lhat for some daye before tbe attack
he sent to Gen. McClellan reoorte of hls condition,
the lbreateoing attitude o! tho enemy in bis imme•
diate vicioi~y, and urged that Geu. Snmner ba sent
aoross to bis support. This was not done, however,
unUI after the atlack commenced. Reports continued
to oome in of the upproach of the euemy. The di,'loioD was called out and formed, the working men
called in, and preparations made to meet tbe comiDg
attack. Two lines of battle were formed-one in
the rifle-pits, and nnother about one-third of a mile
in advance-<:omposed of five or six: regiments and
four pieces of artillery. A re8lmem had previou1Jy
been ient out to support tbe pickets. About 20 min•
utes to 1 o'clock the enemy commenced the nttack
in force, supposed to amount to abont 35,000 men,
attacking in front ancl on both flanks. After fighting for some time, the enemy continuing to come on
in force, the forces in front fell back to the
and fought there until nearly surrounded. Ro-en•
forcementa had been promised, and Gen. Calley had
selected the position to which they were to be 118·
signed; bot no re-enforcements came up to his posi•
tion until j oat before ho was forced to fall back from
bia second l,ino, wbeu o. sinsle regiment arrived. Af•
ter abont three bollJ'S' fighting the division fell baok
from its second line with a loas of 1,433 in killed,
wounded, and llll81UDg. In the coarse of an honr
aft.er Casey's division bad been driven back, the l'Omainder of onr forces were swept back from o. mile
and o. half to two miles from Call&y's fl.rat line, when
the enemy wore obecked, a.nd tho fighting ceased for
the day.
.
Doring the battle Gen, Snmner, whose corps was
on tho left bank of tbo,Cbi~kahomiDy, was ordered
bv Gen. McClellan to hold hie forces in Nadinese to ,
cross. Geo. Sumner not only clid tbnt, but at once
called out hla forces and moved them until the heads
of tbe columns were at tho bndges ready to croaa,
tbere~y saving be,ween one and two hours. When
tbe order came to cross he immediately moved bis
forces in the direction ot the field ot battle, came up
with and engaged the en~mv, o.nd relieved tbo pre&•
sore upon the troops cn&l!ged upon his left.
BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS,

The next day, the lat ->f Juno, the enemy att9.cked
Gen, Samuer at l,'air Oaks. Geo. Rooker, ?ho had
been ordorei forward the day before by Gen. Heint~.
zelman with one-halt' of llis di viaion, hearing the
firing ot tbe enemy upon Gen. Sumner's forces, pro•
ceded at once in that direction and engaged the
enemy. In a. short time the enemy were repnlsed,
and fell back in confnsion, 'l'bere was no communi•
cation be~weeu the 'forces under Gen. Sumner and
thooe nuder Gen. Heintzelman (Hooker's), but each
fought as he de~med beat under the crrcnmstsncea.
Ge11, McClellai,, W4$ with, the mai11 part nfthe army
,m the left bank r>f the Cliicka!to,niny. A.flu the
ti{(htin{( wa& over he came across to t11e rigltt bank
of t/1.C 1·iver.
BOOKER'S RECONNOJSSA.NCE,

On tho morning of Monday Geo. Heintzelman
ordered Gen. Ilooker to make a reconuoisl!aoce in
foroo, whieh ho did, advancing to within {our milea
of Richmon~! meeting wit!', no rcautaoco ex_cep~ a
little from tijO enemy's pickets. Upon bewg JU•
formed by Gen. Heintzelman of what be had aone1
Gen. MoCielian ordered the troope to be recalled nna
occupy tbe poeition that had been held by Casey'•
division.
The oflicors engaged io that battle, who have been
exo.nnoeil, testily tuat tbe army could ka.I•e pus'!&i
Tight on to the Cit:; of R ich.rno1td with, little rend•
a•icc; tlJ,it the enemy were very mnob br?ken and
dem11ralizau, throwing nwny 1mns, olothing, &c.•

that mi~bt tmp<·<le their flig\Jt. Gen, ,McClellan
eeems to ba,·.i contemplated nn lmoo~-d1ate movemen, upon Ricbmond, for, tho day nfto_r tbi, battl~,
Junu 2, be write< to the Secr~tary of'\\ ar:

11••~

•' Th•· e•w11y d.t 'l.~teJ b force a·u.1 "\\""Ith
irpirU rcrlerd.ny murning, but oro Evot1·wbe10 mo \. .,1 ,maUy repulud wltb
GTE"&t hu. Oor
cb:.q;c.J Ca"Q.u.-1 t1you \J.,th da:,-1. aad
-unlfoiruly broke thi, t-u~w,. The rea..tlc. h, th.tour 11.;!c. lt
wilbln four 111ile1 oi Rlcbmond. I only wa.h for tho titer lo
fall ti, croi6 with the rt!at "'' lb" force aud ma' ea gf'ntral. at•
tac);. t;bould I fiaJ tl.em holdlu& trm ID a ,·ory •trous poattloo, I way wait for """b&\ boor,. l can brh1g up fro01. .Yort
Mo1Jron, Bnt tho ,,,,,.-,a.cc ot my troop1 h now 1ucb tbat I can
.,.,.n•ur~ mnf'b.. 1 do uot ftu (or odd• apinat me. 'lhe Tic•
tory 11 cottJrT, te-, and all c.rKI, 1, due to Lbe pllantr, of oar
otll~r11 a.oJ men~"

'l'he movement waa not mad~, however, aa Gen.
McClel an at.at~1 because of tne higll etage of wnter
and tbe bad roaoa.
:\IORE RI:•t:XFORCDU:~'T!'.

On tbe 0tb of June 1\ItCaU'a divit,ioll of Geo.
McDowell's cor1-s was ordered to join tbs ormy on
the peniu~ula. On tho 8th of Juna Gen. Mc'Clellllll
tele~rnpbs: "I aball bo in perfect readiness lo movo
forward aud tako Richmond tho women, that Mc•
Call re1etcs here ant1 t be ground will admit tho
pa,e:11:e of ru-tillu1·y." On the lOtil or 11th of Juno
McCall's lroor• cowrucu~d uru~mg at the Wllite

HonM',

l'rcparotion~ coutinncd to be made in Wnsliington
to 1t\Jtl down h:, l~n,1 from Freder:ckaburg tho re•
ma'nder of O~n. McDowell's co1·r~, 110 being direct•
ed to co,o~,crnto fully wiu, Geo. l,IcClcllan, bnt re•
tai,,iug 1111 ioder,mdent command. 'Ibis does not
Dl'I cnr to hr.ve been in nccordunco ,~iili C'lenerol
llcCldlan'a wiebe!; lor,
the 16,h of Jone, he
telegn.p\Js to the Secretary vf "'ar:

<~•

"Jlon;bt to bo dlatlrcllyuu~entoo,ltbal JlfeDO\<'elland
h1a tro.:,ra are co,ur,lev·lJ ucdcr UJY cot.t:ol. 1 Jttrt'f'itd a
telecram from htrn rt''-t.ll'""io~that Wc<..~-.,r, dhhfon 1.i•l1~1 t,e

p!1et:d •o u tojojn Um S.mrnedia•• ly upoa W11 1rrlvat. n.t.
reque,,t. d()(•I not l;rtatbe u.o 11ropt-r 1phi\; whatever troo~

re~ ~::tr: ~t c~~u~.:.~~'!:. ':1 tb!.11: ~~:t~i
1
eda

.am uow pl,lCfHl UtHl, McOowc l ,.houlll wi1b. tbo &tnoral {n.
tere t to bA ue,ltietd for tbQ pnrpcfc of incree.1il~-: bil cot...
maod. U I UllDt>t.f'i.,.:Jy- co..-r.cd all hit troop• J wa:.t tJ0'48 or

tllett1, but would profer \O tiobl tbe battle ,vhh wbat I hlve,
D.Dd hit. Gthcr• be u•pontible for LLe r-ult.s."

On the 18,h of JIIlle, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to
the Secretary of ,var that he baa received iotormntion from de11erters to tco efl'eci tba, troops ban le!t
Richmood to re,cnfon:o Jackson; that tho mo,emeut
commeDCC<l on the 8th; and that if re-euforctments
have gone to Jacluon, they nre 1 robably no,
Iese than 10,000 men; that !,e caunot Youell tor the
truth of tbo atatemeot, but that i~ seems pretty cer•
tain that it b believed 10 mchmond au<l amoug tLe
Rebd troopa. To
the 1>resident replies, on tbe
same day, that tbe information is corroborntcd by B
cfup•mli from Gen. Kiog nt Fre<.lerickaburg, and remarks: "lf tLis 11 true, it 18 ns j(OOO as a reenforcement to yon of RD equal force.'
On tbe fllme day Gcu. llcClellau telegrapba to the
Prevdeol:

A gentr-JleUJtJf'mn,t may t-ke place a.t IDT hoar. Aa
ad'l"a.otebyua i~,·ot,--u a ba:.tlemoro or lendectW.ve. Tbo
eoemy t.J.bibit at every pol.at a ret.dlncn to med ua. They
ce,utnly h&Tc grtM nam'6en and ~xteoalve work.a. If ten or
ti...'l•n thousa.nJ ~11 ha.'f'O 1,n Rfchmeiod to n,-er.force Jack•
toD, St. illu,tra:cs their •trc nirth o.od c~uOJe.uct>, After to-ID<)r•
th
11

ae~-~ ~i~,.1 a'!!!;b~lD1;wl r.T:;b1:-J~di,\!:~;v:g;

eutb e11d aky. ud the ocmpleUun or some neco.ary pre•
llm1aariet."
STRI:NGTlI OP TIIE AltlIY.

Tbe returns of Gen. McClellan to tbe Adjotant•
General's office give tbo following ea !be stren,ctth of
tbo army on the pcuinenla on t!Je 20th of June:
:Prttent for dat:,t 115,102; ~pechl duty, 1!:ick 11nd lu
arreat, 12,225; aosent, 29,511- total, 15G,8;J8.
ST'CART'S RAID,

About tbia time tbe Robel Ocnernl, Sturu-1, with
hill cavalry, llllldo bis celebl'lltcd raid, lll8king tho eo•
tiro circ:iit of our nrmy unburmed, nnd <liecoverh,g
t11o nature of our commnnications witb tho York
Binr.

JACli.SOX TOllEATEXS A.'\ ATTACK,

On tbe 21th and 2;;tb of J nne Gen. McClellan.
te!CcllraJ1bs tbe Secret11ry of War tbt ho it ln!ol'Uled
by ik,ertera and conlrab .nd• tbat J ,ekr,,,n is COD•
tcmplating an e.ttnck upon lii11 rig\JL nud rcnr, A.I
thia clis,iKtcb of Gen. Mc\Jlcllan, llll<l the ouo of tbe
Presideiu iD reply, nrJ dated jmmediately prniou,
to the" 86VOU doys' battle," they are givun bert1 in
full,
"~•ed u,:iO p. m. McCr,1'tt.A:<'•· .fon~25-6.151>, m.
"th••• Jett tttumed r,om \be field, and tiod :ronr d.lapalob
I.Jirv2Udt0Jaclr.tou. Snenl eootn.:.anda. j.m iD,cl•• leformation cou6rwlng tho 1a,rt,01i.1tlo.a. that. Ji&.ckJ01l1e.dvauoe
at or11ear Hauover Coo.rt,lloo1l"-, and that BeaW'8£~~~•
rl•od, with 1trot1i; re-tn!.,retwe-~tll, iu Ricbdlon,1 J'e,iW,11-Jo
11.cl.lneto tlll.v.lt tbal J•cuon wlJI alta•lt my rl,hla>drev.
Tbeltebcl forci,le •t1tedat 200,000, inoJodiD.I Jackaon and
Bet.utol{UJ.. I 1htll b••e to cuatt-ad agaia,t vuUy ita.pertor
oddlif'tbetenporh tetrue, bu.t1.b.11armywilld., . . in tho

power or man t-J hold tbeir p('ltition •nd rettultoan attaet. 1
w,- great tnferlGrity of uuwbM.!. \:Jut feel tba\ I am 111

r,,aret

no f!i;~~-i.ru~:[~ !? ::!ll,::C•C::f:~1~l 3f:•::.'t'i:

K:t,i'ru point; uncltl11t ell tLe &t"allat,lo me-1111 c,f the Govern•
mont1bouldbo ~1oc.votute-Jttre. l wUldc,a llbi.t aaeoeu.lcand-, ,riLb tbe •ti odldumy Ih vetbehonorto t»m.•
wand; ac1l If It ts dt'!SttoyeJ bT OY1•rwh~l01hiRnumb~n.. can
at ltml!lt d1o ,.it!J. it. aoJ
St• fate. But tt tho r,tult:ot \ho
1ctton \1,:hlch will o;.etl f h•morrow. or wirbla. • 1bo1t t!me, lt
a ditater. th-, rr,~nat .. Uty <'atino!. be thrown. on my tiboul•

!::•!;:~r::~?ir::o

1

de.i;a~i~c•:¥
receiTtd addi.Uonal tote!.
11 ~nc-9 c n1hu h:.~ tb• •upi,o.:..t"on. t.n r6PJ'rl t, Jack.ton'•
moTemtnt• auJ 8tanre;ne1' . r 1hatl rrobabJ,- Ve a1 tacked.
to-morrow. aud now g.> to tho o•bu ~ldo. t,ftbe ChtckahomiDY
t > arra.ueo for the c:e!dlJt, on t at ..tJ, . I h.·•l lb.u. U1ce lt no

UIO ia my IJ;MU

.~e:E~;)D~hk6°L~LI~~\~·. Jillijor-Oonenl

Ilou. E. lr. STUTOY. Stc:-ete.ry ct \Va•."
The BDawer of tho Pre,ident i1 esfollow1:

II

•• \V,untXGTON, Juno 26', ltG2.
1
• Yoo.r UJ.reo dl1p:"1toho11 ct J'(l tetday in. rtolo.tlon to the aff'aJ.r,
n1-!laawlth tbcut.ren.tt.t, th 11 _you.-..~m._pletety •ucce.ed.6J in
tu.alms ,-our 1,oint, are, ery • utifJl»I,

"Tile late, or,ootOl!>, m .. •o:&l'ltlaK lhe pr~babUUy of

vourbl'h1~ Ci'rer~hetmetl bJ 1').tw ireo. aod tall.\i:i11 or wbom.

~:

:Ct~ ~i~:t~!:~i\~~~b:G: ~ii d~"J:
0

loat yGu can ·w ith wh11t you Lave; while yoa coal.1111::ie, uni.en•

croutly 1 tb.itill: 1 tll anome th....t I eoa.JJ. al•e you more U I
would.. J have omitt"J• 1 abaa Gmit, no opport.11D.ity to aen.4
you re-cuforcemeutM wtenevu [ po,tlbly o~~A. LINOOL~.
11

M3jor-0ml"n.l 11.oCLSLUx.''

BATTLE OF JIIECHAXICSVJLLE.

Ou t\Je nfteruoon of the 26th of Jone, betwtou 2
and 3 o'dock, the enemy, in conlliderablo force,made

a vigorons attack upou ihe !roopa of Gen. McCall's
Din,;,oo, slalioned at )focbnnicsville, consiirtiug of
tile two brill8dca of SeymoUJ' nnd Reynolds. 'l'he
actioll lalted until mgbtft1ll, when the enemy Wel'Q
repnlscd. Troo;:11 wero @ent up by Oen. l'orter to
tho asaistance of tilo,e cog,iged; but they wel'Q not
in the bllltle, thoagb eomo of them were in politiou
to euppo"' tho rig;l:i, of tbe line.
About 12 o'clock tbnt ni,.bt the troops were
ordered to fall oock to Gaine, • Mill, which waa ac•
compU.bcd withoDt 10118.
B.\TTLE OF OATh"ES'S MILL,

OD the 27th the battle of Gaine1t's Mill was

fonght, priocipally by the troors under Gen. Porter.
Olll'forccs thoro engnge<l werofrom 27,000to30,000;
the force of t'.!e tDewy being from two to tiuM
limes tbnt number. 'l'bo enemy were in eucb en•
pcrior force tho!, nltbough our trooos fought with
~ceeding bravery.,__}hey were driv"u back with
a loss of about 9,uw men, in killed, wonndcd and
missing.
Gen. McClellan was qne,,tioned as to the t>Olicy
of leaviog tho right w,og, conei.stiug of OD!Y about
30,000 meo, to meet tho uttack of tbo BDpenor forco
of tbo enemy, inbtead of w,tbdrawing it to the
riJ.?lit bank of tho Chicknl!owi•y before the b~ttle
of Gaioea'• .Mill. His tea,imony on that point u u
followti:

" Que-1ttoo. ,Vbotevcr mfrbt I-la.Ye been the tatentloua of
the enemy, u the aU&c-k wu to LaYe bet-n ma.de by him.
would It not b.vo be.11 ~tter to hue p!-4 both wilt1• or
our a:rm.~ on tho umo 1id1 ot the l.:b1ckabomlay prior to the

_:;,,?e~~t::" r.:.~! Ihl,,k

0
b•!
[bey ou U to bm 1-11 broDlh'
0
lo Ibo 1awo llde vf tbe rt,or l,ffo,- fhe7 aetQall7 wen,,
•
I

12

=•

" Q uoalion. What nd,1111uige
gainel by i,,,vlng tbe
rl&ht w!Dg ot our army tu be attuokad by a l!fObllf eu1J6dor

foree1

an•~~!!i'~;;l\!r !~t::~~!a~ eC::li!~i°i:a
0

0

armvandlts ma.tt·.rial.

6

t~!

•• Q ue,tlon. WUI you oxploluwh•t Wllll dqnebytbo , lght
win,: of oar nr01,,1 ot or e.\Joat tbe U111e tbo ltft wa, engi:Ktd

wbii.'!h ~a•e.d our fl!f.1,k. from at.iack aud enabled tbe arwy Olld

lta material to be wltbdrawn1

1of~!:\b:r~~:,yd!~~~;h~:gt\~w~~:~!~~~c~i!esfeftb:~:
the elver, e.ud gave ua time to get oar mate.rial out of the
Woy."
RETREAT OF THE W UOLE ARl\IY DECIDED ON.

Dnriog tbe nigh~ nfter tho bnule of Gaines's Mill
all Olll'_forccswere coocentrated on the right bank of
tbo Chicknbom,Dy, and tbe n ext d;iy tile movement
. to tbe J o.mes Ri1•er was <let rmmed upon. Gen.
HeJ.Dlzelmon testi.fiee thnt the night nfcer that batUe
bewruH ent for bv Gen. McClellan; it,~t hsfonnd
everything 1>~cked, ready to leave; t hat Gen. McOlellan eahl t here were t wo t hin:,;s to'be done- to
concentrate Wd forces and risk o.ll on a battle, or to
withdraw to the J ames R in.r; that if h e r isked a
battle tJiere, and waa beaten, the ar my wnadestJ'oyed.
Gen. Ilcintzel111uu advised him not to 1-i,k a b~t tle
under such circumstauces, for it t hat army WIIS lost
the esnse would be l o•t; t hat it were better to go to
tb:e J ames River and await re -enforcements. Gen.
McClellan r eplied t hat bo was ot that op1uion h1m•
self~ and tbat wo.s determiDed upon. That nlght, at
12:20 a. m., Gen. l\IcClellan telegraphs t ile Secretary of Wa r t hat be (Gen. McCleliao)isnot responsi•
bl.e for tho resul t, but feels tba.t the Government has
not snetwned his army.
.
To this t li.i P resici.ent r eplies, on the 28th:
' ' If :,011 have bad a drawn bat~le, or a repulse. tt. it the
prico wo 1~ 1 for t he enemy not bein1 i n \ Vakbington. \Vo
fic,t-ected W ;ubi? tou end the eoomy cooceoc.r&.ted oo. yoa.

be~r;~te•tt;!!~:

npou u•

0 Save y oa.r army at aU eveota.
\VUI send re--enforcemenh
u !uta.t wec:m. Ot coarse they eannot re&eb you to-day.
to-morrow. or next de.y.''

The 28th of J nne passed without any eerioua
fighting. Col. n. S. Alexander iestifiee that on the
a fternoon of t hat do.y he was sent for by Gen. Mc•
Olellan, and went to his headqnnrtera, at Savage's
Station, arriving there about dai·k. He recai vea i.netmctione to proceed with an e,cort to tho J amea
River, eend back " soffi.cieut number of men to act
as g 01des for tile difterent ~olumns of the army,
communicate with the gunboat, , and order snpplies
to be brought np the river; to examine both shores of
the J ames to tbe mout h of the C hic ii-a.hominy, and
necer tain the landing !laces; proceed up the l ;Jii.ckahommy to the bea of navigation aud ascertain
the phcea wbera t he nrmy could cross, iu case of
neeessity~ and then return to headqnarrera and report. He left Savage's Station tbat night, and
reached tbs James l{lvcr the next afternoon. By
tbe t.ime be had completed his examination the army
bad reached tile J a mes :River at Malvern,
M'CLELLAN PROPOSES T O DEST ROY HIS BAGGAGE.

While at headqnnrtera, receiving his instrnct!one,
he was shown, as he t estifies, a printed order uot
tben i8suet directing t he destrnction of the bagg11ge of omcers aDd meo, and tho tents, cawpe,
eqmpage, and.things of t hat kind; appealinll: to t be
army to submi t to tbis privation, as it would be onl vtemporru:y-•' only for a fow daya." Ilo remonstrated with Gen. :UcC!ellan agaillst issuing such
an order; t liat it w ould have a bad effect, would de•
Jlloralize tbe army, as i t would be telling them more
plainly t han tlley could be told in any other way
tha t they were defc1tcd nud rUDning for t beir lives.
'l'bo ord.er \VOS not issned, and Gen. lllcClellan testifies that he bas no 1ccollcc,io:1 of any such order.
TUE r..ETREA'r T O JAJ\I.ES mVER.

'Ihe ret reat to the J ames Iliver having been decided up~n, t he mmy took up lts march, llein.., nt•
tacked by the enemy i n tllo day limo, Md lioll:ever
sni:ce!!8fnl in repelliD::t tbOllO nttacka, evacuating
their poeitiOJlB during the night. Tile Mlions Of

Savage s.Slalion, Glendale and Malvern were fought
dnring t be movement of t be BTmy to tha J amea, ihe
enemy beiag ropuh;ed in ~ach day's .fighticg, uncJ
our army falling back, under ordon, daring the
. •ht.
~ t would appear, from all tbe infor mation your
Committee cau obtain, tkat the battles werejought
tlte t r~ops T,andled, ,;e,o di.vositions muds a11ct olJ
ones chan!(ed, entirely b;y the corp, co,11.mattders
wit/wut dircctio11s J,-on, the Comma,zding General'.
He would place the troops,,. themor1tin,r,the11 l ta'Oe
~J,,e f,eld a,al ~eek the positio" fo r tlte ne.zt day, gi'O~IL!( 110 d,reelt0111 m,t,l t!te close of tlte day'• fight•
i11c,_f•ken the troops would be ordered to foU back
during th.e mgl,t to tlie 1u10 po1itio11 selected by
llim. In that manner the army 1-eached thu Jwne1
River.
BATT LE OF MALVERN illLL.

The battle of Malvern Hill, of t ho l at of July,
w as the most fiercely contested of any upon t he
peninsula. 'l'be troops were placed m the morning,
under direction of Qeu, McClellan, who tl.e,, left t he
ji,eld, returuin,r to it ogain i1t the afternoon. The
~•t action of the day commenced a bout 10 o'clock
m _th~ foreno_oo, b ut did not continue long. The
pnnc'lpal acbou, w beu the enemy attacked most
VJgoroUJ!ly and persietenUv, commenced late in the
a.f~ernooo, nn,t continued till after dark, t he enemy
be1oi:t repulrod aod beaten at every poir.t. Many or
th~ officers examined by your Commi ttee are of t he
op1mon tbnt t be enemy were so severely puni.ehed
O[! t ba~day t hat they could have been f ~llowed.into
Richmond bad our army followed t hem up vigor<iWlly.
I \ is trno that our army had been severely t ried
during the preceding ,veek, fighting, as they did,
nearly every day, and retreating every oigbt. The
corps commanders and the tro ,ps under t hem fougbt
most bravely-no troops better. H oweyerdisheartened they may"l.io.ve b ecome by what nil mnst have
regarded as a precipitate 1·etreat during t he night,
they still fough& with t he moat obstinate bravery
when attacked i.n the day time by o.n exultant &nd
succell8ful enemy,
M'CLELLAN STILL R ETREATS.

The comlll8odiug general, however, determined to
fall back from Malvern t o Barri.son's Bar, n otwit hstanding the victory won there by our nrmy. fie
seemd to have re;rarded his army us entirely unfitted
to meet the enemy, tot on t he day of the batlle a t
Malvern, evideD,ly before that battle took place, he
writes to t be Adjutant-General of the army from
Hu.nil's plantation.
AND STILL WANTS TROOPS,

11
My men are completely cxha.u,ted~ and I dread the result
tfw e u e au.ac-.od t o-du.y b y fresh troops. It pouible 1 I ahall
ret ire, to-night to Hanhon'1 B ar, where the guoboata can -ren•
dc r woro atd in covetillg otir pogi Uou. P e rmi~ m& to UT(&
u1e freeh troopa.

t ~~:!:b!~u!:eh~~~:.!!J!l?i aeudio~

On the 2d of J uly t he President telegraph.e to Gen,
JdcCiello.n:

''YouT dispatch or yesterday moroiog inclucea m e to hope:
y our nrmy is having aomo rc~r.. In tbi11 bopo aUow me to
reason with y ou. for o UliOment. W ben you e:st.. for 60,000 m&D.
to be proa:1pUy leo~ you0'CU w u,c. aureJy lab.or unde.r so m&
groaa mlstrik.o c f ft1.cc.. u eceDtly ) OU • ~t pupera ~bowtn,
your dlapoul offo1ccs mada l as, Spriog for til.o defeoSG of
,vashiu~ton, o.od advJrtng n. return to thet phm. I flo_d included in a 1\d e..bont \ Vc.sbiilztou 75,0CO meti. Now please b&
aHmed that I have not in~n (Ulougll. to illl tb111t vury plan by
15,000. .Alt of C::ca. Premont', iA the t."al!ern a!l of Gm..
Bankt'•; all of Gen. McDr;wcll'1 not u,ith t(uu; am:l all in

!:u'iiWJ~~'°iv~~JJrt::.~1:
:i°~T~~· K!!:v,~~:1t
·:cl.000i
have ,i:.i, ouuidecf
armu
Me-mountain,..
1

uattl"

7J10UO men. ecuuf

Tnuat.hoide&eifi;ondlo;Jou G0,O00 men, ot illll' other c ou~
1idere.bleforco, rr.Jwp.Jy, 11 ,t1:1plu cb.urd. lf, in ,.our fre-

ft~i:;:~!0f~r0!!:fot!:~~~;~•lt::;:: ~~~.u;r:;:~iobnat~~

11cvt.d Clf ,t1ch i mpre,~lon. I oaly beg tb.J.t in 1.Cte m&Dller
, on ,vi.ll not [lt-k twpo,Hlibllili'!t orme.
•• lr s ou tl:.i:...k ) 'Oa am lle,,t .stTOL8, enoagb to t,ke l llehmoad
j ustnow,ldll110,a~k yoatotry ju,t uow. Savutlu,n:uwy,
.tn•teifal end personnel. nnd I w.&11 atrcugtll..otl i, for tUu cffCD.•
1:vo agrln fJ.$.t. l c:ui."

On the 3d of J uly, after the arwy had reaol'ed

13
Hnnjson's Bar, Gan, McClellan mites to lho Seoretary of'"Var:
11

I am tu llope1 that the e1:1em1 is us completely worn out
he wu cenal.uly very severely pllll.Lihed 1D. tbe

a, wo are;

Iutbatt.te.
.,.
•
*
*
..
*
•
Itiw, oreooue, fmpouible to ettimate as yet oorlo.uea., bot I

t::i~~~~!:!ber there ue to-day moro than W,000 men with
"To accompl!sb tho groat ta.It of capturing Rlobmoud, llld
pntti.ngou end to tbi1 rebeliion, Te-t=nforee m~t.t should be
eut llle ratbM mocb over th11n lcu&:D6n 100.ooome11.."

TlIE ARMY llELPU:SS.

The retreat oi- the arm;r fr.im J\falvern to Harril!On'e Dar was very precipitate. The troops, u pon
their arrival there, were huddled toaether in great
confnsioo, tbe entire army being collected within a
spaoo of nbont three miles along the river. No orders were ,riven the tir,t day for occupyintr t M
l1tght• which, commanded the position, 1tor were tke
troops 8~ placed as to be able to resist an attack
in _force by t he enemy, and 11othinf? but a heaoy
rain, thereby preveutinfr the enemy from bringing
up their artillery, sa.,ed the army t/1ere froll• destructio11. '.['he enemy did succeed iu bnnging up
some of their arttllel'y, and t br ew some shells int-o
tile camp, before any preparations for defense. bad
been made. On the 3d of July the bights were taken
poeseaoion of by our troops and works of defense
commenced, and t ben, and not until t hen, was our
army 2ecnre in that pesition.
NmffiElt OF TROOPS.
By reference to t he teetimonr, of .Mr. Tucker, Ae-

siatant.-Seoretary of War, 1t will be seen that prior
to tbe 5th of April, 1862, 121,500 men had been
landed on the peninsula. Shortly afterward Gen.
Franklin's diV1Sion of Gen. McDowell's corpei numbering about 12,000 men, waa sent down. n the
early part of June Gen- McCall's division, of the
881ll8 corpe, of about 10,000 men, was 1ent down,
together with abont 11,000 men, from Baltimore
and Fortress Monroe, and about the laat of June,
BOmo 5,000 men of Gen. Shields's division were abo
eent down. Total 159,500 men,
On the 20th of July 1862, according to the ret111'DJ
aent to the .Adjutant-General's office by Gen, l\IcClellan, the .A:rmy of the Potomac, under hie command, was as follows: Present for dnty, 101,691;
apecu,.I duty, sick, and in arrest 17,828; absent, 38,795; total, 158,314. TbiB incln~ed the corps of Gen.
Dix, amounting to 9,m, present for duty, or in nil,
11,778men.
lll'CLELLAN IDLE.

The army remamed at Harr!.on's Bar during the
month of July aud a part of August. I& engaged
in no active operations whatever, nod was almost
entirely unmolested by the enemy. The subject of
the future operations of the army was a matter of
nm.ch deliberation on the -part of the Government,
Gen, McClellan claimed that tho Jamee River was
the true line of approach to Richmond, and that he
shoold be re-enforced in order to renew the campaign agaillSt that place. The Presiuent vimted
the arm:! nbont tllo 8th of July, but nothing woa
then decided upon.

ms AR)lY ENERVATED.

On the 25th ofJuly Gen. Halleck visited the army
at llurrJ.Son'8 B ar, accompllllied by Gen. Burnside,
who had come from Nortli Carolina, witll the greater
portion of his force, to Fol'tresa Monroe. T lio general officera were called together, nod the question
of withdrawh,.g tho army was enbmitte<l to them.
Tho council was or rather an informal character.
The majority of the offioera expTessed tilemacl v~s in
favor or o witt11lrawal o! the army. Gen. Bnrnsido
te&tilies t liat, as ht1 understootl fro:n the officers there,
the army was not in a goo.I condition, sickness was
in01'00sin11\ man;r of tfie regiments were without
shelter auu cooking utensils, and many of the men
were without arms. Tho general opiruon expressed
by the leading officers W::lll that the men md become
veg mnch euervuted. O,ie of the leading ojficera
1aiil that his c<>mmand could 1wt, ·fa hi, opinion,
'fMlrch three miles arulfiglit a l,attlc. Thlll eondit.ioa-

of tbe troops was one of the rouone asaignod for tho
final ,vithdrawal of the army from tbo pelUll~ula.

lll'CLELLAN'S DElllA1'"D FOR RE- ENFORCEMENTS.

Geu. McClellan applied for 50,000 J'e-anforcemeo.ta
to conblo him to resume uot.iveope1'11tione, Gen.
Halleck, when he visited the nrmy, infori~ed Gen.
McClelJ!l1l tbJt tho Governmeut cou!J faro.ab him
only 20,000 a dclilional troops. Gen, l\IcClollan consented to renew operations with that nnw.ber of reenforcements and Gen. llalleck l eft with that un.
dcrstanding,
the daythnt bo l eft Gen. McClellan
wrote•lo !rim, a,kiug for 15,000 or 2:1,00& troops from
t~e Wca~ro. army, m nddit10n to tho. e promised torbim, urgrng very strongly !,but they should ba
brongbt here tempor11r,ly, to be 1·et11rneo.1 to tho Wes,
after Rlchmond slloaltl have been takoo. Aa tlm 1
could not bo do~e, the oroer wns given for the with•
drawaloftho army na rar idly as J)OStibfo, in order to~·
co-operate wit!\ tb'3 forces under Geo. Pope, then in
the preaeoce of a snocrior force of tbe enem,y. .

Bot

lll'CLELLA::S'S TESTLAIONY,

In regard to the re-enforcement of t he army while \
nt Rarri6on'a Luncho.g, the testimony of Geo. McClellan i s as follows :

r:~h::in·t;.,~~~i3~~
~:ru:d~~:o i:::a::t.:C:1s~J;
Rlohznoud?
0

Qoeatton. How· many availoblo me:i did you eatimato that

npon

"An-1u•er. lthink.Ih:1dabout85.000or90,0l0 men at Har•
rlaon1e Bu, a.ud w·oa.Jd h'lvo uudertakcu ano&.ber movernont tu
ad"ance with abou; 2ll.0A m ore rt-erUorcementa. My -oiow
,,01 t bat preU.-y moch oven-thillg th1t tbo Oon,.rument coalcl
have controlled ought to b a.\"'e been ntiused ou the Juen,
River. l dld not belloYe t.ho enemy ,vou1d troub!e \VashiDg..
ton ao lontt a, we bad o powerful army in tho viel.nity ofRieb•

mood. a.nd did ud •hare t he apprebeo5-ion.s for tho aatety of

Wuhiogt.cn that were enter-ta.bled by agre3t mat1y..
•• I aaked for 50.000men at firat., ou tbegroaud tbat I thought
the army.i.hould be mado as 1troog a11 pcuible, and a, little u

r;:~:D,~ei
:~ ~~::ol)!t~~: ge~tt:t•~:o:~~gjo2onot,;
men, or aometbiug ubout. that nnmber, was all that could bu
had, and I said t hat I would t,y Ii •~aln wit b ,hat numbe,

f!'::r:~~~!;~~~~!i!120:a
amo-vement.

"Queation. About how many men had beon
from th
251.h ot June unti.l y ou reached Hani.aon'1 Bar, iti killod,
wou.nded, and miHiDg 1
11 An.awer. I think tho Jou was abou~ U,000; bo.~ I colli~

no4~

a~e~ri~!vtQuj;~buo:i~l:~~;ba\~:a~e~~!!~c. for an
8

wonld have been greater, witb tho addition of 201000 men
tbenumberwhtchyou bad a~ Bar.rt.on'• Landiug,than;hey._
wer&in front of Rlchaiond, and befor& Jacluun had fonneil
junction with tbe reat of the enewy 11 force• 1

"Answer. I should bavo counted upon the effect ot th.

,v.

t::~~~1;yat~°:c\r:!~:/:h!:11oc;::::.t~£ tb1:l';~rtsr:..
b.11.ttles, which had

taken place, upon tho entmy.
0

~~,M~~~w,~ch dem.oralh:ed, 01pecially after,

0

GEN. BARNARD'S REPORT.

In cloriDg their repor~ upon the campaign of th ·
Peninsula, your Committee woold refer to tho repo
of Gen. Jolin G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers of th
.A:rp:iy of the Potomno dlU'ing that campaign, macl
to Gen. McClellan. The concluuou of hie ropOY~
which he terms "a retrosoect pointiog ont the miatakes that were made, ana th.us tracing the cause
of ita (the Peninsular cnmpaigu'~)fail.nre t-0 their true
sonrces," is ns follows:
CAUSES OF l\1'CLELLAN'S FAJLURE,

•.,

" Ono of the promioent among the canses of o.lti- '
mnto failure wna the inaction of oigbt months, fro
.August, 1861, to .April, 1862. More than aoy oth
wars, r ebellion demands rapid measures. ln N
vember, 1861, tile .Army of tlle Potomac, 1f ootfnll
~upplied with all tho •materiel,' Will! yet about
complete in numbers, discipline, aud organization_as
it ever hccmne. For four mon~hs, the great marmo
avenue to tbe caoital of tho nation woo blockaded,
and that capitol kept in a partial sui.te of eiege by a
greatly inferior enemy, in fa.cc of a movnble =Y
150 COO IDOIJ,
.I In tho Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk con.I
aud should have been tdlron. The N11vy d8Jllande
it, tbo conntry demanded it, and the means _,ve
IUDp_le. Bx i.ta capta.ro the career of th~ ~UU!I

twhich proved eo disastrous to our eublequent ope_ra-

88 it was, we ollly induced him to ovacuato or pru•
tion,1 would have been p1-eve11te<1.. The vreparatton
dential reasoIII!.
o!tlwl ve81!81 waa known, and tho Navy Department
"Yorktown baviog fallen, however, as U did, it
Wll8 not without forebodings of the mi11Chief it
was right to porsue tbe enemy wiLh our w!Jole force.
would do.
But the battle of Williameburg, fought, ns it WO!!,
•' Though delay might mature more compreheniuve
without reconnoitering the position, without concert
plan1, and _promise greater results, it is not the first
of acnon nmong tbe di0'uent corpe and division
a11111 in which it hrufboen shown tllat successful wnr
commandcra, and almoEt without orders, was a b!Ull·
10methiog more than abstrsct military prinder which ought not to ha\'e happened.
ciples. The true question waa to &etze the fi.ratprac"We knew of this position beforeband, and we
&icable moment to satisfy the, perhape, nnreaaooable
knew it was fort.i.fi.ed. -we might have been eure, if
1 but nataral longing of an ambitioWI nation for rethe enemy made a stand there, that it would be a
aulta to juaufy its la ,'18h confidence, and to take ad- strong one, for ho would be fighting for tlllle to get
TI1Utage of an nndh-ided command and untrammeled
hia trains out of our reach. We fought; we l oat
liberty of action while they were potsessed.
several thousand men, nod we gained nothing. If
"When the army did move, a plan waa adopted
we bad not fought, the next day a battle would in
petfeotly certain to im':ite, nay, compel, interference,
all probability bave boon non8C888Qry. Bo~ lf it bad
and when the army WWI to go by Annapolis to the
been neceesary, we should bave had tiwe to have
lower Chesapeake, I felt confiilent that one-half
brooght up our r esources, reconnoitered tbe~tion,
would ecarcely have been embarked before the other
and delivered our attack in such a way tbat 10me
haJ.f would have been ordered back to Waahillglon.
resnlt -wonld have flowed from it.
The enemy waa then at Manassas, and a feint, even
"We had Mery advantage. Fraoklin'a divi!ion
if not reality, of ao attack npon Washington was so
landed at West Point on the next day, aod Sedgobviott1, 10 certain to create a panic, winch no Exwick's division on the day followillg. Those two
ecutive could re&ist, that interlerence with tile redivisions, had the enemy waited another da,: at
Jlloval of the rest of the army wns certain.
Willinmsbw·g, could have cu~ bia commnnicaiion,
I "When the enemy fell back behind tho Rappaand in that cru,e we would have been superior 111 hiii
bllililock, and destroyed the :railroad bridges, tbe cirfront and have had two di\Tisl.ons in hie rear. Hi,J
cumatances were greatly changed, and there were
hast,: retreat nod perhaps bia capt1l1'8, must inevitmong arguments for the hoe adopted. Yet, reanlts
ably have followed, and the great object of keeping
have prQFed how many reasons there were to be conFranklin so loog embarked, and finally sendinglrlrn
aide:ed, beaide the purely military ones, which to We.,~ J"oint, wonld have been occomplisbed.
op~ed theml!lllves to the adoption of snch a line.
"On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed
I 'The facts connected ,vitb the witbholdin11, of Mcthe Cbickabominy, and connected with the na"?. in
Dowell's col"l)s ha\'8 been ao completely exhibited in
the J awes Biver. Wo should then have had a muted
the proceedings of tho McDow€11 Court of inquiry,
army, and the cooperation of the navy, and probathat eve,,y one who '!"isbes can form hie own judgbly wonld have been in Richmond in two weeks.
ment. Whether it waa wise or unwise, it WWI one
The fact that we did not know the cbuacter of the
of tb011e things reanlting trom the k1king of a line of
Chickahomillv as an obatacle (as it lay across our dioperations which did noL then cover ashington.
rect road to lticbmond), that our transport• were on
"At the time the Army of the Potomac lauded on
the York River, aod that the rnilroa,1 furnished 11
the Peninaula the Rebel army was a~ its lowee, ebb.
good means of supply to the army, th11t we wished
Ila armies were demoralized hy \lie defeats of Port
to connect with lkDowell coming from Frede1ioks:Royal, Mill Spring, Fort Henry, For& Donel~on,
burg, &c., determined our route. In takiug H we
' Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge ; aml reduced by
loot essen,islly all that was worth going so far to
aickneoe,
lo,s
in
battle,
expira1ions
cf
pcrioda
of
1
gain. viz: the Jamee River approach a11d tl1e coop,ervice, &c.; wb'le the Conscription law wae uoe
eration of tho m,vy.
I :,et even pa.aood, 1t seemed 88 1! it needed but one
"'.J.'be route chosen, two weeks sbonld not have
1vigorous gripe to end forever thia rebe!Lion, BO nearly
been spent in traversing the foriy: miles from Wilthrottled. How, then, happened it Umt the day of
liamsburg to Bottom's and New Brid1tes; and the
tho initiation of tho crunpuign of this magnificent
barrier of the Cbicbhominy being left unguarded at
Bottom's Bridge, no time ahould ha\'e been lost in
1Army of the Potomac Wll3 the dny of the resllf!Citlll tion oftbe Rebeleanse, wbicb seemed to grow pari
mak:iu!f use of tbe circumstance to turu and seize the
pa..u wilh the slow progress ofitsoperatlons 1
passage of New Bridge, which nugbt have been
J
"However I may be commitled ro any expression
done by the 28th of May, and even earlier, had
(If profeesionnl opiuion to the contl·ary (I certainly
measures been preu~d and prepared for it.
did 3uggest1t), my opinion now is tbnt the lines of
•• The repalae of the rebtil.i! at Fair Osks ebonld
Yorktown ehoultl have been a.s,:iulted. There is
bave beea taken advantage of. I t was one of those
reason to believe that tbey were not held in etrong
occBlliona which, if not seized, do no, repeat themforoe when our army appeared before tbem; and w~
selves. We now know the state of disorganization
know that they we,e far from complete. Tho presand dismay in which !he Rebel army retreated. We
tige of power, the morale. were on our eide. It
now know tllat it could have been followed into
was due to oursel\·es to confirm and EDSLain it, We
Ric~inond. lfad it been so, there wonl<l have been
libonld probably have sncceetlea. Bat if we bud
no resistance to overcome to bring o,•er our righ&
failed, i& mny well be donbteu whet.lier tho shock of
wiog. .Although wo dill not lhen know "!Ill that we
an unanccessilll oss'lnlt would be more demorahzing
now do, it was obvious BG tba, time that when the
I.ban tile labors of a sie;,e.
Rebels struck th~ blow_ at our left ,vin.'<, they did nol
I " Our troops t cifod n month in the trenches, or
leave aoy mea!l,I 1n tbeir baud.a noused t o oeenreanolay in the swamps or Warwick. Wo loet few men
ceas. H wo• obvious enough that tLoy struck with
by the siege, bot diSOlll!e to~k a f..arful hohl of the
their whole force, aud yet we repnl:,ed them in dis~Y, and toil lllld l!ard-!it.:>, unredeemed by the exorder viith three-fifths of 011re. \Vo shoultl have
citement of combat, 1rupeired their moral,?. ,ve ilid
followed them op at the same time tbnt we brought
not carrz with oa fro::1 Yorktown eo good on arwy
over the other two-fifths.
118 we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that munlll.
"After it was known that lfoDowdl was called
gained by t!Jo euemy we have ta.ted to our heart.a'
off to another quarter, there was no looger hope of
oon&cnt. T iley are not yet exhausted.
an increose of fon,o by the junction of his corp1.
" The siege baviog been determined upon, we
There wero no other re-enforcements to look for beabonld have opened onr batteries on the plooo aB fast
yond what we received by tbe ruiddle of the month
.. they were comp_le~. T be effect on the troops
of Jone. The Rebel force wns known or auppoaccl
would hnve been 1D8p,nng. It wonld ho.va lightto be constantly increui.ng l,y conscription, by tbe
ened the siege anu shorteLed our labors; and, bo- inJlu of troops from other pnrt!, and by the 1,reaking
aidee, we would have had tho credit of drivmg tbe
up of Beauregard'• army.
enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas,
'' At last the moment came flJM:11 action toal i •
1

,v

I

p,raiir:t, TM c11tmy a.,u~4 th~ initiatir:e. 1Ve
Ai:d, fl'arn,11g of .,.Jun. a11d tcMre lu tt>a1 to ,trike.
Hail Porur bee 1 withdrawn. the 11igkt of tke 2Gt4 of
· June, our army woultl h.ave been cor.cen.trat,d on
t/14 ngl1t bank of tlte Clii~kal1omi11:v River, wli.ile
two corp,, at lra,t, cf tke enemy' I for~ tcere on
tM l,jt ba11l:. lVkot.,r;cr courac tte tlu:n bok,
1r/r.ethtr to ,trzke at Jlic,hno11d and tlte po,-tion of
tM tncmy on tM right bank, er m011e crt one, for
tie Jame,, tee would l,ai·e had a concentrated.army
and a fair cfiance~J a brilliant ,,-e,u/t in the first;
and ill Ue second, if tee accompli1l1ta nothing,
tc01tl41,ar:e bttn ill t~ ,ame ca,e 011 tlui morning of
tAe f!lt4 <U tee u:ere on tkat of t4e 28th, minu, a lo,t
bcrttle and a ~mpul1or;v ,,-ctreat, Or kad the fortified lint,, throu,n up czvressly for that object, been
lu:ld by 20,000 mm, a, they could llave been, we
tcould /1a1:e fougl,t on tke other 1ide u,jl,h, 801 000
<Mn. in1lead of !?7,000. Or, final'!/, had. tM t,ne,
been aba1tdoned, t£,t4 our Jw(d. Oil tM right bank
of the Ohckahominy, tee migkt ha-ce fought and
cru1hed t!Le enemy 011 the left ba,,k, ,,-eope,ied our
communication, and the" retun1ed and take" .Rich-

'°"

.,,,,d.

"A, it tea,, tu enemy fought toith hi• to/tale
for«-t.:z«pt enouglt lift wjore our lmu to kup up
a" appearance-and tee· fought u,ith 27,000 "'1tn,
/01i11,r a battle a>1d 9,000 men. By thi, bfeat toe
,ceredrivcnfrom our 71011tion, our advancefor con.
quat turned inw a retreat for safety by a fora probably,,.~t greatly 1upcrior to our o,cn,
"Io Yi&\11" or the length of time which our operations before Richmo:id consumed, there b now no
doubt that the depot at the White llowe should
have been fortified, na well as one or two points on
the railroad thence to the Cbiokahomio1; tba; the
ttu-tu-pa"t B ottom's Bridge should have been
eomplei.ed, nnd likewiaa ltks•de-pont,or strong poeitions, 11rernred to cover the dtboucU, from our
bridges to the left bank of the Chickabominy,
Witll tbesa the army would bavo JJ08""•sed free•
dom of molion to conoentrate on ciLborside, and the
diaa8troua battle of the 27,h would scaroely ban
occurred.
"When the army reached the James River it
needed no prophet to predict t be clisastera which
bayo eiuce bel1tllen our country's cause. It the
army bad enatained itself nobly it cnnnot be denlcd
that so much frnitleu toil, nnd eo much diluter,
had depriYed it of tho I.fa.,. wh.!ch =ulte from 1nccesa alooe. I, waet moreover, na well tis our fol'OOI
elsewhere eadly ahniuil,hed in numbers. On tho
other hand, tho whole army, from lte first low elate,
had ri.en up nn orwy moat formidable in numbers,
excellent hi orgax,i.z.aLion, and ioepired by a gre$
1uccesa, llad it11 nuwber, indeed, npproacbed to
that attnbuted to it-200,000 meo-there Is little
donM that a mo.rcb upon WnBhlngton would have
speedily followed our wi1bdra.w1,1J to the J amoa.
" From encb conaiderations, ce well as thoao followiog from the resulta of the _paat operationa, I
conme1ed the immed.iAle withdrawal from tbe
J amea to reunite v;i\b our forcea coveiing Wuh•
ington."
Tho report of 01,o. BamAl'd Is the ooly report of
the ofilcera engaged in tbe campaign of the Ponlnsnla
wbicll your Committeo have obtained. Tue report
by tho commandiDg general baa not yet been made,
nnd tho reporta of Iii, 1111bordinlltea have not beoo
aent by lum to tho Department.

a,

CO-OPERATION ,vrrn GEN, POPE.

Oen. Do.rnaide, wilh hia comm<llld, wu tho fim

to le&Ye tbe peninsula. Ile Lmdcd at .Acquia nod
pi:oceeded to Ftedciir.kshurg, rolionng Geo. Kt.og,

who proccoded at onco to rejoin bis corpe (McDow•
cll'e) thon with Gen. Pope. Soon ofter, Gen. Dam.
aide wna ordered to Gl!lld nll possible IWl!istonce to
Gen. Pope, nnd at onco ordered two of bla th.!-ee
divilliona (Reno's ond Stovcns'e) np tho llippabnnnock. Sbortly_ alter lh&t lbfo odVllllce of the nnny of
tbe Potomac, Fitz J obn Porter's corJ)P, roached Acquia, and was sent forward by G,10. Dnrniido to
Gen. Pope. Tbo rest of the Army of toe Potomoc,

except Keyea'1 corps, left t,o garrhon Yorktown,
prooo:eded to Alexandria, and from th,re joined Oen.
Pope. Ge~. Samou l!Wpped st .Acqnia Bild debarked
a p,mion ofhia oorpa there; but herece1ve<l orders to
re-embark them llj!l\Ul and p1'0Ceed to Ale:un",.;A
which he did.
--,
Tbe troope eent to the aesiatance of Oen. Popo were
sent by orders of Geo. Halleck; for thoee oen, from
Acquia the ordera wera given tllroagb Oe11. Bnm.
side; for those ecnt out from Ale:uu.&ia, tho ol'llus
were given directly to tbe corps commanders, until
Gen. IccClellanarrived,outb•26thof AUillat; Biter
which the orders were given through him.
Tho circnm.st.ancel connected w,th the campiign
oftbo Army of Virgina have been 80 follf investi•
l'!llod by the military courts in tho ca.sea of Gen. McDowell and Oen. Fitz-John Porter, the proceeding.
of whiob were public, that your Committee have not
deemed H nece~rv to make 80 tboroagb on invest!•
gation of that C&Ulpaign 01 they wowd otberwi.M
have done. They refer, therefore, t-rincipally to the
orders and oorreepondenco, in relatiou to tho delays
in tbe forwarding of Gen, Snmnor'e ancl Gen, Fr&nlt•
lin'a corps from Alexandr.a to the aesiataoce of Gen.
Pope.
M ' c ~ • s DELAYS lN SC.WING ASSISTANCE..

At 10 a. m., Aug. 27, Oen. Halleck telegraplui
Gen. ?ifoClellan that

"Franklln'• coTps obould marehln that direetloo ( V - )
u 100n u poelibla.u

~=

At 10:40 a. m. Oen. McClellan replies: - - ~-

co~p~
~To~=~~a'1t:'r!;i:b!::1('fr?~~:)° :
form btm u to bl1 meao1 or tun1l)ortatioa. l':aroey wu
110

7e1~erda.1 ai R1pp1hauuoct: Porter a\ liultan, Kolly?-. BnrDDU.111 kc. Sumner wW co.mmeuoe tol4hia.a: F&lmoa.th todaJ.,,

At 12 m. on the eame day Oen. llalleclt teleppha
to Oen. MeClellan:

co;~;:;~r;r:.,[i:1t?1~
~1 ~~';:[1e':u?.~•- r!:~H:i'!."e':tJ•s1,~t
o.od llleketta. uea.r \Vure11tou; lteuo on hh r1/it.. Porter f.1
Cf!:f::n_W~~: :.:~e:1:r::u~~:tb:ttt :tit~~~
l'taa.tlw', co?p• ahoald mo.-e oat b,- Coreel mvchu, carniD&
0

three er !oar ihn'
bit, b:, nllroad.''

to be oopplied. u tar u

peal-I

J!'rom Oen. McClellan to Gen. Halleolr., 11&me day,
sent 12:5 p. m., received 1,40 p. m.:

"Mr aid ms j,o\ rotu:uod frc,i On. Fnnklla', camp.

\"t~°h\!::0?.8"uo~~~\!:•.f~~tf.du~rf.";.,:t,1Ja!:
the corp, ln readto,,u to anve at ouea.
11

From B11111e to anme, sent 1: 15 p. m., received
1:50 p. m.

·• Frankllu'a arWlery bu 110 b,r.e,, erc~pt tor f,)ur
wllbcu~~ l c,:lll piclt up no can!?:,. la Ylo,r cf
tboH f•ct,., will it uo\ be well t, po,b tia.am1f'1 cotpt; here
bywt.ttraarapldl.r "'J""'1blo, to mal<e l.:nmedl11.o unnp,,

0:J:l=ld:r!~~~u \ah~::io:r~~!1:J~:!!ta:,
cl:~i~~
enemY'• force be-tween l'op• anil
Can .i"ran.Wn,
:OU:~;1atlto:i"l1~:33~~~•
:!:t::f•
~~°; z:,ar:::a!:.
.Falmoa:b aud A<.qab, al tlie
Um, COTorin~ tbo Nh'eot
11.mo

or &Dyof i'ope'• l ruopo \VhO ma:, ,.u b,cl; la t:.al

dltMt!od
I do uot. ,ee thi.t we li&Te !OTce uoa~b on b&Dd to tonu • coo-

~j~bJ:E::u;::J::!rttbrv~~;n,,:ve do

llOL

bow.

At 1:50 'P• m. Oen. Halleck replies:
0

Ye,; IthislkSomner'•co;pasbou?d come to Alez,...d..d,a.

~~!,0:~l,i~f.r:-~~}~~.:.;.lh&c,_••m=~
to 1pll't' hlmT Tbe ea.emysae:n1to betr,t.o:;.to tara. Pope'•

rlabl. I, th•~ DO ....,.r COIXl<l!Uolcatln11wilh Wmt"
On (ho morning of the 28th of August, Gen.-Hilleck telegraphll t.o Gen. Franklin,
I

•• Oa putinc wllb Gen. MeClollm, o'>oat two o'oloclt ttri.
mon:lia1, it wlJI ondentood WI. you ,.,....,re to mo•• wtlla YO'fl'r
ocrps t<>-d•y toward Maaau.. JaacUoa, to flrlvo lb eae~
from tho nilroad. I b•vajost lo1n10J lb,t tbo Ooneral bu
not roLOJ'Ded to Aleundrla. If yea b••• not reoolvod hll or•
der, act OD thiL"

At 1 :05 D. m. of the same day, ihe 28lb,
Cl"Jtom te~raphJ to Gen, Halleck:
•

o.n. M<>-

.. Yoar d&EJ)stcb to Fn.o\lln rec,.l,-ed. I haft been do:{

~~~ktl!"~:nlb. ~::lel!r~!re~:o~br:1.t~oJf:r ::1Ue17t

1te1\.U~o, •
* •. • * • Ple:uo 1,e Car•
nard ..-1 bo 1nre the wo·t, to..-ard Cbala Brld;a ant perr..1,17 ..;,.,,.. l J,.,k upou th""6 wo,to, npecl&UJ Et.lwl .ill,n
aocUlarc;r, u or tl:o !Int Lnpori.noe."

A~ 3:30 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegrnphe to Gen.

:MoClella.n:

11 Not a moment mall be lost lo pa•hlnr u J&rce • r"rce u
-'ble Iowa.rd 1,la,o--. 10 u 10 eomanuw:ate mlb Pope
Wore the enem1 if r&-ea!"rccd.''

=dt~:::rf3c!t::~!dt::mn;,~~ no~~ ~r\~!~~l~td!!
~t't:11~Ult~: r.~=td!u;:e:t~~t:r~
A\ 4:45 p. m. Oen, McClellan replies:

11

YoaTdi•pa~h recti'fod. NeilbM
11

8

Sumner'•

c:i~~::~~~fi~~!!:11

wt1laceompU1"1 nolblnl{ bot the d 111•rruot.iou oCtba t.roore ~nt
oot. I r.p,,at tuat I wl!l loae ~o time In preparlDg tbe troopo
ao• b.,.. (or the 6 IJ. and t!l:.t •haw.., ordera ;rou 1Da7
aiH, .n.erheati»tz ,vbat 1 Lave lo 11.7, will bo c&nlcd ouL"

At. 8:40 p. m. Oen. Halleck telegraphs to Geo.

lllcCJellan:

" Thor& muat bo uo to:rthe.r dotay 1n moviag Fnnkllu'•
eo~ _t oward Manlllld; they mu1t ~o to--m.orrow morotni::.

=i\:r::l!~c!:.·u:1o~:
j6:it 1::P:~ ~e!{J.!'!7b~hd:or
witoou~

teated or T"ic~lll)UI
our aid~ If the.rohawa"lt
wqoD-', tbe weu mll•t. carry _rroTWona with them Ul1 tho
wa:;ou cu eomo lo their relle!."

At 10 p. m. Oen. McClellan tolcgraphs:

"Yout' dJ1paleh tf'ceh-cd. Franklln'• corps. bu bean ordered to mlt'ch ot. Go'clock to-morrow moraitJ~ Sumner hu
about U,1 000 W1,nlry, fflthont. cavalry or artillery here.''

At 10:30 a. m. of tho 2!ltb, Gen. McCJellAA tolegraphs t0 Gen. IIalfocli::

,. Frauk1io'1 corp, bin mot.ion; 1tartod nbont 6 D. m~ J can
alve hlm bot lwo ,qnAdron• ,,t ~volry. * * • • • Jf
Sumnor n,ov,. lu oupporl of Fra11",11t1, It loovo, 01 wllbou\
ao7tJ:uatwortby tr,opv ia aodnear \Va.~ntcnt on. Yet FrankUn lo loo mu~\> al ue. \VhAhh1II bo do,&1 Have butlbree
~udron, belon;.111,;1 to the Arm7 or tho ro~omac.. Ftt.0tl.ln
bu bat f,3rty rooad, of a.mmt..olUoo, and 1~0 wa;on• t , mo-:e
more. I do co, tntnt 1'.,ra:tsllo h la. c>:.di·icu to acc~mpli,h
much tf be meet. strong re,,;'.i:.ane,e,. I 1bonld not havo moved
him but f.)r yonr prouin; order, of Lut uight.11

At 12 m. Gen. McClellan telczrnphs:

" Do ~u ,vhh tbo 1aovemeut or Fnnl:Hn'• corp, to cou..
Unue 1 He 1... without reaeno ammunition and wlthoat

tzan~ortation.0

I n ono!her dispatch of 1!8lDO date be te]ezrapha:

u F'nnkUn. bu only be.t•ten 10,003 and 11,000 reacl.J for
cluty. How far do you wlab this force to ad'Vance f"

At 3 p. m. Gen. Halleck tclogrnphs to Gen. Mo•

Olella.n:

'' I want- FrankU0'1 eorpa to co far eno11gh to find cat
eomt:th!ng c.bou\ the enemy. Per.t1ap1 be ma,: got auch in1
o:'1o~•i~!x.hiJ~i1':.
thlot trom dl-llon or llaUU1111, either b:, tef:cram or
tbroojb Fr&DkJJn'• •couta. Ou.r people, mu,i move moro ee-,
tl•tl7, ~ud 6ud out whore tho c0em7 .la. l am tiled or
1ueue1."

"~oa will lcmcdlotel7114!nd eonmucUon t...in ond iruardt
to ••?alrnilr03d to N • - Let there be no doby ID tllto.

~e::Jl.'b~t~

'l:,i~

:~:i! M~::i~~Tt1aAb~

coatrary In my on!oro. 1.J,v«tfple and reporttbo fact ol 11,u
duobodfoaoe. That corp1 ,,.• ., 1>uw forwud. a, I dire<>tod,
to rro:Ccl tho raUrood and ope11 our oommWlicatlona willl
l\I1na.iaa.a.''

lll'CLU.LAY RESPO:S-SIBLE FOR IT.

To tbiJ Gen. McC!elhn rephC11, 11~ 8 p. m., recei vcd 8.50 p. m. :

" It wa• ll"t ufe for Fra-ntun to mO'\'ft be::,ond Ana.ndlle1
under the circumata.ace~ uut.ll w-o knew ,vhu wuat V:leooa.
01)n. J.-ro.ul.fln remataed l.Je.re untll about J p. tn., ende11.vot101
to armngo f.;r

tor hie command. l am re,pouaibleCor

t°,t;it!!li::c:U{o~~;c;~~~d di½::~ ~~':i,~~~;::

refe1e=ce to Fran~d1 lDO'ft'mtnts orto-morrow. * • • • 1A
.....-d to to-n>oc,o••• mo,emon11 ldeolndefiol\e llunc:tloo1,
u fl b not • ~ l e lo me to be eceuaed or clliobeyi,,g ordera,
wbed ba,e limpl:, e,;eroued the dilierelloa you eommitlAld to
me. 0

At 10 p. m. Gen. ru:cClollan telegrnpha:

Not hearing from yo:a. l have sent order• to Gen. Franklin
to pl.1eo Mmteif in ~mmw:ucaUon with Oen. Pope, b7 ad•
't'a1Jclo1 as 100n u ~Wblt, and at. the u.a:ie time coyer Ui•
tra!l&ll ur rope'uoopli.._"
0

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan fonvaroa to Ge:o.
Hnllcck n dispatch received from Gen. Franklin
11t .6.nandnle, dated 7:15 p .m., in which Gon. Franklin
¢ves rumors concerning the battle of that day, closmg tbna:
"rope!, uld \o bn TerJ tbortofprorulo01, ...d tbooollD!ly
will not. 1urport Lim!'
·

At 5 n. m. of the 30th of Angnat Gen. Popo eent a
divpn!ch to Gen. Halleck, received at 3.20 p, m.,
from bnttlo-fteld ncnr Groveton, Virginia, containing
an nccount of tho battle of the day botore, and cloaing
aa follows:

M1CLELL4N REFUSES SUPPLIES TO POPE,
" l lblnk }OD bad be•I oeod Franklin'•, Cox'•. and Stvrila'•
reglmtnta to Cf>nt.revlll._ u &110 f.>ra;e and 1ub.ll:tenoe. l
:recelveil a no!.e 1hit roc.ruLo1 from Oen. FraulUn, written b.1
1

~~~!d<:.c:.•J :1.::f:: 1.•:,,'!a~'ift~:1:'.. -:~:! :::.,,~:;u•:~
:u~~r::.f,!'°:i~1:":1:11~Ut ;fbt~~~h~';:;1!!~ 1:~n"g ti:
t11.emlf, ft(td• no~innd-. \Vill yon have these 1oppllM eeot.,
wilh.o ut tbe leaa~delay, t11 Centreville1'

.At 9.40 11. m. t.Anguet 30, Gen. Hallock telegraph.a
to (kn. McCleuan:

"I am h:, no mean, nlu6od wltb Oen. Fronklln'• march or
yesterday, conr1deriu& the ctrcnm1ta.ooe1 ottbo case. Be WH

~1:::;~11~'!';::::l';:,",} ~:~~::J:3~!~,t·::tu.:

Yertil wrocg 1tl at.oppWa •~ Aoandlle. Moroover, 1 learned tut

fl'~~

oiu.,. lb aninl at Alu1nc!ria. He knew lb~ l:11portan.,. of
openlng commuDicatlou with Oen. Pope'• army, o.nd ahoal4
have acltd moro prompUy."

At 2:40 p. m. the President 11sla! of Gen. McClellan:
''Wb,t DOWI (rom dinc:lioa or Mana... Jcu,clionf Wiat,

0
Ilavo ordered Sotoner to Jea..,e 0110 brla:ad& in the vtel.ulty
or Cb•ln llridJ•• aod to movo tho re.ii, ~ia Columbia Pike, on
Allaudalo aod FAldax Coort•lJoo,o, il 1h11 la Lbe roule7ou
w!ah them to ta!<&. Be and Franklin aro both wtrueted to
jolu Pope u prompll,- u potdble. Bball Couch mo,.. alto
when he &niveat"

:~:~f.: :! :-u~'!!l.•
pnerally?n

At 2:45 p. m., received 3:30 p.
Ian repliea:

m.,

Gen. McClcl•

r• Tb0 lut no111 l received from tho dirftctioti of ?ifan11111
WU from atre.a·?lora, to lhe elfect t~ the enemy ,vere 0\'8CU•
atln1 Ceuuevlllo and reEriD:i; towua fioroughfara Oap.

TAU ta by:i:o mtana rtlliblc. I am clear that one or two
eouran llhoa:d bo adopted: Finl, To CODC<!1ltrale all our
anll Lio force• to open comm'UJ1iut1on with POP"- Second,
'l"o U :iu Pop• to od o,d of 1.:• ccra,u, cmd: at. on.co 010 all

=~t~•o~
~f.lt!!f::t:0:o~JJ"~1,~~:l:dt1:,c::ri
wtll do all ia my powor to e.ccompUah U. I ,fflh to kD0\9'

\rbt.tJny Ndor• uuJ aut.hortt.y &rC', I G.\'k f<1r nothln,;, Uot wlll
oboywba!ev"r orC:eort }OD rl~e. I only a.,k a promp~ dnclaion,
tbat I ma.J 11t oace ci.-o tru> n~cchar1 ordcra. It wW not do
lo dolay longtr."

,~~t,~~~,

A.~ 4.10 r, m. tl·.o Preddent rcplfos:

r "Youn or l'>-~•1 Joal rflCelved.
1

l tblolt our 6.rahltorn~•

0
6110
~~!·!~~1!:~1~~
1~ tb:~11:~t!~!. J:1cr~v~~b':i~~
to eoott"ol. 'l'h" I now Jcavo to Gen• .llaUcck, o.tJcd by your

oowaeh."

FRUmLC\'1S DlSOIIBDIT...'-CI:.

At 7.5:l p. m. Gen. Halleck tclegropha to Gen.
11.cClcllm:

At 11 a. m. Gen. lllcCle.llan telegraphs:

A.t 12:20 p. m. Gen. llalleck telegrapM:

"I think Conch •bould land d Ala,ndrfa, and be im•
medl•lol7 puthed oul to rope. &n4 IJi, troop• toMrt tlt4
,Jlgl,ti110 l.1. Ld m& know when Couob atrlvea. u I may
have ot.hor fpformation by tbu time.. * '"' * Send tnmt-port1 to .Acqu,a to Lrln; up llnrn,tde'1 comm&ncl. l 11&,e
teJe;rap!::ed to Um, ud am await.Ulg hLi u,w-u."

At 2:151'· m. Gen. llalleck t.clegra;,b_:

1.,.

"Frankin'• &nd all of Soa,oor'1 oorp1 ,hoold be puahod forward ,nlb all pomble dl•l),ltcb. Tbey mo•I UIO lhoir
and
make roreod marcbeL 'J'ifJle ft.Oro i1 "cr~thinq.n

.At 5 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen.
llallcck:
•L~-llil\lor Ilammonlclll or m:, atllf
from two cillOI

..... •hie or Cctreril!e, at 1::.0 p. m., th.t I""'.!:lin'• OOlJ'O
wu \b,n adn11ct11;: npidly, S11J:mcr'1 corr,, morn;l i.t 1 :U
p.
1he orderly ,vLo LrocW t~o diJpetch r,om Ha.mmer1toln 1utc11h.t le 1 ·onicd fhattboj\glltwacowmoneodllv•
mile• bo:,ond Celltrcv!Uo, Dlld that our Jl"Oplo bad bean drlY• ,
!_'i,,,'.!(•111 oil d&y. .Hnmmontolu n;r1 oil ho learn, w.. faYor-

.At 10:10 p. m. Gen IfoUeck tokgmpba to Gon.
McClcllin:

"All orSa:m:cr'1 Corp, on tho.out?> cldo or tho ri<cr, ~o&
oetaall7 requirocl In tllo {or11, aboalll marcb to rope'• relliol

l'l
~Pl•ce tbom -.;Ith nO'II' rq:imonh. Fnnklin should also bo
/hurled on to re•cnfaroe rope."

On the enme doy-Aug. 30, honr uot given-~n.
McClellan eent the following to Gen. Kolle ck.

f

0
Ever aioce Oen. Franklin r ftCClved notfe& tbct he wu to
}march fcom Aieximlrin, ho ho! bean using ovcry eff'ort to got

(0.n. M oClellM'•l 1rtival al-A.leuodria be ,.... tola to tu.e
lmmedl:ito command of all the troops ID and about 'Wublnaton, ill odditlon to tboae w hiob properly belo"{!ed to the Axm1
of tbe Potomac. Some day, ofter be had heen verblllly dlrcct.cd to tako aucb command be a,ked for a formal order, wblcb
wu issued from the Adjutant•Oenernl'• office. The ordez
h•n~d from tho Adjat:wtrOeneml'a office
an-er Goo.

J:=r;(~jt~
\0{eblia~~::r~D~~r0a0ihaftb~~u~aa
?ir~-:r1c8r:u::i,,·~~di!1~~~~:::: ~::: ~P~:
ditpOG.bl~. ,u,d bis cowml.Dd mtu"Cbod withon: ,vo~one.. Af,c r
val In Aloxand:11>,

l

tho deparbro olhi1 corps. et 6 n. m . yesterday, he procured
20 wugllUs to o·n•ry a voruon of his ammunition, by u4loadin,
eome of Ge:n. B.tllla'a supply tro.i.n tor that purpo.-e.

''Gen.Sumner vrna one ontice d~y tu endeavoring, by np-\ Plication llpoa Qaartermasteu end others, to get B 1nfficlent

t:~~t!!c:e;~~:i~o,!:u:c:;~l~
=~r~~~:~it~foD, but1
1!::r:O:l!td!~n~~ ~!~(l~~i
f1
~'&cfi:\~
J~!it!!~\1d
' Franklin, but tb&y "ill nol co for toward ouppl~ln& tbo doll•

I

ct!~~gbty--flvo wog~Dl wero got to:olber by lbe Quarlermas•
tor lad nf~ht, looUcdwith 1ubsistenco1 a.t1d eent forward Wider
an escort n: 1 n. m., "V'ia .A.lox&adrb..
11
,
Every etri>rt h111 been mwlo to cal'l'Y oat. your imtrnetlon1
promptly. 'l'bo oifficolty sooma to cowrist in the foci that
Itbe ,:reot~t port of tho tranoportation on band d .Ale:undria
and \Vashiogton h8'J been needed for carrent auppllee of tbe
ganisona. At a.JI evenh, such ia the dato ot tbo case u tep•
rese!lted to me by t ho Q.1:1nrterma.ster, aod it n.ppeu, to bo
true. I bke it for ;ranted tbat this bu nol been properly explained to yon."

l

1 At 10:45 n. m. of the 31et of Augu.et, Gen. Poj!e

sends the followiogto Gen. Halleckfiom Centreville:

:=trpb~e~'ts::;,r!i!!ft~~l~nl~r;::r~r~a~~~~
" Our troops are all here, and In position. though mncb

four£:,.. n:o. Dut you may rely upon our civing tbcm (tho
enemy) cs dc~ente a fight os I cau force OW' men to ata.nd

~~wi1~~~1:.~f3t1rt~i::,b!~~I,r:fce1
,vort

0

1 :~'~ a:i ~
es long ns n man wUL ebnd up to the
You must ~adce,
Iwhat lo to bo douo, baviDg lo view the •afef;y cf tho c:apltliL
i'X-ho oucmy is nl!eady pushiD:t a cavalry reco1mob1ance in our
frool r.l Cob nan, whoUler in advll!lco or an atlJiclr. to•day I
don't yet know. I l<llld you thla that you may luio'l9' our
pod.tio.11 und my purpo1e!'

I

On tho 2d of September Gen. Pope wu ordered to
'tfaU back to the vicinitv of Wa.sbiogton where his
\army came under ~be comWllnd or Geo. McClellan.

)lll'CLllLLAN RESPON8IBLE FOR POPE'S DEFEAT.

The following :is from the testimeoy of Gen. Hal·
!leek:

j

Bad the Arm; of the Penioaula been brouiht
to co-operate w1tb Ibo Army of· Virgin!& with Ibo nlmoll
energy t bat clrcum.sta:11-ces wou.Jd have permitted. in -your
jadgllle'Dt, as am.Uitn>:: mt.n, would it not have re.ulted iii our
Yiotory instead or our defeat f
'' Anawer. I thought so at the'lim.e, and attn thiDk 10/'

l

In relation to the command of Gen. McClellan, lie
'liliruselfteatifies es follows:

:1J6J8: b!d t1e8::~d!i ~~y!:m~~!0t:'0
:f:d.:~i:=~~

I "Qaeatlon. What pol!Uon did you occupy o!!et your

Gen. Popet
•• Aua\ver. I wu for aome littlo time-one or two dap, two
or three d,iys, perhaps-without e.n,-~ositio:a.: merel.f at my
8
1

"Qnostlou, At what time did be arr!-.a in Alexandria t
"AD,wer. Be arrived at Alouodrla cn, tho 26th ofA11g11st.
The formal order wu h1u.ed that ho m.h:ht Oue no difficulty
with
Pope'• (orco, 1 thal they n,Jght not q110,ti0n h1a
authorit,s-.U

Oen,

THE CAMPAIGN IN' MARYLAND.

Very soon after Gen. Popo nnd bis army fell baok
on WIWliogton the Rebel nrmy entered Maryland.
Preparations were immediately mado by the authorities iJi W a.sbington to follow them.
In relation to the command of the army ill Mory•
l and yonr Comnuttee will qnote from the testimonr
of Gen. McClelhm and Gen. Halleck. Tho t•ati• I
roony of Gen. McClellan is as follows:

u Q.at!tlon. What position did you occupy after your arrival al Alexandria, nnd yoo bad forwarded tbo troop, wbleh
)~d
under your command to the ..111111>00 ol Oc. 1

!F

.PAnaw-er.

I was for tome lit.tie time-one or two days, I
two or lh,eo dny1, perhapa-witboat any position; merely~•
my enmp, wltbool aay command. On Monday, tho bl of
Septornber1 I recehed verbal in1t,1ucUOna from Gen. Hallock
to ta.ko command of the defonse, of
I wu,
however, expreasty ~robibited Crom, io any way, astuminl

:~!':i':l
~ra~r [h~fl1u~nfe;v<::nin!::C1:~toJ 1!::Jtb";
the Prendent and Oen. llalleck to so out oDd meet tho army

whioh wu comiDg in. and to auumo command of U wbe.n b
apptoached the posl\!on wblob I c<>oeldered It on;ht to OOOll• 1
PY for dc!CllBivo PIUPO•e,, and to poot It properly.

l\11CLELLA." FORGETS.

'' Q.ue1tto11# How loug did you remain in commana ot the
defenae• of Washin~n, aud what orden did. you nut
ceiTe, nod from whom 1

n-1

"Answer. I do not t.blnk that order, U$lf!liog the dofenu1
of
was el"er rescinded, or any other one lseue-d tu
1
th
f~~ro ½~~~
ueTor delinitcly decided, up to tho tlnie that I leR, •• to
whether I waa {o go or oot. I aake.d the question hro or three
tim.. of Oen. Halleck w hetber I wu to command Ult troope
in tho field. and ho said it !lad not been determined. And I ao
»ot thiok (bat it ever,.... l tMnk thatwa., OMOfthor, lhl•o•r
thcU grctDWo ahas,• iUt!J. Men- tM time came t 10cnt out:."

~;f~~ft'!t'!'~~~J;,..'" ~l1i1!~;

The following is the testimony of Gen. Halleck
u,pon that point:

0
Question. By
order. wu Oen. McClellan pl&cea 111
eomwaDd of the army that left Wubiugton to OP!lrate to.
Maryland, aod W'ere these ordon -.orbal or in writing 7

,,;~';:G~lrc~leTz!»tg: ri! ir:lle!i~::tr~!b~

I
I

0

lan'• hou.-e, about 9 o'd«:k in tM moming,prmoul io Gm. Mc- 1
Okllan l,aw,g ~\• city for Rockclll•,
"I will add thot Gen. McC!e!l&n, in virtae of ht• belllJ

R.~:.cto';':fJ~~m:-..:t~!':"~::.~J/i~~=a"!r
all the troop, bete at that time.. '.l'he q nNtion wu diseo.ued

hke
::l;~v~~~i!iv:lv~;b'!imt':!rn3i~o• }~::?''J~. itfl~et by tho President for two or three day• ao to who 1llould
take commaud 0£ the def••••• or ,vubit,gton. I wa1, how•
~!;:,!~/t~ him!~ :~:n~o~!~ t!bc1~11rcJ'~
lan m m11 pr<>enct. I did n ol know whAt the deoiiioll wu
:!:~~g~sl~el>{;'~;!te_!j~~mo!:_. P~e~ f •u~f:~Tf'1Ju
,mlll I beard it thu• auuow,cecL"
I
0

0

11

tbG next day Biter that I wu w,tructod -.orbally bv the
Prctldent ond Gen. llnlleck t,o go out and meet tho army
which was eom.iJJg in, and to llSSame command of it when st
approached tLe poa.Iuon that I cooridered it ou1hl to oeeapy
tordef&utivepurpotea, and to post it prope:.Jy.0

T he t~stimony of Gen. Halleck npon tho Baille

point is as follows:

"Que,t!on. Wh,t wu tho pol!Uon or O..n. McClellan ID
regard to lbo troop, of tho Army of tho Potomac u tlley
londed otAl:qn!4 Craek aud AlexClldri4 7 Were Ibey under
hla com41811d; &D.d if 50, llow Jong did they remain UJider ha
cowm.iodt
•·Amrw<r. Gen. MoClellim rotolllcd the command o!
tho Army of tho l'olomoc u, it J&nded at tbo,e
u·o p oint•, oxcept such
ot it cs were eeot
iato the held nndw- Oeu. l''ope. 'l'llQ•~ portiooe wero con.rid•

t!:~~ ~t\!~i.~~~~!~. :11r~terth:t."!fl
0

=

(rox:n him t.1> t I.a t roops 01 deta.ched, whUo unde.r Oen. l>OJJ0'1

immedta.te comm.and, mun be J.:,ot t ho:-ougb tho. beadqa&il:er1
at ,vaeb.io.;:ton. Ho rutaUJe!.l comm&nd of all tho
ot

hb a,rmx a11 (b~:r b!u.!od o.t. thoso 1J:i.ce3 antll ttDt into tho

":u~t:1:!~':.,':;3;!r.f;"t1~cxi~~o~0~}i"liliedd~':.~
(illn~oe~t:f1le::mJc~feb!~kco~r~tit1JhiJ

1
;::~•

lll'CLELLAN FORGETS AGAIN.

Io regard to the inetrnctione given to Gen. McClellan hia teatiroony is as follows:

Did yoo bnvo anyinterolow w-itb the President
ln relotlon lo taking command of tho troopo for tb.e llfarylantl
Crom him ou tbd

e.amp•fan, or reeetf'o uny

po.1f1!,wer. I do not think h• gatJ~ nu any Uutructi_,n, aftq
that ,n.oTnina. when I was told to ta.to command of the army

tn front of \Vesbington. I do not think

ho c-avo mo any ill•
otn,ctbn, aboat \bo Maryland ""mpojgu.
.. Arter yon commenced ti.to movement, did you recebo an1
itJ;tractton1from ony cne 1,, Au1«-er. l recel\"l:d some te?egtam,. that mi9f_it be l.o,ciktd
upon i:. t'i, t 1atur-a q/ indrucclcm,, tram Oen. Halleck •nd
from the rresicJU't. 'l'ho- s;enerel tenor of H:illcol-'• du-patcbes n·as t hat I _i::cu C.Jmm1dtir.Q an error(a g ,fng 13 far
atDQ1J f'TDm n (1,U!u,JJlt:Jn; that l «a.a Qf)fll!I --rat/tu roo /ad.

~De&~R;~U:/3:~tj0 ~1~!:::~~:ni0tit~tr:~;

t~
smnll fi::.cd tn fronc cf mo to draw mo on, nod then they
wonld eomeinto \Va»bio.geou in r(!ar. Aa fato iu the 13th ol
Sopt•·mber, l reeoUoct.o. t-0le;ram of Gen. Halleck ill which
ho pros,ed tbal somo idea, anti told me tbal I wao wro11a ln
roillJ so far aw117."
J

8
Yom Collllllittee ha'l>i11g gone so !nlly into tho de,.
tail, of the rer.icsnla campaign, do not deem It
necessary to devote so mneh epace to the campaign
in Maryland. The e:ime mind tbo.t controlled the

movement& upon the PeninsoJa controlled those in

l)Jaryland, nnd the same general features charncter•
izo tbe one campaign that ~barncterfaed the other.
In each may bo Eeen t',e same nnreadioeu to move
promptly nod net vigorously; tbe £amo de-.ire for
more troop• before ailvaociug; nnd tho same referencee to the great •nperionty ot nomben on tlle
part of tile eno:nv. Your Committe", therefore, con•
tent tbemsolvca with referriog brie6y to tbe leading
of the campaign.
IU.RPCR'S FERRY.
In relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry,
your Committee ha,e not deemed h neceaaary to
tako much testimony npon that subject. The mill•
hr:, commtwon which was convened in this city l.n
Octol><lr laet foll:, illveatigated that eobject, and their
report bas boon (liven to the public. Attention if
called merely to two teifigrams of Sept. 11, whi~
pn.18<!d between Oen. McClellan and Gell. Balleclr,
anti which are ll8 follows:
"RocJtTIU•, Sept. 11-9:(5 a. m.

~;i;8,kllfr:;
·:i~~~·~:.~~t:.'!'"b!,:.D~~cl,j
be Of !!!,al IMTlco lf ord&r<'d toj,lo me. I n11out tb•t Ila be
ordored at once toJoto

~!'Jib~eu".'ii~ftr~~~~Dt.a.
11

Major--Oenenl Commu.&,.

•• 1tl~•r•Oon. H. ·w. Il.&J.Ll'!01<, o.»eral-lD.·Cblef."
,. WAR- D&P.lllt'JlZ:itT.

t

"W.unlYG'l"G", D. C,, Sept. ll.181lZ-Sont2:20p.m. !
"The-re fl no way for Cot. MUea to Jo:n you at p.rt.ent.
'l'h,- 0Dlycha11.ce ii to defend bi• worb tt.UUl you co.n optn •
tt'1Dmt11J:lcatlozi •lt• bim. Whtra J"Oa d-, ao,
wW "be aa.1>ject to your orden.
El. w. HALLECK.
"
Oen9"'1•iR•Oblet
11
.M1j01•0au. 3fCC.L:SI.L'-.,., RockriOt."
SOUTII l\lOUNTAIN.

On the Hth of September tbe battle· of Soatb
Mountain was fought-the troops at TDrDer'a Gap
beillg under command of ~n. Bnrnside, lllld
at Crampton'• Q11p being under the command of
Gen. Fra11\liu-:e.snluug in tbe enemy reUriog to
the vicillily of Shep~erdatowo.
AXTIETAM.

On the 17th of September the batlle of Antietam

wu fought. n was comrueoced by Gen. Hooker on

tbe right, ot d&wn, our UOQpB driving the e:aemy
before them, aod gai:liog an important po6itlon.
When Geo. Rooker was wounded nod taken from
the field, Oen. Samner took commatj_d of onr right.
Gen. Sumner had been ordered to hold hia corps ln
readiness to advance an boor before davligbl, but
did not receive the oriler to ndvanco nolll 7:20 hi
the morniug. Gen. .D.Ianefield, who had come np to
the aupport of Gell, IIooker, hnd been killed. Oar
troop,, eeeing their b1derll fall, and being very
heavily preil!Cd by the enemv, were forced back for
eome uiettlllce from tbe advanced position Gon.
Hooker bad r~ched; but finally, w :tb tbeusist1111co
<ii lho troopa brongbl op by Gen. Somncr, checll:ed
the enemy's pTOgreu Olld maintained their position.
On the left, Gijo, Bnrnaido, obout 10 o'clock, waa
ordered to alto.cit the enemy al the bridge IICJ'OSI the
Aotietam in bis front, and to dfecl a Cl'Ol!awg there.
Tbe advance of Oen. Bnrm.ide w11e met by a mos~
obstinate reristance on the part of tho enemy, and it
wae not until ll o'clock tlui1 tho bridge was carried.
By 3 o'clock Gell, Bnrneide'e whole command had
cNliied and taken poaition on eome cleva~d ground
jo,I above the bridge. lle was thon ordered to take
tbo bighta commo.oding the town of Shepherdstown,
which wu done llfter despernte fighting. B:, that
time the enemy on oar left hnd been re-eDCorced by
withdrawing somo of their troops from oppol!ite our
rigbt, where onr advance had been checked, and
Gen. Bnrnllide wna compelled to give up some of
tbe gronod be h~<l succeeded in occupying. Ile bad
seal to Gen. McClellan for re-enfercement1, bnt roeeived ill reply that there wo-re llon& to be hsd, bul
ho moat hold tho brldgo nt all bazarde.

The corps of Geo. Fitz John Porter, in the center,
waano\ bro11ghtinwactlonatall. Geo. Hookertestifiea that he had been given to aoderstaud that there
were to be attacks maile eimultsoeously on the right,
eenter and left of oor army. He attacked at dawn;
bot Geo, Bnrneide on the left WW! not ordered to at
~ack until 10 o'clock, and there WW! no attack made
m the center by Gen. Porter.
M'CLELLA.N ATTACKS DY DRIBLETS,

In regard to the manner o! condoctin£: the attack
at Antietam, Gen. Samner testifies:

u I bavo alway• believed that. in1tead qt 1eodlD~ lheH
troops into lha\ acti.oo i~ ariUe!1 at t.heiJ Wfft ttnl, 1f Gen.
McClellan bad ao.thorb.ed me to march these 40,00o men on
the ton f].au,k of the enemy, we could !>.ot have f•iled to tbrow
them right baok io froot ol the othe?' a1-v-isiou1 of 0111' army O!J,
oor le~Bornside's, FraUkl.io's. aDd Por!er'• corp1. A• d
10a1, 1,0e teent t 11, dt"t:itkm afttr d-i.uuion, uut1! even oue or my
own div1Alon1 waa (orce.d ont. The other two drove the
enemy and held their potitfon. My inteutfon at the Umo
wu to have pr~eeded entirely on by their le~ and movo
doWll, b~ug them r!ibt in front of Buna1dc, FrankJin and

p~~~Olt!on. And all oscapo for the enemy wonlil hove been
lmpoulble1
1
11
' .A.uiwer. I thillk ,0.

The battle closed at dark, onr army having gained
@ome little advautagee, at a tieavy loss, but not.bing
decisive. The attack was nol renewed the nexs
day, the two armies occupying tlte positinna held by
them at the close of the yesterday's battle.
WHY THE ATTACK WAS NOT Rfill'EWED.

In relation to the policy of renewmg the attack
on the day after the battle, Geo. McClellan testiJles:

:r~b: ci:~;~: \t~t Idid~ofci>~a'i:.-:r'Ft:,~

"Tho next morning (tl:• 18th) I fotllld tb,t our lou had
0

0

day t,vo

diei1ion,, a.mouotiug

t!~::;
mo.u.

1
0
::~~

tbe attaclt: that da]', espeeial y u I wu ~ure of the arrtval that
o(
fretb.
to aboo.t 15,000
Aa an in•t&uce of the eoudlUon of SO!llO of the troe:p, th&t
morning, I happened t11 tecollect tilo returua of tbe JtJr..t,
1
Cor1)11-U-cn. liootcr £-mad19 thu morntuJ ot tho 18tJJ, by
which tbe1 o were aboat 3,:..00 mer:. teJ.,ortt?a pre1ent for duty.
Foor day, an~r th.I.Lt the r etutUll ot the umo corp.11how+.\d
13,600
THE REBELS ELUDE M'CU::LLA.'1',
'' I b,d errau;cJ. boweTu. to coao,r tlle attack at d~ybreak
on the 19th, bur. l 1. arne.d s110Jo ti.mu Ja.rln~ lhe night or ent!y
iu the wornlu;, th~t. th& O:tiUU)y Ii.id 11.11:uu.loz:ed bis positiou.
ltalte:-w.uJ proved t hat htJ uio• ed wltb sre!l.t npidlty, a.D~,
uoL bein: ioctunb1 reJ b7- wat::oo~, wa1 c.m,Kbled to i;c.l. h11
troops ncro•11 t.be rivdr he,.are wo cot1ld Jo lna, cuy •erloos la•
jury. l thlDk Iha~, tddtigiato coa.tJcr...Lion wh~t t:ie trOO,PI
bad gOMt tbrougb, wo so~ 1u u:mch out ,r ~bem io. t.llis ADht,,•
tam camplUga. aa bUIDlll.ll eudar4.Uce would near.''

WIIAT BURNSIDE TTIOUGUT,

Tbe testimony of Geu. Bur~side, on tho snbjccL
Qf renewiug the atr;uc!t UIJOn 1he enemy the day
after the banle, ia wi followg:

'' Question. Did Toue.xpreSB any opiaioa to Oen. McOlel•
tan, or to any one Ir. beaa.qa1U1en. in i-elatioo. to renewio_g the

"An1wer. When Gen. llleOl•U•n 'llidted the mht ln tho
ar~ruoon, I showed h!tn a poo!tlon on tho rlaht or ih!, wood
I ha•e already montiouod, in which wa1 the Dunker Chan,b,

;::!~~
!~c~~lt:i:n~!e:ll~;,;c~:~&ttf!~!~t;oi:!~eY°
Loldln~ lbls point. l advised t ba~ we ,hould mako tho attao'

on that place the next morfJiog. from Ge u. Sawner'• position.
thoua:lit. the.re waa oo doubt about. our beinc a.bl• to taf17 1t..
We bad plenty of artillery boarll>g "fonlt. IYedrovo tho
enemy !rom there tbataflerooou, aud ~ad no doabt that -we
could take that place tbe uou morning, ud 1 thoucht that
wou1d aocoter the whole let, oftho etJewy.
"Qoe,tioc. lit.bat bad been made, and th.st point bad keu
carried, what. wouldhave been tb6 effect upon tl.ae enemy 1
"An1wer.
It would ba•e been v&ry- dt.aatrou, to thf.!to.
0
Que.ti.on. What r ea.aon• were rtven for uot muiuc tho
1
Jfdr:~~\eu the direct ro11,un or the General
Commanding, but I bavo und~ntood thl!l.t tJ,e JUSOll "'38, thd
he expected some fifteen tboaaand new tro0Jii-Jh~11 whitr,
tootdd make
thing a ct.rlaffl thi,rg-,a.od be prt!fcrrtid to
Wl!Lit to mdc.e t b.b attack 9n the ri1bt., until tbe.10 new troopi

r

ti,•

·~~e;1ou. .J.nd

CaUJe.

to

4.tla.u glliio tM ene-,n.v a~ opport1111,ity

'' Ao1Jwu. I rhmk i i di.4.0

On the night of the 18th of September tho enemy
abandoned their poeitioo and retired ncro8!! the PotoOur army
slowly follow eel, and took up a position along the
Potomac, on thll Ma.rylandaide, o.ieupying Maryland
Highta on the 20th, and Harper's Ferry on tbo 23d;

mac into Virginia, without molestation.

LOSSES ON BOTll SIDES,

Gen. MoCfo!Jan, on tb.e 291h of SeJJtember, re•
po1ta oar losses at South Mountain at 2,325; at An•
ti&ta.m, 12,469- total losees in b<>tli battles, 14,794..
1n relation to tho fos~es of tho enemy in bo~h tliose
bnttlM, in killed, wounded, prbionerd and stragglers,
Gen. .McClelluu eays:

u ft UJay be ttafely c.oacludM:, therefore, tb&t tbo Rebel
tu-my lo,c. 11:r. lea&t 30,000 or their belt tiroopa ill thelt brief cawpaign in .t.Iaryl!wd.u

lll'CLELLAN Wl...,'ffS MORE RE•ENl'OROE)IENTS.

Aft.er I.he battle of Anl.ietaw Gen, l'lloCM!an
oo!Jeti for re-euforcementa, and announced hi& determination to fortify Mary laud Right@, mukiu_g a reqaisil.ion on Gen. Wadsworth, then in W .ishm~on,
for 2,000 contraba.nds for tbat parpo!e. On the 27th
of September he writes to Gen. H.Jleok:
AND l'ROP OSES TO FOJlM A l'tULlTARY SCHOOL.
" ?tty preaent purpose ia to holJ the army about a.a il noW
b, riauJu,lui,: l:farpt:r'I Ferry aocore, 11t;d Wa.tohwa the river
lott:ndln;:; to attack tho enemy t!Jould he atl1;:;mpt to
CT<>H to thb •ide. Our possei)ion o( &rcer'• .Fe.ny gh:e-1 us

a:,"tt!~tt ::t~~:f:~:eJ lllli~:e~.c.:::,~t.:~

cmD.ot otbenl'iso supJlly & Jreah r no.mber o! troop, than wo
now ba,o on the Virginia b1do at that point. Wtie11 the rlter
rises 10 thnt tLe enemy c:inuot. cru&:11 ID force, I purpo,o con•
centn.fu>i t be uruy 1omewhere uear liarpe::'• Ferry, an.U then.
act1ug aceorditit to oircwn.'itli.Dce,, viz: MovlD4 ou Willcbe••
ter if, from tho 1101i.Uon and auitudo ot r.ba enemy, 'i"& e.ro

~!;;oC:al~!:1,~~{~t ti:a::~~i:t~~fJ.on~;~:li~~o~
-~1'
n~~:e~~itd1~te;x;;!~:: : 1fo\!!~~0G~~~ Y:cfeH:t~! I.ion
of thd new troopa prepara:ory to aa. 11.dva &:.Cd oo what•
the au.bject. After my comu1anf waa all in posi ·ioo-•ay 8½
o'eloek at n1gb~I weJJt over,.., G::iu. .li.foC!ell.m's hea.dqua,.
t ors, nt Cadyevilla, and u"r~11 ;ed the opin11JD lll' Gen. bluey,
hi• ehief of IUtT, th~~ U1e a.t.t.i.ck. ou,c:ll.t to be rouewt:d the nt,Xt
mo.rnina- e.t 5 o'clo~k. 1 ah,v expu:i.bed Lbl)
opinion to
ot.ber mew.hen of' Gen. UcCJttol.u:/a at.Jf. 01..•n, b!:ueytold
me that l ougbt to aeo Ue.n • .Mo~ le:la.::a and tell him w.L&at I
though); of tbe matter. 1 weut ii,to Oeu. AfcClellan'a tent.
and in the cow11.e at the con\lcf!::tlhn I e::r.preiied the aama
opinion to him, and toJd blw Ltt..., ii I ooulU have G,000 freah

::~!tir!:e~1t:ifh~11::t:~r~fu;.L°ifeb:a'rJil:g!ttg;~j

been tbit.ikitig t.be m.itkr over a cd wouhl ruokt• up h1s minJ
duric& the uight1 anl 1t l woaltl 11,:end a st.Jr ofiwer to WJj
beadque.rtett, to r~maiu tbore ever ni;ht, ha would aeod mo
ordeu early i!l the 111()1nb1t; cud if be conola.de;d to renew tbu
attack, ho would 161'.ld we tb'3 necc11ary meu. l did send the
,ta.ff officer over1 but Geu. McCtellau eonclude-d not to reoew·
tho attack ,he next dey.
•· Quc1tioo. \\'oulU ..ere bnva been any difD.colM:in fur•

~•~: 1~i~;.~~rj~~~:.oi~:~~~&J'~~ ~!:,d~~ haf~~

been oogngod 1
"An.awer. 'fhere would ho.Ttl been no difficulJ h1 Con,bb·

tI!i~/:i'l~\'.l~~:~~q:~.~•t,;.

, ;~:t.•:,n,,~
ba, uot with orders to tae to renew the att1ot~"
th

li':n.

0

FRANKLIN'S OPINION.

Gen. Franklin testifies:

"Question. Were yon

tho 111.&elr. tho next day 1

in relation to r.n.ewi.nc

01

eYer lioe llla:, be deti?rminod. In @Y ev-uat, I Teganl it u
absolutely Ut:CUl!W-V t.> &&nd uew reghneata at on-ce t.o the old
e-or~ fur »urpose$ Ot instcnction, ao.4 1,t111t the old cerlwont:1

be fil.leii at 011ce.

..

*

..

..

•

•

"My own rie• of the proper polic:, to be purt1-oed to re•
ta.in h1 \Vashlogton merely t he fnco neceuu:, to ganiao11 it,
auil to 5eud ev<rJ'lhiD;; cl ;e a.v,J hble to t~-1.1.u(orce t.lJLt umy.
1'0e n.Uro:d.i giVd tl'J tho Wt!:t1tus ot promJ.1,ly
"\Vn1bin3ton., should h bu neC~.!i.$U'.T. If I a:n
u I
ask, end nm allowed to hke 1uy owa course,1 will bold my•
,ell" re1_po~1lble for tho •al"e.:.y of \Vuhin,aton.''

Jl['OLELLAN KEEPS

ms MEN IN CAMP.

On tbe 7th or October Gen. Halleck replies. Af.
tcr referring to the draf, expected m sowe o! the
Northern States be says:

f ~~~~~::.la~j~i:~idr~ :!l,b:i~~:{,f;:ef!
th8
t~Et
c;~:rti::.0: ~fal.Jng
::i:it p~c~~:i~ u
lam a,thfied that the coem::,
baok toward Rich;::,~ is !'~~J~tJ:!!:~ }~!i- inaon:r :r~p~ ~~:;t~!!~':o
machiwmobil.iLy, und ,ve muat try to remedy t":::e defect. A
0 18
~
dr~J!~t
thoir crippled condltion. '£ he cou-vareroen~s, however, will

1
c}i~~!ivi~bfn

t~,~~~
•

1

0

(l.!'8

0

~:llm:rt~~~::~~e-~x:~~~~~c~~J::rru

0

marching; tbey lie 1tillin cam:p too long;.
"After a bud march one day ia time onoug:b t o reot; IJ1n1
beyuud that. time doc• no, res~ the rueu. lfwo comparu

the ....,r,go dul6n0C mazc~od per 111onth by oar troopo for
th• 1..1 yc~r w1tb that ot the Rebel1, or with European

armiM in the iie1d, we will 1ee why oar troop1 march no bet-

tor. They are oot 11tfllcloutly eurclaed to make them good

aud cfficieoL aola.1era."

On the let of October Gen. McC!ella11 asked for
authority to build a double track ftUSpeneion bridge
and a permanent wagon bridi;e acrosa the P 11tomao
at Ilarpor'B Ferry, which Gen. H,tlleck declined to
give. Abont that time the Preaident visited the
army. After his retnrn to Washington the following order was sent to Gen. McClellan by Gen. Hal·

leck:

llt1CLELLAN ORDERED TO MOVE.
•• WA.R D.BPART>lll:..~,

u W ASBL"{Gt'O~, D. C., Oct, 6. 186a

}

"I a.m t.osb't2oted to telt,graDh you na followe : The Prest•

dout dlrec\l that you eroas the l'otomoo and give batlle to the

enemy or drive him South. Yollr' army mnat move DOW'

whUe the roads are good.
"lfyou cross tbo rlvw be.tween the enemy and Wuhiug-,
ton, aod cover the laV..er by you.r line ot operation,, yoa e&n

~
; J:81t:.::t::t~bn!°~!°ti~ ½,~uo:°1~:&g~:!t~:'.{
to yon. The Pre,ident advitle., the intnior lUle betwoen

Wublngton and tho enemy, but- doe1 not order ft. Be
ve-ry desiroua that yoor army move as soon at pouiblo. Yoo
wi.U immediately report what time you adopt, and
yon
lnteud to cro11 the river: al1ot to w hat. potnt tho re•enforce•
menta are to be aent. It b neceuary that a pl.au I)( yonr
de\:~:Jr~!le!ore order, are ,;lnn

whore

f~b~dbJ bb!fd'~t!~~l~

•• I em :H;ecteJ;J to &d:f:b1t the Seo,ota-ry or Wu l!ld the
General-in-Chief fully concur with the l'reaideut iD tboae
lnatruelionL
" W. B. BALLECK, Oononl•ln•Chlel.
"MaJ,•Oen. McCu:LL.U1."

To this Gen. McClellan replies on the same day:

"lt 11 important, in making my decl,1011 regarding the
route to b e taken by the army, that I ahoold know. lint.,

:t!•:::::1f!!tnr:~l~;!:1
~:1::o:~b~~b~~r:::~~:~=
lho enemy and ,v..hlligtou1 wlietbor they are to be old or
n•w troops,or what proportion ofeach.

l [lrr•O.blo, I should
!~:~!~li:~im~rilion'8JU to me, it cau be got here
"Second. Will yoa Worm me wbat tbe present condition
oftbo Alexandria aud Lee, bur~ Railroad l, 1 al1 0 tho l\lanuaaa

!:?=-~J1U1fthhb!~~'::d't'::f~~e1£~!~i~e~;1!n12

WIDcbealer Railroad la nol materWly Injured."

=; ~~::.a;:::.~

To thia Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th:

"The Manuia.a Gap Road can be -repaired ~n a few da.p.

Tho Leeoburg llo1d b moob more ln.1ured. You can reaob

t.he former ID Jeu time lhau would be reqlllred to repair the
sent you will De partly new and
0

BIS l'LANS AND FEARS.

On the same day Qen. McClellan telegraph.a:

0

A.fteT a full consultation with the corp1 com.mandort ln my

fii!ee~~ben:~e~:;
the
V::~iv~°JJ!
~Vneo~~: i~~~o's'! tb~~v~~v:!1!!:a1:1:o~~f
of the Sbenandoatl, we ,vould leave i t ia. the power of the en·
Wi.Dchester.

On no other liDe north of \Va.biugfun can
11
7

emy to recron Into lila.r,rla.ud, aud thua check the movement.a.

!1 t~::::::gu~~~;;.:igfe~
;~i:l~l~~~~!:Jd
be reached by us in advance of him. 1 see uo objective poillt
0
1
~::~;.:

0

. of 1tra.tectcal valoe to be galned or 1oosb~ for by a movemen.t

between
~be Shonaudoab aod WaabioJtton.
11
I ~•h to atate dJ1:>Unctry tha\l d'o not rc-!;&l'd tho Une ot
the Sbon tndoab Valley aa lmportaoHor ulterior object,. le ii
1mporta.ut only 10 looa ae tho enemy reme.ina near \Vloohea•
ter. Alld we c3ooot follow that line far beyond
point,
aimply because the country U destitnto ot
and we
have not •ufficieot
of tranaportation ono.ble ut to ad•
T&DCfl more than 20 or 35 mUes beyond 11 l'lliL:oad
canaJ ter•
m!ntlL 11 the enemy abandon Wu,cheater aod fall baok upon

that

t:~

to or

:~t:,i:::i
\;~·!1u~:lhe~ 18o.r:!\~0eg;~:.!W~n~\!.~8!
upon water or railway commo.111catiou.
0

"The ouly l)"lts'ible object to be gah>ed by an advil.Dce from
thb vicinity h to fi;bt the enemy ueu \Vincbe•ter. U they
retreat, we havo uoihlD11 to glliu by panning them, o.nd, in
fact, cannot do 10 to any great dilurnce. T.be objects I pro--

~!:~:er!i~~,f.sti"n~
~~t.1oW:~~•t1fe:!!!~:~~nu::;
the
to iultre
f:~ft ~Ult:e:~1!!st~tr~i;::~~:.~(!;!'Ul';:t~i~t!h~ :a

Valley of

Sbcnandos.h, tbcre to n.d()p~ a ne,iv aud deoltive
JIDe ofopera\loua "blob oballatrilto ot Ibo bC8lt oftho Robclllon
11
I have taken all -po&iible meaaurei
the mo1t
.txt.b corp, ate iD rca.aineu to m o'°'e from their ptetent camps.
Tbey nee.d 11Joes and (l.fber iudi;pennble articlea of clothwc,

ro:r !t:i1 b~1::~ ::•~~i:o:\!ie::u~~ii:t~h:i~:t
0

9

an

"Please

BeDd the re-enforcement.a to Bupor'• Ferry. I
would. prefer tba.t the now redmente. be •ent II rf"gimeutri, not
brl$Rdei.i, unl•11 etreadi done ao wlth c;Jd troop,. I ,vou.ld

~~-H}lth!:~;:;1;iv! 6;bt°~~ tVi!:~:,t~~l:t;~rba:':
0

dewpeiate affair, requiring all our rel\Ouroet. t hope tbat no
tun~ ,.,,m be lost in •~odiog forward tho re•ouforcemen'-, th1t
may ret them iD band ns soon a, poa~ible. 't

r

S'l'UART'S CAVALRY R AID.

Ou the 10th of October tbe Rebel General, Stuart,
!lll1de bis rnid into PcnD11yh·anfa, retnroing iuto Virglnia, havlng made the entire circnit of onr army.
On the J3tb. Geu. McClellan reported to Gen. Hal•
leek the resnlt of the raid, and necribed i's sncceaa to
tbe deficiency of our cavalry, anduri;ed "the imperativ~ necessity of nt once supplying this army, inclndmg the command of Gen. B anks, with a snf6cient nnmber of borees to temonnt every dismounted
caviµry soldier within the ehorte,t posrible time. If
tbie ia not done we ebalt be consumtly ex:pGsed to
R ebel cavalry rnids."
TotbiaGen. Halleckrepliea: "Your t elegram of
7 p. m. yesterduy is jnst received. Aa I have already
informed ::1100, the Government bas been and ill making every possibl9 effort to increase tbe cavalry
force. .ReD)ounta are eent to yon ae rapidly as tbey
can be procured. The President ha, .-ead, your telegram, atul directs me to
est that if t he enemy
had more occupation south o the river, his caval.-y
woukl not be so l1kef11 tom e .-aids north. of i t."

•i:;g

THE !'RESIDENT TO M'CLELLAN.

On tbe 13th of October the Pre~ident wrote to
Gen. MoClell:m concerniui:;_ the operaUons of the
army. And on the 17th of uctober Gen . .McClellan
wrote in reply. The Jetter of the President and the
reply of Gen. McClellan are us follows;
,
. , Encuuvx 1\tcu10:i, WA&HfNGTON",

Oct. 13, 1862.

"MY DEAR Sm: You remember my speaking to
yon of what I called your OYercautiousness. Are
you not overcautious when you assume that you
cannot do wbat the enemy is constantly do~ t
Sbonld yon not claim to be at lee.et his eqnal 111
prowess and act npon the claim 1
"As I nnderetand, 7ou telegraphed Gen. Halleck
tbat you cannot snbSJst your army at ·winchester1
unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to wi
point be pnt i_u w:orking order.. But tbo enemy
does now eubS1st his army at Wmcbester at a dis·
tanoe nearly twice ns great from railroad transP.Ortatiou 118 you would have t-0 do withont tbe railroad
lllat named. He now wagons from Cnlpepper
Coartrllouse, which is just about twice 118 fnr as
you would have to do from Harper's Feny. He i•
certainly not more than half aa well provided with
wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased
for you to have the advantage of the railroad from
Harper's Ferry to Winchester l but it waetea all
the remainder of Antnmn to i:ive it to you aud iu
fact ignor~e the qnestlon of time, which cwot and
mos\ not be ignored.
"Again, one of the standard m!lltims of war, as
you know, is, 'to operate upon tho enemy's commu•
nications as mncb ae possible witbont exposmg your
own.' You seem to act as if this applies ao-ains~
yon, bnt cannot apply in yonr fa1Jor. Obangi positions with the enemy, and thirik you not be wonld
break yonr communication witb Richmond within
~he next twent:y•four houre 7 Yon dread bis !!'Oing
into Pennsyl varua. But if be does so iu full iorce,
he give11 DD his communications to you ab~lntely
and you have nothing to do but to follow nod r~
him; if be does so with less tnan full force, :thll upon
and beat what ill left behind all the easier.
" E:x:clusive of the w ater line, you are now nearer
Richmond than the enemy is by tbe route that yon
can and he must tnke. 'Why can you not reach
there before him, unless vou admit t hat he LS more
than your equal on a marc!J.1 llis ronte is t:io arc
of a circle, while yours ia tbe chord. The ro:ids are
as good on youra Be on his" Yon know I desired, bu~ did not order, yon to
croes tbo Potomac b3low inlltoud of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My Idea wae, that this

21
would at once menaca the enemy's communications,
whicb. I would seize if be ,vonld permit. If be
ebould move northward, I would follow birn closely,
lloldi.og bis communications. lf be should p~event
our seizing hie communications, and move toward
Richmond, I would press ulo~Jy to him, :figbt him if
a favorable opportunity should present, and at least
try to'beat hi rn to l{iclimond oo the inside track, I
say 'try;' if wo never try, we shall never succeed.
If be ml\ke a etand nt Winchester, moving neither
north nor sooth, I would fight him there, 011 the idea
that if we cannot beat him when be be:ira the wastage of cominsc to 11s, we n ever can when we bear the
wastage of going to him. This proposition isa Simple
trutb, ond is too important to be lost siqbt of for a
moment. In coming to us, be tendera us an advantage which we should noi waive. \Ve sboold not so
operate ns to merely drive him away. As we must
beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we Clln do it, if
at all, easier nelll' to ue than far away. If we cnn•
not beat the enemy where be now is1 we never can,
be again being within the intrencnment11 of Richmond.
" Recurring to the idea. of going to Richmond on
the inside track, tile facility of supplyiDg from the
side, away from the enemy, is remarkable, as it
were by the different spokes of u. wheel, extending
from tbe nub toward tho rim, and this, whether yon
move directly by tho chord or on tile inside arc,
bagging tho Blue Ride-e more closely. The chordline, as yon Eee, carues you by .Aldie, Haymarket
and Fredericksburg, and yon see how turnj>ikes,
railroads, and hnally tbe Potom«c., by Acqu!a Creek,
meet yon nt al4 points from Washington. The
same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press
closer to the Blue Ridge ' part of the way. l'be
gape through the Blne Ridge I understood to be
about the followin~ clistances from Harper's Ferry,
to wit: Vestal'e, live miles; Gregory's, thirteen;
Snicker 's, eighteen; Aahhy'sz twenty-eight; JIIan.
aJIISB, thirty-eight; Chester, rortv-five, and Thornton's, filty-tbzee. I should think it preferable to
take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to
make an imJ,>Ortant move without your knowledge,
and compelling him to ke!p llis forces together for
dread oxyou. The gape would enable you to attack
it you should w ish. ll'or a i.,reat part. of tho way
you would b6 practic&ly between the enemy and
both Washington and Uichmond, enabling us to
spare yon \he greatest number of troops from here.
When, at len~h, numiog for Richmond ahead of
him enables him to move this way; if he does so,
turn and attack hilll in the rear. Bat I think ho
should bo engaged long before snch point ie reacbeu.
n is all easy if onr troops march as well os the enemy, and U ill UllDIIUUY to say they caunot do it.
This letter is in no seuae an onler.
u

"Youn1,truly,

Mlj,-Gen. MCCLBLLil,"

"A. LINCOLN.

•• Hul)QUAB:TBRS AR1rT 07 TH'B POTOJU.0,
}
'' Cill-P IMFLBA~'l"VALLEY, Oct. 17, 1862..

" Sm; Your letter or tho 131n 1nat. reaohed mo ye,terday
morulog, by the hand• of Col• .l'erldu
"I had aent oa., strong ree:,u0OUiauce11 early in the mom•
lnr, in the d.ireclfou or Charleatown. Le.et.own. &c., and. u
1harpartilleryfui.n;wa1 heard, I feltit incumbent to go to
the front. 1 clid 11ot l~ve Cbs.rleatown uutil dark, Eo that I

have been uno.blo to ,:-ivo to your Excellency'• let tel' ihat mu
u.d re~pectful eonflderation which it merits at my bllDd&

11 I do uot- ,1;-bb to detaio. Col. Perki.us
tbh UJ..Orn•
ing'• In.in. Hberetore think U be•~ to send him back with
this almple act:nowledgment of tbs receipt of your E:i:cel•
leney'a letter. I am uCit wedded to any particular plan of
operaUona. I hope: to have, to•day, rcll&bl8 hlfoimatiou ae
1
0

MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS WANTED,

Geo. lfoClellau continued to ll8k for ro-enforments-for boraell-faying that the issu<> to his army
was only 150 per week; and for dotbing, stating
tha~ his army needed shoes nod olhe'r articles of
clothing, and ' 1 bad for some time p:1$i been suJreriug
for tbe want of it," and that ho was "constra'ned 10
believe tha; i~ was in a great de!:!1'00 owillg to tho
want of proper acliou on the part ,'f the Q onrtcrmuster'a Department." The anbject was reterred to ,be
Qnartermaster-Qeneral, and be wna ca.led upoo for
a etatement in regard to the matter. There waa
much correepoodeoce upon the subject between Gen.
Halleck Geo. McOleUan, and Gen. l\Ieige. The resoH of the o.xamirultion ia fully £tated in the followin!( communicntiou of tile Secretary of Wur, of the
27th of October, and the reply ul Geo. ll:u!eok, of
the 28th of October:
M'CLELLAN'S MISREPRESENTATIONS.
11

.. \VAU DRPAllTll.l;.,~,

I

l.

\V.unJNGTOY CITY, Ooh Z1, 1862. 5

W:~:B~~od!n!~ h~~etJ~b~~!t1!~~e:i~!;

dt~o~~!
fine weather of thl1 l'all. for want of ab0tt1 clotbiug, and otbet
supplle1. Yon will pleue report h thilo Department upon
th
~ ~~~}n/o1;~~ and in what manner, tbe requlsitlou11 f0%
rnpplle1 lo the arm:r undo, Oen. ilcCJollan ~•e been made
since you a'Sln.med com Oland at Ceneral-in-Chie(j and whether
&n)' reqoltltion for 1upplie1 of aJlY: kind bu 1iDce tba.t time
been mndo upon tbe Secretary of \Vu, or eommunicatiou had
with bun, except through you I

~;tb:e !~l~tlC: ~i'::!!!2;~~;~::;te t!~::

of a:boes, clothing, arm,, and other necetsarlea, and whether
th&tt hu been nny neglect or dela.y, by any Department. or
Bureau, tn filling: 1he requisitiona 101 eupplie•i and wha.c;

been, and t., the conditi~n of that army, u compared with
other arinlt).1, in reapect. to suppliea 'lo Third: A\ what date. after tbe battle ot Antietam, th&
orde111 to advance epioat the enemy were gt,;,en to Gen. :McClellan, and hoot otleo. have tbe:, been Tepeat.ed 1
•• FourlA: "\Vhetber, in your oplllioo, there bas been &117

-d

want in the anny under Gen. McClellan of ,hoe1. clothing.,.
arw•, or otbet eqntpmeot1 or 1uppliea, that our;bt to b.a'fe pte-vented itl adn.uee tLgainlr. the enemy when tho o,der waa

"F(//1,: Bow 10111 wu U alter \ho orders to advu,ce were 1
p-.en to Gen. llfcClellan b1foro he lo.foro,ed you (hot any
1hoe1 or clotbiDg were wanted in hit a.r1ny, and what are h19
meana of promp,ty eommoulcatina: the wants of the army to

you, or w lhe proper

~~'ll'Wr'Jt~

'iJr•JJ/JfJ{),"'•nt'
"Sec:ctuy ot War.
".Moj.-Gon. H.u.ucJ<, O.noral-lu-Chief."
''WABHINGTO!'f, Oct. 28, 186'Z.
11
Sm: In reply to tbe 1e:venl interrogatorle, COJl.tain.ed ill

I

your letter of ye1terda.y I h&ve to report~
'"J?ird: That requililions for tuppUe1 to the arm:,_nndn

Gen. McClellan oro made by hit ola!f-ollicero oo tbe eb!efs

ot

~t!efQ~!~telka"biW: ~:i~a~~~r:::::;o:e:«~; if:~~

bureao.1 bere; thd t.s. for Q.uartermutex•• auppliet by hi.I

•~~ue?J/, &c.

No aoch 1equiaitjon.a ba-ve beeu, to wy
tnowledge1 made upon the Sec:rol.uy of \Var, and uoue cpou

the Geoeral-ill•Chiof.
" S"""4: On aeveral occulon1 Gen. McClelltm hu tolographed to mo tho.t hi, army Wat de6cl~11t iB certain t,.uppliee.
All thcso telc~• weie immed.iat;e,ly referred to tbe h,o.da of
bareaua, wttli orden to report. It waa ascertnined thet ill
every iD1tance tho reqttf1d,ton1 bad been. immediately filled,

except one, where the Quarterma.ster•Geaeral h•d beeii
obliged to ,end from Plllladolphia cortaln ullelco of elolhl.ug,
tent• &.o., uol bavillg a loll supply h<re.
••1hero bu uot.been, aofarQ.,lCould ucertafn,8!L ne:.. 1

;eif!, ~dyr~ bfG~~~a~ci!rt:~, :~r~ut1:e 1~:E:~ or'YS;
0

;~ b~~J.·

~~~:;::~r~.:;1c~;;.dod~o~df~~\:a:ft::dt

0~

;i,otl or ori:i w ont of c.e.n; bat whc:nevcrnotifio<l ottbb, ogenta

have beeo sen, out t-0 remove the dilfien.lty. Undor tbe ex.cellent ,uperioteodci:ee cr O•n-.Ebapt l thtuk thendohlye

have beeu lca.t frequent elld of ahortcT aaration t!lan b usunl ,

1ritb freight trains. Any ermy of the ,;.ze CIC that of Ge-n.
ll!cCle:lnn will fnoqaenlly bo f,r oome ch;• withcut tho 9UJ/" I

ll~;!=:!~Jt
t!~:
t ;LJ:~rttrileb';~~ it;;;o~P:v;ot: 1::J8i r:01n~~f':n::o1~br::d°Ja;::~tr~~:!~=
tcb:em to tllo difteJ'Cn!. bri;ades GDd re;;UDerJt.L
will ~tve to your views the fulled and. most. u.npr(Uodloed
;;~~;

oontldenUou1 e.nd that it b tnyinteDtion to c.dvo.neo tho moment my mennte shod, and my ctivnlry are iiuillcteziUy reno-

e1>~~::-b1fch~U&c '::tyat ;:-;.re;o~;a!,~;:~wi::o~0R~~
vated lo be antl&blc.
0
~

9

!ally ~xph.tnit11 in:, rensonit, Wld givini;: you timo to inae
woh iulittucliou• u may uem beat to you.
•• I am, Sir, very re1peotfulll(1£().
"lhjor-Goncral Uoiled State• Arm:,.

o}~d~bt'rLllN',

" Hit EicellJlno, th<> l'8B15m!IN:r."

i·rom all tue i!lfa,mallo-n I et.n obhln, I o.m uf lhe oni.b.lcn
Ul:1t the reqrd11tlo111 fr-lm tbc~ army bavo be;cn tilled"' mc-ro
prompt y. a:id tb:it. t!lo men, o.9 a gcnar:il rule, l:evo \,ten,
better e.upplieJ. th.m oar armiea: opcr:i.Lfog in tbo \Vea~ 'l'he
lBttcr b~vo opera~cd o.t much g:-c3!.M dhtl':lcc, from tbe
t1ource1 oft;c~p1ll1, an~l h:ivo lud far leaa f':JcLlUu C.>r t:-.1JJsportation. ln fitlt'. 1 bcllevo t:...at no
in the tT"orld1 wllile /
in campaigo, }J:i.ve beB.ll 10oro promptly or l>c.ttur iupplled/
thaD onrs.
"Third: Soon aftertbo bottle ot .A.nUe!am Go!l.McClellm
wa, urged lo cl•• ruo information of hll IDlendau wovom~

I
(

I

\

t

ii, order lbat, I/ he mo,ed betweeh the enemy and Wuhin&•

tou. re---enforeemeuti; could bo
from t.hit place, Oo the
lit of October, fiuding tbat ho propo.ed to operate from
.B,uper'• B'euv, l urged him to cros, the river at unco and
g!Taoattlotoihe enewy,polutlng ouHo him the clliadv•n•
tac• of dolaJh,~ till tbe autufiltl ralt11 had owoUen tho Poto•
DJao and impaired the road,. Oo tbe: Gth or Oct •her ho Wl3
ptremptoriJy ordered • to croaR: the Potomao and rive battle to
the eDtibl)', or drive him aoutb. Yottr army mud move now
whiJe ~he rotWa are sood.' H will be observed that three
week, have elo,psed rince thi• crdel"' wu glve.n,
u F'otLTtli: Ju my opinion there baa bteD uo sueb want of
wi,pliet lo tbe army under G~11. McCleUau u to preven~ llb

tb;n·::~:ht:id~d:~b~ ·,~1::.t,b~1: ~~rd

th
w:J~::W~~hto

0

U\·e received hf.t 1oppilea ...t.most a.a rHdily u, by nmal.n.hJg
inactive.. on tbe north side.
"Fifth, Oo lbe71h or October, In • telegram ID rog1l'd to
hi, 'blt.ended movement,, Oell, AlcCJellata Gtated th&tf~ would
nqu!r• at leaal three days to supply the Firat, Fifth a:nd 81:rtll
Corp1; that they Deeded shoe• and ot.be.r indhpeueabJe
artlcleia of clot..blng, u wen ae •helter tent a. No eomvluiut
W'81 made that aoy reqoi.b-itio.11 had oo~ been filled; o.nd ft wai
Inferred from bia language that bo wsa only wl'Uting for tbe
dl<tributlon ofW. 1opull...
" On tlte lllh be tele;raplted that a portion of hi, 1uppll..,
uni by r&U, h•d been delai-ed. Ao alN,ody ,Lated,
wero iwciediately aent from ber6 totnveniga.te tbb compla!Dt;
and they r.?ported that everytbing bo.d gone forward. Un theam& date (the 11th~ be 1poke of man, of bJs bones hovlo;
broken down by f;1h1ue, Oa. tbo 12,b he coro-pldoa that th.et
rate or
w111 only 150 bones per week for tbe e.nUro

::r:i~t~Q~~c1:1m!~1::.o~ll~~ro:~t8l~:t1t~:lt::
~!::::iro~~d!: rb:::u:.:
1 t~:f:i:ra~::a:~~-~~:~:id~~":~

~r::i~!~;:jo~r:»:1x ~v~::,t~l b~~ t:;J;!r!':!tlD:;
11

8,7Mia alli ioaddi:.-!on, that a lart_;-,nnmbe.r ofmuli:1 bad been
1o-pplicdi and thit the nowber of aaimat,·,n,.h <.,en. .bloCJel•

;:•:h:•;;~•~th!1:o~S::

!!1'Jr~:[h~\~b!~~h:t:et;:~~'
he could procure.
h On the 18th Gen. McClellan ,tatelil, in regll'd to Gen..

~~i~~h1~~11,

tro,:.d::!;dlui~~ezt~~:~~::.i:~fJ~'1:

be forwarde~. bat they hav(t not re<>eboa. our depots; and an..
le11&_'eater eff.>rt to lo-rore pro1:E* tran•nrl•doo ii mado by

:-:v.w~::1~ biN1::;~~- ! l;htl:a'!:ht~.t~;"::t1l!
1

army

coiaa.emeJ,' I im.mefutelycalled Ueu. r.l~iga's atten•

"Your telegnm oi 12 m. bu be&n en'bmit!ed to tbe Pre.I·

t"~;do1;:ffn8:t~ht~!L aa/r~:! t:.:!,'.an~t°
wm

a~i!~!~!t

uuwt in ooodJUou to obf!y H, you
be o.bl8 to
110011
'lbe Preride"t do,, nol e:r:r,ct impo11lblll,
8
all W. 100 weotborahoald

w&ht of a'bll!ty.

~:~~";!~.,'j ;I t:~:;~.j,;~f•

011 ti.le 22d of Ootobtr Geo. ltoClellan

" Arter Ml couaultation, I have decided to move upon tha
line lndlc&ted hf the Prc11deut ln bl.w letter of mo l3lh lo1t.,

f~J.•1~:~0~:,1Pr'o~~11m:te&Y J:ie~7~: t~c:~Ta'!!e:~·
Leeoburg, Hilloborougb, Snlckernille, &o. I oball need all
the ce.valr,- eud otbe.r re-enforcement.a you c&11. asucl lDJ9 frum
W a.biugton."

On the 23d Geo. Halleck replies :

1
'
Should you tnove e, pnpoted iu yourttilegram ot yeai.ot,.
tl6y. J can aend abont 20,000 meo Crom \Vaahiugtou c.o t6411•
fi>rooyou."

ABOUT CAVALRY.

On the 25th of October Gen, McClellan transmit•
to Gen, Halleck a report of Col. Robert Williams,
commanding a demcbment of cavalry, in which it ill
stated that nearly half his horses are unsound, from
"sore tongue, groue, and cooeeqnont lamene88 and
oora back•," anct that •• the hor£es which. are still
eoand are absolutely broken down from fatiaue and
want of flesh."
'l'o this tb.e President replies to Gen. llfoCleUan
on tho same day:

"I hn·v . ju1t ttaJ yoar di,patcb about
tongue end t ....
\-\11H 3·ou J)a.rJon we frJr Wing what the
borl8J$ ot your army have done 1Wce the b.att.J~ or Antietam
that f&tlzno• auytLln&'I''
tigued llOTitea;,

Gen. McClellan replies on tbe erune day:

'' In reply to ,oul' telegram of thi1 date, I have the honor to

s.tate, ftow ,he ti.rue tl1.b o.rwy loJt \V°ll'-bh•tartu,:,, ou the 7th of
September, V'!y c-..Vlllry lJu htreneon11tt1Dlly euiployed 1n ms.k-

ing re0O1.uoi.1tat1ce,1 econt"n,& e.ud pick~th.11 lihice the ba ttle
of Antietam •b rt"",£_iment1 h11vnmade a tr,p of:100 wile,, mnch•
inq: !'JS ttulu in or:ie day, wLilo codeavorillJ to r&1ch Stuart's cavalry. Oen. Pl@U !WtU-O, in tri.s ofticiiJ T~port., state, that he,
wi~h tberama.lnder of our n~Wlbte c~,·alrv, whileou Stuan's.
track.m:rched '18 miles in!!-4: Loa~ B~~~de tb;,.._e two remarkable expt-ditfon~ onr cav,1ry 1Jas hbtn o.up£e.dio pickt:t...
bg tt.Dd acoutiu« J ;.,u mi.lea of river from 1fuce tbe battle of
A utiuta.m, and ha, ma -tu reri:a~ed recon oo1~
eiuee that

~:~et;o~~~:f~b~u;e~~i~}tt~ t~"~~fs~1~t~at~.t:iJ t;t!
b';~:t:;:ic:u,t~>ihC:t:rti:tL:'l!?o~~•
~~!~e1n~~t atJ::~:':a~ llr:~::e:~;kde !i ~~~e~~:ra::1
bea t.b1;1,t, you will aJig 0oosidt.1r that this aome C!n"11lry ,n.s
ontb0-2i.,i thatlO,OOOmnrewereon their way; aod u.~
0

ot boch aud 1boea had beeu ree-efved bp'; the qoa.r~r~aatcr of
8

more otde;ed. Cul. I 3:all!, o.ideade--eacop a11d chief quuler•
muter to Gen. 1'.teClellt:.n1 ~fo1;rapb"'d on tho :t5ili: i 'l'be1;af•
ferini for wut ofc1otb.iJ1i h ex .i.~erated l thhlk; and Cer•
tainly m:1ght have been avoided b,- t.i.mely rcqaftltioll..S of regl-

tao.obl and brt,;;ade qoartermaa:tere.1 On tbe 2ttb he teJe.
crapbed to tbe qoe.rtermaster·g,_)ut;.ral that; • the clo 1 hJns wu

llO~~i~:a~d ~1i~h;:i· fb:[ji1otbfu~•lr'J:! c:na~i1:·t~~:d~
f:t: more ia •tUl n6eded, I ha-ve ortlered more thllll would
•tom 11.ece~•ary Crom a.oy d , b fll:l'llhhed we and l beg to re·
i

uaind you that 7otJ ho.ve el"a)"I very prompUy mel all my
reqaialti.,ns ha far a11 l"lothlug 11 conce:rucd. Our department.

ro::~: ::~7ne !~!:V!!c:r::;:r
1

1

0

dl&~~ic:i!~

ovS:r
~ili"'no~
call1 for clothi.Dg and otbu artic.lu.'
• lo regard to Oen. McC,1.eUau'11 mean1 of promptly cum.mu•
nlcatUJ~tlle wanta of bia nrmy to tile, or to tbeJcrot:r bure,101

f!t~:::!·Jil~:r; ~~~!•i!~tii~~o~,Jt~ti~:

llli;wn by telegraph.
"lt 11 duo to Oen. Me!g, that I abQuld 1ul>mlt borew:l!h •
CO:PY of a tcle~Dl. reet,ived by Wm irc.-m Geu. McCle.11.uL.

ISe6 dQcumeu ,.. )
11

'' Very-roei,,ectfally, your obedient servnnt1
•• H. \v. lLU,LLCb:, O, noral•ln-Ch!ef.
Hon. E»Wl?'f M. STUTOY, ~cret:u-y of\Var.'1
M'CLELLA..."I' STILL OCLAYS,

On Oct, 21, Gen. ?!IcClellnn informs GJn. Halleck
that he bas neatly accompliahed supplying his nrmy
'Wim tbt1 clothing absoluwly necs58lll'y ior marching.
He complains, however, of hi.a -want of ca,·iury, nnd
conclude&:
.. Withou~ more cavalry horae1 our commanieatfon1, from

th& 10omeat we m'1rch, would be a; tUe mercy or tho luge

~~~::~~i!=icr::p:J1,
.:~;::~a:
!~'iii~
a way u
inn.re
My experience bu

cavalry foroa of the enemy, and it would oot be po11lUle for
00
::~

aaeb
to
•ucces,,
show o
1:he neceuity of a largo and efficf.eDt ca.val!, fotce. U-cder the
0
1
~

~fl~.fr~~:1t~~~b

!:'z/:v:;:~.;--::~~e:r'f: !::/t

tJie tec~on of l he oew bol'Sl!1, every pou ible 1top having
tieeo tu:en to i naare t heir prow-pt anivalst

To thii Gon, H Alleck roplies on the same llay, at

:30p.m. :

brou,bt from tbe V6oiun1 •, where it encnut.itel'ed tt1O1t la•
service. o.~.d was, 111.t tbe comme-nceme11t, oft Lis cam..
PtUJ!D. in low condi, ion. aDd from thd tirue to the prMent has
hailno 1ime lo recruit. If auy ini.tance c..1.n ho fouud w-bertJ
overworked ca:rr.lry hH performed more labor tba.u min&
aince tilo be.ttte or Aot~e:illn I om uot
ofit.''

'l'lle following is the reply of the President:

,, Yours, in reply ti> U'lin~ about- bor~eai reeeivad. Of
cou.r..ie, )OU koo\\-·Che,f.scte b"tter than I. Stilt, two ooo~idera
don, i-einain: Stuart's cavalry on~warcbed 01u1, b o.vi.oit cer•
ttLiltl:, done more m'l.tkt d 11ervice Ob the r,eninHla ill.d every..
wb~r& ii.Dee, Secondly. ,ntt 1,ot a moYerutoc.ot oor ann,be a relief to tho cavalry, compelling the euetny to cone.en•
trate i..Dlltea<i. of '(oroging' to.sqnt.lds overywhere1"
lllORE nlEN WAN'Mill,

On the 27th of October, Gen. McClellan tel&grapbed to the President:

·• Your excelle.ncy is aware of the 'l'ery great rednct1ot1. of
numbe~ tbat bas ta'..;.en 11laoo in 010&t of the olJ. reptwt:otl of
thb command. 0.D.d how neccus.ry 1' !a to fi.H up c.aese sk:eleton1 befoco taltlaa th•!m again. inlo act1 ,11, I b&\"8 tbe honor,
therefore, to-reqnen that tlio order to fill up tho old :rep.lllenta
with dnfted me.n may o.t once be Li5.aed."

To this the President replies as follows on the

same day:

"Your dhpa•ch of 3 p. m. of to-day. }11 Te;ard to filll01 up
old. regiment.• with Gl:r~ned meu1 is receivt!-d, and tile Teqaea,
thenin abaU llo complied with oe f,1,r aa practfc.able.
'' And 110,vlask t1d..i:!9tinet an.swu to tho question: I, it your

~~~~~tet;t~:i,~

~~~;~Td~=~:t~.\ng

'f!le followin_g is Gen.. M~Clo!lllil'~ reply:-nfter referrrng to previouo communlcat10ns 1n ro111c1on to fill.

ing up tlJe old regiments, be a:iys:
.
'' Tu the prea3 of b1muc1s, 1 then called an aide,
antl 10.ling Ww l had converocd with you upoo the
subject. I ilirected him to write for 1.ae :i. clispntcb,
aek.rni ·yow-excellency to hay., tbe necessary order
given. I regret to ssv that tbia officer, after wriLing
the dispatch, fiudin~ ine elill eogaged, eent it to tb.e
telegrsvh office wu::out first snlJm:itung U to me,
noder the impreeaion that he bod comma.nicatcd wy

23
vie~s. He, however, unfortnruiwily added, 1 before
taking them into aotion again.' Tbis ptirase WIii! not
antbomed or intended by me. H b1111 conveyed &J.
together an erroneooe impression 118 to my plans and
iDteotions. To yonr excelleooy's question I answer
distinctly tbal I ha.ve not bad any idea of poalpouing
1he advance until the old regiments are filled by
drafted men. I commenced croESiog the army into
Virgmill yest.et'dny, and shall push forward as rapidlr na poeeible to endeavor to meet the enemy."
Yonr Coaimi1tee would say tllat, in their opinion,
a staff ofilcer who could, from negligence or other
cause, add to a dispatch from the Geuei-a.l commanding an army to the President, that which '' was not
authorized or intended," should at lel\l!I be &115igned
to aome other duty.
M'CLELLAN TAXES FOUR WEEKS TO CROSS THE
POTOl\IAC,

The movement of tbe army aoross the river, whioh
was commenced upon the 26th of Octo~er, continued
slowly, llJltil on the 5ili of November Gen. :McClel•
lan announced to the President that the last corps
of hi• army fulisbed crossing on the 3d of Nov~m-

ber,fust/our weeks from tu ti,ne the order to crou
toa, gitJen.
In the letter to the Prellid11nt, of the lnh of October, Geo. McClellan writes:

co•~J:!!b~c~~~:r~Y
U~
/:::;u:::vi~~::i~o~:~:t;~;
explaining my
aod giving YOU time to i11Uo •uob lll,.
teUODI

drllctio.lll u may aeem beet to you."
THE END OF 111'CLELLA.',,

GeD. McClellan was relieved from the commanel
of tne Army of the Potowac, in porsuance of tbe
following ordua:
"Hlu.DQtr.lRTERS OJP TB11 Alt.MT.

}

"\V.unJNGTOl<, 0. 0 .. Nov, 5, lSGi.
u GRDB.A.t.: Ou re:coiptofLhe order ot c.be .President, aen\
herewil.b, J'OU. ,vill immoJiately turn o•er yo\U commaDd to

pontoons to .Aoquia Creek, which order Gen. Halleck.
signed, and it was sent off' to the telegraph oflico.
WOODBURY SAYS HE WAS NO'r,
G,in. Woodbury states that he received tbat oroer

011 the

morniDg of the 13th of Nov. He testifies:

u Gen. Halleck.'• order to me oftbe 13th made U. appareot
that. the army we.a prepar'inc to marcb to Fredericksburg. .A>
to the time when tbe movemt,tJt \'i'Oold be made I ne'le1'
ceivod any fnformlltlou. FearJog, however. t.bat tbe mo"""'
mout. wopld be precipibte. I we.it to Oun.
offi.u,
a.a.d urged him to delay thD mo'l'om.e.ot eome five day,, Lo crd.ur
tba.i ,he neceuary prup:ll'B-ti.0111 toigbt. be made to tua.are

~1!i~11forT:n tt!!t::t 1!L~8:dv1:t!eh:r:b!d~!y0 ~~'ifict

mood. I fftjoioed that. my 1uggestion was noii.Dteudbd t o
c.aute delay, butntber to prevtini 1'. In makiog tbi11ugge>
ti.on I had reference not ooly to t.he -pontoon trt.lll, but thalaod1Dg1 a till to be created far the Quartermuttr a.u.d Coll:•
mlua.7 DepartmentL'1

HALLECK SAYS HE WAS NOT.

Gen. Halleck teetiliea :

•• 1 will •tale tbat all the t,oops la Waohinfton aod ltl .,;.
ci.clty were n.od.er tlu, command ot Gen. McCfeUan when he
wua relieved, and be issued hil ordera directly to the com..
mfllldfng officer of \Vuhiugton, with one 1in1le reatticUon:

::ror:i ::nUPis~dnb:i,6:de: rru:;~:r~1eu::;{i.!~:::
0

maodiug officer here. In all o3.er reapeet. they wete all un-der hi.I direction. Oen. Bo.nui;!e. when be relieved hlm, wu
told that they temaioed pr.!ci<i:~7 tho 1ame a1 before. Oo my
Ti.lit to Oen. Buru.ddc, e.t '\-Varre.nton. on tho 12.Lh or Novem•
ber, in • ~ g aboul tho boatund th!ag• <bot ber.qolred
1'ro01 here, I repeat.ad to him that tL.ey wero all sobjei0t t.o hb
0tdera with lha., elDgle exception. To 1nuvont the ueceu\t,
of. tbe comm~ding officer here -reporting tbe order for the
boat.a here1th& order was drawn up upon lih table, and siguea

flth~i'
t1ftaek~h~ e~;in:"i:::~~~~:tt~~e~vin~~~ot~
Woodborv on my retnru, and hq told .me Ile bad received th6

order. I told him that in n». these mattera lJe wu uod•r Oen.
Bnn,aid&'o dlr•ctlon. I had nothiDg further to glve Wm, ex•
oept to commoolca.te that order to him.. In converu.tion with
him and Oeo.. Meiga, it wu proposed tha& the
of pon•
aboa.ld c.o down by la:Jd, Ml they eoald be go,ten down
1ooner in tbat wsy, without illterferlug wlt.h the tupplles

train

~!"~t~tb!:.th~tctll !rb:r :a~
:~:~lDl\?eDrJ~:p•::f]:l1;~ ~~~p~~:di1:!:ei:~Jt for fatther :~~i!:tte'i!~'o~
ten were uader Oen. Burnlide'1 directloa Ile elso informed
MaJor-GeD. Baro.1lde, and repair: to '.l're?Jtou, .Ntt"-·.Jeney,
"ll. "·· BA!.LECK, Oeue.raJ.in,Chlef.
11
lilajor-Gca.. MeCLB.LLA..."'<", CommandiDG:, ~ , &.c,0

,, \Vil DJ:PJ...K.T~T, A»Jll'TANT-OB~BRAJ.!.S 0ffJC.,}
1
'
\VAS-DLSCTO!'l, Nov.
18b'2.

s,

•• O:sn-a.u. ORDxns1 No. 18'2.-By dltection of the PrWcleot of tb& United St.ate,, it i• ordered \hat Majo.,..Geo.
McCJella.u be reliuvitd from the conu;Qaml of the Atmy ot the
Potomac. and that l\bjor..Oen. Bur.naide take L.he o.om.aiand or
that army.
"By order of tbe Secretary or \Var.
'' E. D. TOWNSENl>, A.ls!st•m .Acljatant-Oenorol,"
OPERATIOXS UNDER GEN, .OURXSTDE,

Upon assuming commr.od of the Armyof the Potomac, Gen. Burnside at once determined to follow
the line of operations which be had pre,·ioasly suggested to Gen. McClellan; that is, to mnke Frcderiwbnrg tho base of bis operations. Re assnrued
oommand on the 7,h or 8th of November, and on the
9th forwarded to Wualnngtou bis proposed plan o!
operations. On tile 12th of November Gen. Halleck
came to Warrenton, and, with Gen. Meigs, bad a
conversation wilh Gen. Dnroside upo,.1. tne future
movements of the army.
Gen. Dnruaide staled that bis plan was "to concentrate the army 10 t he neighborhood of Waneutou; to make a smiill movement acl'OS1! the Rsppahannock, ns a feint, ,vit!t a ,•iew to diYert the
stteution of the enemy, lend lead them to believe
tha\ we were going to mo,e in the direction of Gordonsville, aod then to make a rapid mo,•emont of the
whole army to 1-'Ndcricksburg;" for the reason
that" we would all the tJWO bo 115 near 'Was' iogton
as would tlle enemy, and attor arriviog at Fre~rick.sbnrg we would be at a point nearer to Richmond thau we would be even if we should t.ake
Gordoosville.''
THE PONTOO:llS-WilO IS IlESPO:NSJ.OLF.
TllEffi. DELAY 1

FOR

Gen. l3Ul'llS1de des.red to have provisions 11rnl
forage, together wiGh pontoons to enable the army
Lo oroes tbe Rappahannock. Geu. Mciga testifies
tb11t while at Warrenton !Jo wroLo an order to Gen.
\Voodbnry, in \Vasllington, to C9.l1 011 tl!e Qnartermaetor :it Washington for lrlll1f}IOrtaLiun io; the

0

0

::!'•t!i! tt~e•::t,';13;!~.toT!f:C::.i!f~ll:~bs!:t
we1 while at \Van:e.uto.a, tba.~ Capt..Duane, Chief of the EnJP.•

~ibf1Jiiii!ie{n~~fer!~aTl~'r=::i:!~fe!,direct com.

•• Que.1tlon. Do)OU know whether ihure wa. 1u:ty dela.y hi
1tarUni tbom, or la their progrell,l"tbere !
1
I beard t.b&t Ul1:1i:,,v1,1a. de-lay from tbo •t.eam..
' Anawar.
en geU.iog egroond with the pootoon1: and there wu o.delay
I U.Dderstood, tn the traiu 1ofog down by l.i.ud, oo accoaot.

~=

~f ~i~~!t:r:rc~~~~dJ; :1 f~ba1dt!b~ }::;:•~!:r:;
?1X!r:l'i!:~t~
!~g:~:1°:!c~~~~:t:~~~i~.:a!~~-re!ufi:d
m3inly from accident ond the elldmebta, that uo
bad. any
1

t?ea:.~v;;~i~::t~:t::t.t:t:tr:X~~~~ d:,di{t:::c!~
8

WIUl

t~~~~~!b~?;\~i3d~:e.'~~ '1:[tc~lcfia :~t~:n~i~~:t!!
1

8

tbe oommaudlng officer <>f the train tba.t went. down L&d done
blll dut.y u.bo i that l.e waa dlspo~t:d to wake 110 f.irtber iU·

tt:!.
wt,u

!;\:;u'::: J!:1a~v~ ~::;t,fbe

vc.~U~~i:t1oC:.
i
tdv~nee of the
onLil the boats arriYed, or a.nyt.hfo& ol
tbatldnd !
•• A.nrtWtfr. No, Slr. I romember fhh,1 th.at Oen. ,vood•
bu-ry. in coa-veri"at.fon with we, said lh'lt. UWJ. Buroa\de coold

~:!1~e!~t~af~e t~:~~alun~~l2se~l1J~r~0~~e~riv':::t(! 'f~~

I re.DJ&ikcd to hint tblit I di.t not bow t.zaetly \Lu day when
Oen. Burn.aid~ y;ouJd move; but l ccatld nt;t t~ll blm, u the
Oeneral diJ. t.aoll..now hituarl". \Vhile I was at \\·.a,e.nton he
proposed tbi.s mov1:nl1e.Qt, and be wu dit~ctcd 10 t.uak6 ell
prcpe.rutiooa tc:1r it, but not lo beiin it uuttl the Pre,.idont
'\V'&I coo,uhcd. J i-eturoed ou tho c.t"tl.rooon of the 13tb, tllJ.d,
l Uiillk, on tlJo morJJiD;t.f lhc., Utb, l had D aillteovii:.wwUb
tL.e l_,i-cilde.nt, Ill wbii.:li ho eom1eo1ed to Ot1n.
plc.wl, aud I i.:.umi,diately t.ehigra.pn1:d lo Lim to co ahe~l u be.
bad proposed. l tmdcretoo.1 t.hnt there wu., coa..tder11blu
de.lay in get&g tbt:l bonh from Acq'lb dowu t.o the Repp!rbnooock Rivtr1 on aeeouut uf the Uo.:d roads, dl..lficulL_y of
ttauepo1tetlnu, &:c. 1 bt.:t 110 ulhcr clda7 tbou \.~1u wL.ionwnolJ.
uitura.ly occur 1,..VQr a to\1.;h country il.i& \hat.; alld •M:i•

*~~~~el.iyrt~n~~i!f lt: u;~~~!'ni:.~• ~:r.:r~~dd~l!~rr;:

brldzea~ero \VU cou..ddt!roble dellly in th•'- \\~u coo.Iduot
comm.eoce the repair ofu1e T.:i;ilroad vutll vt:o Bdrneh?o toot
po...aesalou of it, u i.t wu all in tuc po1;ie.1,iou e>f tbo l.'ne:my.
•.Lb.at ,~aa uoderatood botwcen Llim and Oeu. llattpt, in mJ'
pieEienco. Oeu . .Uaupt weht,oot with uw iouulke UJO arrangement for re1,1airiug tht.' rosJJ a1 euly ut: po11ible. I re•
-member 1110 cuuven.aLi1i>u; h• eoald n-:;i l&nd anytb.iog. but
v.-oulJ llave· C\•erythl.og down rcoJy 11 ..0011 ca h~ could, .au.d
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when he foaud Oen. DuruaJdo wu in po11euion, Ile wc-ald

o;,DUJ1euce.1'

BURNSIDE EVIDENTLY WAS NOT.

Gen. Burnside testifies in relation to the forwarding of tho pontoons:

•· I uod€'rrfood that o~n. llalleck wu to give, the uoce,uary
order!, Bild lben the cffieere who should receive those ordert

r;::d<JtJ:k:b:ra)~esy~~~rJt[,,~! :~:n::~t:tr:atco~gorh:~:
plan ,broupb oilieer.s of ml owo; but-, baviutf jusf ta.ken the
1
ft°!!1..~~ta~;ba~r u\Vl:!h1 ;~ri; ~~!ldt!~1o~ci;:~:rn;
tbe B.!IJ.IltalJco o! oll my cfficue, to cb211ga ih po1ltfon ftom
1

,varrenron to Frederiobbul'.;; ood I retc, iodaedl e:tpeeted,

tb~t nll tho partl ot U1e plan wbfob wero to be CX<!Cuted tn
\Vaah.ington would be etteDded t-o by tbe offi.cen e.t that

place. under the direction of the clliterent departmeDU to
wl>lch those part• of Ibo plan apperlallled.
" Q.uettfoo. Did you or not understaud that you youraelf'
;~ reapolliible
aeeing tb.o.t thote ordou
0
"An,wer. l dld not. I neverimaained Cor a moment that
I bad to carry oul anything that reqw.re<J to bo done iJl Wa,h•
ington."

d!le te

for

w~ro cu•

On the 16th of November Geo. Burnside started
the cola.inns of lais army from Warrenton to Fredericltsba.rg, not havio;, haard anything of the delay of
the po11toons from \Vasbington. 'l'he telegram announcing tbe delay did not reach Gen. Barnsid.e
tJDtil the 19tb of .t'l'o..-ember. The corps of G1ln.
Sumner was in the advance, nnd it was tlieiotentton
that he shoold cross over to Frederlcksborg and take
posseeeioo of the 1>lace. Dot the non-a:,ci v11l of the
pont-oone in time prevenred the movement which
had been contemplated, and necessitated the adop•
tion of other meaawces.
TllE BATl'LE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

Geo. Burnside then be!lao to make preparations
for another movement, bring1D$' up the pontooDe WI
rapidly as possible, t-0 enable his forces to cross tbe

riverJ

Tbe plan determined upon WIUI to cross tho river
at two points; the right wing to crose opposite Fred•
ericksbnrg nod the loft win~ t:> cross from three to
four miles below the city. The left wing was composed of the Left Grand Divwon1 with a corps from
the Center Gr3Ild Div1ston, making n force of from
50,000 to 60,000 men, the wbole heiog uoder command of lllaj.-Gen. Frnnkliu. Tho crossing WIUI
made successfully at both points, but with much opposiLion from sharpshooter• on tho right.
'

PLAN OF BATTLE.

Gen. Burnside states the followiug in regard to
h~ P,lan of attack:

hi~~7~b:.t:::,!ob~a~:t
::r ~~~~r,~; :e!;,U:t ~1!:~b~:::
connected the two winga of their army, ®d avoided a long
0

0

detour arou11d thrOugb a bad country. I obtained trom a.
· colored men, from the other 6.lde of tbe tOWll, loforme.UoD 1n
re,aud to thlanewroad, which ptoved to be correct. I wanted
to obtain posS-esaion ottbat new·road, and that W'8'1 my reason
for ma.king au •tt.aek on the extreme left. I did not iDtend
to make tbo attack on tho right until thst pollition had
been ta.ken, wWch I supposed would ata;ger the enemy,
, euttin1 their line in two; ond then l proposed to make a
direct attack on thoirfroni and drl\"e t.bem out of the,irworb.11
'
ORDERS TO FRA!IKLIN,

'

The following is the order to Gen. Franklin, who
commanded the-left:

i . liu.DQtrilTBRS Arurr Oll' TJIJS PoTOllAO,}
•' Dec.embor l3, :;: 5:S a. m.
11
Oen. Hardie will carry thU di1p:atcb to Jou and remain
' with you durlug tbe day. The general cotnmnodlng: direets
tbat you k_eep your whole command in pOiition for a rapid
movenitn, down the old Richmond ro:id, and you will send
out.at. once a diviaion, n~ least, t,o J?.aH below Smithfield, to
oeize,, if poutble, th• Li.s,bb uear Capt. IlnmUton'•• on thiJ
a;lde cf Ibo Mo.s:upono.x, tak:hi; core to keep it. well •upported,
o.nd lioe otre.treat open. He ha, ordered another column
ef'ad1vioionormoretobemoveclfrorn Gen. So.mnel"'a com•

"l l>ove tho bouor lo ho. Oonor&I._very n,:,pectfnlly. your
obedie•t
aervll.O.t,
•· JOBN (f• .l' ARKE, Chietot ~t.lf.
1

Ma]or-Ooo. .F'n.A..."'utLL'\", Conimaa.dinc- Department, Oraud
Diviafon Almy of Potoma.c.. 0
FRAll'KLl.'ll'S INCOYSISTE!\T STATE)1EYTS.

•

Gen. l,'ranklin etatep, when lo.st cxamlDed, thnt
he received tbe above order at abou~ 7 :3J a. m., nnd
that be nt once took mensur;s to cnrry out what he
considered t o be the meaning of the order, thet is,
"uo nrmod observation to nscertain where tho enemv
wae." In bis restimony, inven wben yonr Committee wert1 nt 1,'aJ.moatb, he says: "I _put in all tbe
troops tbnt I thought it proper >.:ndprn<fentto put in.
I fought the whole strength of my command, as far
ns I coald, and at the 8&me Ume keep my connection
with tbe river open."
FRA.',KLIS RESPONSJDLE FOR TIIE DEFEAT.

From tho testimony it would appear that the attack-was in reality made by one of the smallest divisions in Gen. Franklin's commaod-tl.te division
of Geo. Mende, nnmberiu_g about 4,500 men. Thia
division was supported on,ts right by Gen. Gibbon's
Division of about 5,0bO men. On tbe left was Gen.
Doubleday's Division, forming the extreme left ot
our line, nearly at tight angles with Gen. Meade's
Division, and extending to the river. J llBt as Gen.
Meade's Dl\'1siou advanced to tbe attack, Gen. Bhney•s Division, of Gen. Stoneman's corps, oumbering
aboQt 7,000, cmne up and took position immediately
in rear of Gen. l\Ienile.
GEN. BIRNEY FAILS TO SUPPORT DIEADE'S AT-

TACK.

The division of Gen. Mende succeeded in piercing
the first line of the enemy, and gaining the crest ot
the bill. Gen. Gibbon, seeiDg Gen. J\Ieade advancing to tbe ntLick, ordered his di vision forward. A.f..
ter his last brigade had 11..tvanced, dr!viug the enemy
with the bayonet, aud be waa preparing bis batteries to open upon a Rebel regiment that made their
appearance on his left, Gen. Gibbon was wounded
and taken from the field. Gen. llleade's division
buvingreached tbe crest of tile hill, formed themeelves in the presence of tbe reserves of the enemy,
wbo opened fire upon them in front, nnd they also re•
ceived afire upon their tlank. The enperiority o1 •
the enemy was so overwhelming that Meade's division WWI forced hick, os wae nlso Gibbon's divhion.
T~e enemy pnroned until cbecked by Birney's dh1sio1J. 001· forces continued to hold their position,
without renewing tho attack, until they were ordered to withdraw across tbe river.
The losses sustained io the attack, in killed,
wounded, aod m.is.siug, were as follows: :Meade's
oivi.sion, 1,760; Gibbon's cliv~ion, 1,249; Birney'd
division, 961.
J"RA)o.U.IN DISOBEYS A DIRECT ORDEI~ TO

ATTACK.

Gen. Dnrn~ide, upon bearing of tbe small fores
ordered to attack the enemy, sent au order to Gen.
Franklin to make a vigorous attack -n-itb bis whole
force. Several of tho witnesses te•tify thn, bad the
attack been renewed with aU tbe available force
nnder Gen. Franklin's command it would have been
snccessful. Oen. Franklin tesWies that it was not
nn order, but a request, and tbat wbeu ho received it
it WW! too lato to rcnEw tl1e attack, and therefore he
did not do it.
Gen. Franklin testifies es follows:
'' Tho order untler which 1 was nct!na directed that the liD11
1t tt'Ibo dh(!cted thnt 1 sttould;

of retreat sbouJJ be kept opeu..

!i~!d~~;ro~•~:\'~~~:~:d :t~lirtum~;~: c~~':1~~:fl~~
tt~~nk,~~dcJ:id~:
!~i\iJ'icl~i!w
t~h:e~!'1~~
i1t~!f
afl1!•i:t'it':::Aboe1~:l~10ut~~.1L~C:·au!:!!3:j
hi.:ht.i OP botb of tho~o r-oads. Iloldiog: thcao blgbt1, witt tho
1t wea-nn w:med obEervation to uscert-aln where the C.Ql.!nlY
"
*
•
*
* lwa1
r;s!~~:~~
fh:~~~~t~tol\~~! ~r:it:1 tii!~~h! litrcutthcned
in thla opiDion by tho ataff ofrteer who brou;ht
tht.to move, by colu.mn1, dhtna f,om ucb other, with a
0
:~~\~

01

it

vitw:ot•,~oidin1 t.he pos.s-lliilit::, of n col!i.i.lon of our o~n
forces, wbft.ib mli;ht occur ill n CCllEflll movement do;iag tlrn
fog. '£woof Ue.a. liooter'• diyia:on, ere 1~ yoor rear o~ the

Gt.~t~~'::fi~~:cu~:t:~~iilrtc r~F~del1t1:'~o~
0

by a.u ordc.rlv'fery ,oou. \"oa. will kec.p your '"•·hole eom•
,nand in tf!tu.line:n to u~ovo nt t1nco WI 11oou 111 the fog llftJ.
Tho ,vatcbworil which, it-pos!ible._ ahonld b-'9 ginu to every
company, will be• ScolL'

it, {tho crde:).
•
,..
*
*
*
*
*
• Qat;t.U.OLI. Did you not nndcrshncl, from tbh order, that
,-~ woro tuu~o 1111 l4o troops 1Jcceseury"'to seizo eu.J hoJd tbe
l:igbh llUl' C~pt. illlll!ilton1 a.. at1d tt et rho Geoe:rol commDDcl•
lJ.3 co111idcred that that \VU nccena.ry to bo dc,ue in order to
e;cow-o 6UCCCS3 I

uft1~:·:h~!!ti~1fi x:;;t}'

1

,~~

0

!-Zet"1~JJ~~ ~t::;~:

So; ofit 11howF1, had aucJ1 beon hJa inteJ.1tion; aod.. besides, he
<lil'ecto me to koop my wl>olo command 1n po•lllon lo n,o,e
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alon11 t',e cilJ Riellmood toad. Ir bo b-.1 lotondcd mo to n,e
my wholo l .:.rc.e, if \lt:Cr•a,ary, to hnld thu hill, Jut l1ardly
woold bii,·o couvled it ,...tth the aond1tlon to koop ruy oom-

ma.nd tu read.iuM1 for thi• other movement.

1
• Qtle,tlo.;. \••:i.• the r.tbcr L1ovemrn~ fi;,:..,fol811r;tilafccrthe
~ooofrhn~bf ht.:byoucuooi-•1
•· An••cr. I think tt...t ti• othl!r 11J\)~en::.ent, if n bad hN'n.
ordered \'• 1th. t1• ,. ho!f! r.uco, would haTo n1•ect~ri.Jy io•olt'ed
thepo-.,e,&io:1 ,Itbo,u hight._ Had l b•"<'n ordt.ted t11 mu•o my
wbola ftJN:e nlong tba R1t~htnoud ro.u.1, l 1hould h3va b1"6n com~lled to t"\r." • I that wou1d bo found ia. 1ba road, and those
hi.ght1 ,~ onl J lr -ve 1,e.Pn t.n lho ro1d.
·•Q,a,•.. hou, .Aa it W4.Jhadi-pe::iub1e Uiat we ,boolJ ba•e

1~J?~e}!~!~-~u1!e~~::.1!:J~:•!o~o:_:

~~,n:~

0110 d1vi.,l• n co-p:u, b1:,h,w SmubficlJ a ·a1 "ize, if p011iblo,
thoao ht_bb, diJ 1ou J,ot (l~ttm th•, ,hu o,d.,r rt,qalrec.l of yon
thd y<H1 •ho1.1h1, w.bcu ltJ)ul&td in tho 6rar. EJ.tt.,o.,pt, rl!new

thOlltl•ck1

•• Anawer. ltblok It aid; but by tho time tho Jl•bolo were
dri•ea b~io.lo th• woo...:a by B1t1nt)••1 divi&ioa aod Slckle,a'1
cliTUirn, 1t. w&J pa.t 3 '>'tluc&.. Jc, wu d.uk., .,, 1bs1. time. b:,

S o'cloci:, a:id it\~•• tOJJ 1.ite &hen to
-.itb tho a!fgbrut hot>--,1 of t1lCted•"

.a;U.ct •a.ch an atlempC:

The te>tw,011y uf all the 1oit11,isc1 bifor• your
CommiU,·e pr01Jes .,,,o,t cotlclusivcly that, liacl th.e
attack beGI 11UZde !IPOII the ltft tDtth. all the force
tDhu:h Oe11. Fronkl,11 co..Zd. hore u,e:I. for that pur•
post, t~ plan of Gm. Burn&itle -would. hace bten
completely succeuf«I, and o,ir army tDould. hat1e
achitfll!d a most brilliallt 'Victory.

After tho ntw.ck on Sutnrday, onr 11rmy l'emnlned
in poauion until Monday ni.gM, when~ was with•
drawn t cross tho river witl1ou 1011'.
Yonr Commirtce havo no, COL8idered it -nt.ial
to rePOrt upon the opcrat:OI)B of tbe right wing of
our army UI thiJ ijattle, for the reueon tbat t bo enc•
cesa of the ruoveruent civ:dently depended to a very
g reat exteut upon the 6ncce88fol opendou of the
l'llt. Although 011r troops on tbo right fought mod
gallantly, making repeated attacks, tbe strength ot
tho eoemy'e pos11iou wu euch that ow- forces wero
compelled to retire.
AFTf:R F REDE RICKSBURG.

On Jan. 26, 1!!63, tho following resol ution waa
adopt~ IJy tho Senate, and mtll'i'ed to yolll' Com•

mittee:
u Rt,olNJ, That tbo Coa,mlUee on the CoDdoct of the War
be ll11tructt.-d tolnqt1ire wbelber Major--Veo. A. J::. Bum1ldo
hu, fllna9 tho battle.o r Frot..1crlcktburlf, formed auy pl•n• tor

Ule mo\'tmcnt o!the A.rwy of t.b.e l'otomao, or any p.1rtlon of
the aame; UJJ U so, woettor any mbordal.1.te Generali oCaald

army hate wrlttc.a. to or •ish~d \V&ahh11ton,

:~t.i:.r:n~:.

,o oppoae or

interfere with tbt, exccotlou otsa.c.!i mo•ccne:c.tt,and wbe,her
b;~::!~tbho~:;-.~eeu anea,ed or lr.terlcrecl

Under t.ll11t resolution, yon, Committee iJroceeded
to tako tho testimooy of .Major-Gen&. A. E. Durn•
aide and John G. Purkc, ondBrig.-Gen&. J obn Newiou,J obn Cochnmo, IUlil Willilu:i W. Averill. That
t eatimony hrill11a to light tbo following facla:
DIJRXSJDE 'S PLANS,

Shortly after tl1o battle of Frcdorickaburg, Gen.
Burnside d~vited a plan lor e.tt11cking the onomy i n
bia front. '.rbe main army wna to cross at 11 place
some six or seven miles befow l!'redericksbnrg. Tbe
poeitiooe for 11111 artillery to protect tho Cl'OElliDg
were ull aelect<!d, tho rolllh were oil surveyed, nod
the corJnroy w ne c11t for prepnrmg the r oads. At
the same t ime n feint of crossing Wl\9 t o bo made
some dl4tnnce abovo l!'alm.outh, whlcl1 feic.t could
be ttlnle.l lllto a posltive ottaolc •honld the enemy
discover the movement below; otherwLoe tile main
attack was to be made below.
A GRAND CAVALRY I:XPEDITlON,

In connection witl1 Um movement of tllo main

army, n cavulry exredition wna ors:wized, coneia~
ing of2,5Wo!tbe best cavalry in tho Army oftho Poiomao, l ,OOII of wbom were picked meo, Tho plan
of t hat upedltion w:ia ns followa: A ccomprui.iod by
a bri11ade of infantry detailed t o protect tlle ol'Ol8iog
of the Uappabannock, it was to proceed up t o
Kelly's l<'orll; there the 1,000 picked men were to
croea, and to proceed to the Rap1d:m e.nd crou that
river at Hne<.oon Ford; then to go onward nnd crou
the Virginia C&ntrol Railroad at Looi;a ConrtH cu.ee; t be J amee Uiver ot Goochland or Carter's,
b lowing up t he locks of tile Jnmre Wver Canal nt
tho place of croaaing; cro6S tDo l{iebmond ond
Lynchblll'g RailroaJ at B point eo11th of there, blow•

iog up lbe irou-brillge nt tbo plaee of croasiog; crou
tb11 Riob,cood. l'.iterabnrg nod W~ldon R,ilroad
wbero it cwo11eJ tbo Nottoway River, deatroying tho
rmlroad briJga there; and tban proc~J on _by Gen.
Pryor'8 co:nwand, and eff.!Ct a Jnocuon With Gen.
Peck, at Suifollc, wllera st..amera we.-.ito will wtilliug to take tl1em to Acqnia Creek.
To distract tile uttsuuon or the enemy, and dee<>ive tbem m regard to which body or cuvalry waa
tho attacking column, c.t tho time tho tboueand
pickl-d men cro...od the Rapp;.tuunock, 11 portion ot
the r OUlaining 1,5:JO was to proceed toward Warren•
tou; aootber portion toward Culpepper C11urtliouee; and the remainder were to accowpony tbe
thOll811Dd picked men n3 far ,ts Uaccoot1 .b'ord, and
then r~ttll'II. While this country expedition ,vna in
progrca!, the geu'!J'&l movewou, w..a to be mrule
acl'088 tbe river.
On tbe 26th or December, an order was issued fo~
the entire command to prepare tbreo days' cooked
rations; to havo their w ttgoue tilled with ten dllys'
email rations, ii po6sible; to b1~ve froUl tcu to twelve
d.lye' supply or beef cattlo ,vith thew; t<> tab
forage for their teams and their urtillery aod cavalry
hor11CB, and the l'C(lWfilte amount of ammuoitlon-in
fuct, to be in a couditiou to 111ovo at twolvo honrs'
notice.
GENS. COCBR.\.'-E AXD NEWTON TRY TO PRE•
JUDICE Till: PRESIDS.',T AG.UXST DURN•
SIDE.

Shortly nfter tbBt order was issued Oen. John
Newton and Goo. John Cochrane-tho one com•
mundiog a divlaion and the other a brignde in the
lef, Grand Dn·ision, under Geo. Wm. D. ltranliliu
came up to Wnabiu;cton on Jenvo ofnbseoce. Pre•
vlo1111 to obtaining leave of absence from Gen.
Frankho, they inJorwt:d bj,n and Gen. Wm. F .
Smith tbat when tl1ey cnmo to Wnsblogtoo t hey
should tako tho opportuwty to represc,a to some
ooc in nut.hority bere tbe dispirited coudillon of the
ll!'my, and tb~ daoger thero was in mtempt11lg &lly
movemeoG again6' tile enemy ot that lime.
When they rt>!lcbed. Waaoiogton, Geo. Cochrane,
ns ho atatea, endeavored to find certJUn mombera of
Cougre@a, to whom to mako tile desired commnnica,.
tioo, ]!'ailing to lind tbem, l1o determined to seek
au 101A1mew with the President for tile purllOBO of
making the communication directly to him. On
proceeJiog t o tbo .l>resident'e house, be t here met
Sccretar,y Seward, to w llom be oxplained tho obj ect
of bla bemg t bere and the generll! purpo1·t of bia propoeed communication to the l'retideot, ond requested
him to procure ao interview for them, which Mr.
Soward promucd to do, and which he did do.
THE GENEl'lALS l'lli:VARICATE.

Tbnt day t ho interview took 1>lace, nnd Gen.
Newton opened tho subject to t b.e P resident. At
firat tho PreBJdeut, as Gen. Newton expreseea it,
"very n::it11roJJy conceived tbui they bad come there
for tho purpooo of injuring Geo. Bnrn.ide, and eng•
gestlng eome other per.on l<> JllJ bia place." Geo.
New ton states, tbot wbilo ho Jlrwly believed tbat
the principal canto of t ho dispirited cond,uon o! tho
army w aa the want of confidouce in the military cnpacHy of Gen. llurnside, bo dt-emed U i mpro.r,r to
aay eo to tile President "rigl1, aqoaro out, ' and
tbcroforo endeavored to convey tb.e eame JJea indi•
zectly. W hen naked if be considered it any less im•
proper t o do anch o thing indirectly than 1t Willi to
do i t cfuectly1 ho quaWied hie previo1111 nuullon by
uying that We object was to inform tbe l'reaiJent of
wblltbe cootldered to be tho co:idition of I.lie army,
in tho hope that tbe Pretiideot woold make lnqtl11'Y
and learn tho truo c:n. s Ior bl1D1:ell. Upon perceivi og this imprel!ll1ou npon the miod of tho 1•rcaident,.
Newton and Cochrane state t hat they hastened to 088nre l.llo President Umt be wa eotire),y
mli!takeo, and 10 for su~ded thnt os t ho cloee of
tb.i illter view the Presiden, said to them he was
glod. tbey had c;illed upon Wmi nod ihnt ho hoped
t hat aood would ,·oAnlt f rom tho oterview.
THD l'RESIDENT INTERFEJ1£S,

T o return 1-0 Geu. B lll'll1'ido. T ho cave.lry ope-

'
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ditlon bad
the brigade of inflllltry detailoJ.
lo accompany i, bad Cto6iled the Rapp:i.hannock at
ll'cbaro's Ford and returned by way orEUil'e Ford,
loaving the way clear for tho c,valry to croes at
Kelly's Ford. 'J:'bo day they had arr11nged to make
tb~ crneaiog Gen. Barosido .rec,,1v..d from lbe Pre..i.d~o, the followmg ltlegram:

,e:~r~::~!:::~t,~'u:are,~~~i:;
,i:w~ttt,:iot wake.
Gen. Buroltlde stutt,s tba1 Ile could not illlllgine, at

the time, wbal reuou tho Presidenl could have for
&cooing Wm such" telegram. None ot tbe officers
ot We comm11nd, except one or two of bis staff who
bad remained in camp, bad been told anything of
bta plan beyond tbe simple fact that a movement
waa to be mitde. lio could only eoppose tbnt tile
dispatch 1-eluted in sowe way to important military
movements in oilier parts o!tbe connlry, in which 11
-.u m,ce_ry to have cooperation.
TBE CAVALRY UALTING.

Upon tbo receipt of tbat telegram, steps were immodmtely taken to halt the cavalry expedition
where it then waa (at Kelly'• Ford) nntU farther
order11. A portion ot it wae ebortly afterward seat
off to intercept Stuart, wb.o had jllllt made a raid to
Dumfrie.s and tho oeiilbbotbood of Fairfu Colll't•
llouae, which ii !Ailed to do.
BURNSIDE CO)lES

·ro WASHJNGTON.

Geo. Bnrneide r.ame to Waebinaton to ascertain
from the Prnident tbe troo state of the cue. He
"'"' mJormed by tbe Preaideot that 110me general
bfilcers !(om tbe Army of tho Potomao, whose names
bo declined to give, hat! cnlled upon bim and repreeeateJ tbat Gen. Burna1de contemplated aoou mak·
10g n movement, 1J1d that tbe army was ao diapirited
and demoralized tbut any utr.emot to make a move•
in dlsa.eter; thal no
rueot at that rune wast
pr<>oJjoent ofilcera in toe Armv of the Potomac were
1.1.1 fuv<>r of uuy lllO\·ement ..,-~ tim.,.
Gen. Bori,,.de informed the Pre11ident that none
of l,is offic<1rd Lad been informed wbnt
plan was,
and theo 1,11-ucee<ied to explain it 10 detiul to the
l're&!dwt. lla urged n_r.<,n the President to grant
111011icrwi,.,ion to curry Hout, but the Prellideut de~liued to do so Bt that time. Gen. lblleck RD<l Sec·
1-etary Stauton were aenl !or, and then learned, for
tbe fl.rn time, of the Prefident'a action ill atoppiag
\be movemtn!; oltbongh Gen. Halleck waa pre,·iollllly awure lhut u movement wa, contemplated
by Oen. Bornude, Uen. Halleck, with Gen. DurnlliJe, beld t,at uie olllcers who had m1de thoee repre.,.,utationa to tbe l'n:silient Bbould be at once diamiisocd tbe service. Gen. Burnllido ruwa.iaed bere
at that titno for two daye, but no couclllllion wu
reached upon u,e 1ubjtet.

ms PLAXB BCCO~IE KXOWN TO TIIE REBELS.

W ben ho returucd to hh1 camp be learned th&t
macy of the .detalLI of the geoeral movem!nt
and tho dot.ails of the cavalry expeditioo, naa1
b<:come known to tbe llebel sympathizers m \T88h•
inl.(tou, thereby rendering twit plan impn.cticable.
Wk,·~ aakaJ. to fJ)kom he had C1Jmmunicaud 4i•
plan,, ht ,taud. ttat he had, t,,/cl no one fa iva,Ain,:tan, except the Pre1idt11t, Stcrrtary Stanton,
a1tci Gen. Jlalleck; and. fo hu camp 110,1e kntfD of it,
ez,xpt 01~ or two of l,i, ,to.If offu:era, fJ)/iO rtmained
v, camp all the tim.-. He professed bi.m&elI anabla
to tell how bia plane bu,! beeomo kuuwn t~ the
enemy.
llE ASKS FOR OltDERS BUT GETS N0!,"1:.

A correapundenco then toot place between the
Prem.dent, Geo. llallcck and Oen. DnrD6ide. Gen.
lluroEi<le de,w,ed di&t1nct nutbority from Gen. Halleck, or 1owo ooe authorized to give it, to make "
movement acrOl!a the rivH. \Vaile urging tho im•
portanco and nece!l!ity for sacb a mo,·cmeat, be canilidlv admitted that tllere wn,bardiy II generalofllcer
10 bis commnnd wllo nppro, ed or it. While willing
10 !-3lre upon Wmeelt !l1J the responsibility ot lhe
movement, and promiamg to keep 10 ,•1~w Lile l>resideut'a cau11on concerning aoy risk of de•troyrng tho
army or tbo Potomac, .be deaired to bavo at least
Geo. J:faliec1t•~ eanction or permieeioo to mako the
wovcment. Gen. llaueclt replied tnat wbilo be had

alwaya favored n forward movement_,_ he could no\
take tbe respowbility of eiving any air<,-ctiom
\0
how ancl. when it ohoitld be made.
ITE TAKES TOE ncsPON.Smu.1TY.

Gen. BnrD.l!ide ,hen determined \0 make a IDO-Ve.
ment without any fortber con-eepoud~nce oo tho
subject. Re wu unable to devi110 any promising
as t be one jud thwarted by this interfereuce of hi•
1ubordioate officers, 10.\ich inurfere,= gave
emy t.lle t1me, if 71bt th.a meau, to a1Cff"tain v:kat ht
had propo,ed to do. He, however, devised a -plau
of movement, and proceeded to put it in execatioa.
As is well known, 11 wu rendered abortive in con~ueoce of the severe 1torm which took place
l!hortly after the movement began.
Gen. Buroeide otatea tbnt, bceides tbe inclemency
of the we,,.\ber, there waa another powerful reason
for abao.dooinir the movement, viz: the almoet uoivereai feeling amoog bl• geoeral officers against it.
Some of thoee oJ!icere freely gave vent to their feelings in the pre88uce of their inrerion.
Gt:NERAL ORDER NO,

8.

In oonsequence of tlm, and nl10 what had take11
place dW1.ll6 tbe battle of Frederickeburg1 &c., Gen.
Buroeide directed an order to be 1.Ssnea, wbich bu
atyled general order No. 8.
That order di.emiesed, BJmo ofllcera from the aervice, subject to the 11pproval of tbe Preeiden~ relieved others from duty with tbe army of the .l'otom.ac, and abo pronoonoed sentence of death upon
aomo deaert~rs who bad been tried and convicted.
Gen. Bnrwride states tbat be bad become aatieiled
that ii Wd8 absolutely neceasary that aome suob ex•
amplea shonld be made, in order to enable him to
mamtain the pror.:4:r authority over the army under
his command. 'l be order was duly eignea and ilaned, and only wrute<l pnblicatiou.
Two or thn,e of bi• moet lrual.ed etalJ oJlloere represented to Geo.
tb11t ebonld be tben publish that order, be would force apon the President
tho neceeaity or at once unctiooing it, or, by refu•
hill appronl, B.88wne an atmade of boetilny to .
Gen.
'l'lle pubhcauon of the order waa
acoordiag!y delayed for tho time.
TBB PRESIDE.'(T REFUSES TO SCSTAl:N BURN•
SID£.

Gon. Bnrnelde came to Washington and laid th•
order before tho l'realdent, with the distinct aaeuronce tbat in no 01ber way coaid be exere188 a proper
command over the Army of tbe l'otomac; an<llle
ftljkeu tbe Preeidoat to 6811Ction the order, or accept
I.wt rcalguatioo ae major-general. 'l'k• Pre,ident
acknotoledgtu that Geu. Bur,..
tDIII right, bnt
decline.! to dettde without consa!ting witli eome of
hiJj a.dviaere. To this Geo. Burnside Tepl1ed that, if
the l:'rendent took tl1'1o for oouaaltauon1 he woald
not be allowed to pubU.h that order, an11 therefore
uked to have hill re.i11Dation accepted ut ODOe,
Thia tho Preeident declined to do.

,a.

now BUltNSIDE OAlllE TO DE REL.l.fJVED.

Gea. Bumaido returned to bia camp and came
again to Waab.inl!lon lbat nigbl at: tbe request of
tbo
nuu the oat mornlng called upon tbe
Prealdent for hill decwoo. Ho W8b i.o!ormed tbat
tbo Prealdeot decliued :o appro..-e .bia onler No. 8
but had wncladed to relieve him from the commanJ
of the Arllly of the Potomac, aud to appoint Geo.
Hooker In hie plaee, 'I'bereupon Geo. linrw.ide
eg:uo l.asiated tbat bis tttiignation. be accepted. 'I"bia
tbe .P-idenL declined to do; aod, deer 1ome urg•
iog, Geo. Bnruside coD10nted to ulte a leave of absonce for thirty d&ya, with the uoderelan.ding tbat
at Ute end o! that ti.mo he llhouid be -igned to
Jnty, as be deemed il improper to hold a commieaion
as major-general and receive hie pay witbool ren•
deriag asrvil:e therefor, Gt11. Bur111ide olrjecudto
the fJ)urding of tt.e order fJ)hich rtlU!fltd Mn from
4., command, a,,d. ,di,,h ,tated. that it toa, " tU 4i6
o,on rt9uut," a, bein3 ,111ju&t to Mm a,;d. unfoun~
eel inJact; 6ut upon tlu repreuntation thal a11y
other order t11ould. do injury_ t o t/u caiut, he co,.,. ,
,ented. to let ,t remain a, tt then read,
Tho foregowg eratement of the !aeta proycd, to
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6f!tber wiUl the teatimony herewith aubmitted, l!O
l ally nod directly meet the requiromcot1 or. the
re;.olat.ioo rcforred t-o tb.ern, tl111t your Committee
Jeem any comment by thew to ba entirely unne•
~eiinry.

CO"SCLU!-10:-1.

Your committee thi.t.ik it b<:Uer to submit tbe teatimooy wbicb they have taken in relation to the _con•
Juct of tbe war, ..itbout cnticJBm to anv oon@1~e.-.
,1ule extent of military plane or movemeuta1 loav11,1g
eaeh reader to form hle own conclus1otu1 Jrom the
testimooy, nod each
of competent military
men n• h may conuuo.
Aa they lool< bacl< onr tb1utro~le or the past
two yeart~ Lbev ftel that oltbough we hlive not aocompli1beo nll tbat we hoped and expe~ted within
the titne, e.ill the great progreas made gtve11 us fllll
lll8a111Jlce o! Jionl succe@e.
Wben the Uovernmeot took its first active atepa
toward reai»tiug the Rabelllou the Rebelll had been
for more tbao five
actively aod openly
making preparationa tO reeiJ,t iL• autliority and def,:
i1s jnrisd.ictioo. They bad usurped tbe control of
the machwcry of one :Slate government after another,
and tb118 overawed the loyal people of
States.
'rhey had even 110 far control of tbe F,;deral Government itaelf 111 to make it not onl1 acquiesce, for the
time beiug, in rneasoree for ita own d.etrnction, but
contribute to thu end. They had .e,zed and taken
into their po,-100 the ann• aol1
of war
of the government. They had scattered and
demoralized the army, aod tent the navy to the
mou d.iatant
ohhe world,
There wa1 tre~son in tbe Executive maoaion,
treuon in the Cabinet, u·ea,on io the Sena~ and
\he H oOM of Representativt:&, treason io tbe army
and navy, treason in every department, bureuu and
office eoonocted with the Goveromlljlt. 'When the
new Administration came into power it wae neceeaarilr obl.iired to-adopt ils measo,eawi,h the greatest
cantlon, BCOrcely knowing lnend from foe. An army
ud navy bad to be created, There wu owarcely a
bat-t.alion of loyal national troops to protect the capital; and tho lint setJBe or &ecunty felt io the capiw
waa wheu the volunteer troops eoU!red it, summoned
from their homes for iu protection. At the nme
titne 1t wua with great di.lllculty that the loyal peo•
pie could make tbem11elve1 beheve that e.ny 1eriona
reeia~oce to the ao\hority of the Government would
be attemped. There were uot wanting tboee who
cooJideotly aaaened that 11 was but an ontbont of
parti.an aoirit, which they predicted
wonld yield to an exhibition ot force, aod a deter•
mined aod united spirit on tlle part of tho people of
the loyal Srnte• to ioporeu it. Instead of tillCb an
eaay anprre..ioo, we have ~pent two yeara, almost,
1D wartare. We have thrown in.to tbe field a. mtlllon of men. We have poured oat our 1eaourcea
like water, and we iiod 011J11elvea &till engaged io
the fe&l'Cal atro~le.
Bot the oat1onal
la not the only one for
which false anticipations were formed-for which
the prel!tlot condi,ion ot tbio1:1 preeeoh a
cootr&,j, with the early vi,ione of it., 1opporte1'11.
·rhose wbo beard, in <.:ool{reu nod eb;ewhere, the
,·:stravagsncea of the con•1•i.ratora wil.l l<now what
were clu,r bopee what tbe1r expectations.
A speedy marcll o!)on the capital; a 1peedy ov~rthrow of,the legal Governmeut; a speedy
aion of a people too pu,iUnuhnollll to maio1.un their
rights; au.I upeedy anbje~tioo of the whole coootry
to the aa.umpt1otu1 of tb4' Sooth, were the promreetU
!eatorea of ttieir deloaion.
The cou~piratora taugllt their people to believe
tbat if war cawe it woo.Id not be on their aoil, As
yet, the boa, ile foot hua aoarcely trod the eoi.l of a
tree SIBW, nod 1t u upon the 110il of the St&tea ia
open r~bellion thnt tbe co,nea, bu mainly been
waged.
'l'he Rebel• found theimelvea, almon without
retist&Dce, in po!i!tW0n of every: fon and harbor on
the
of the revolted Sta.tea e.xcopt Fort
Pickens, Pen1acoln harbor, a.nd the iaofated fortifioa•
\ iiona lllld ba.rbors of Tortuga, and Key Weat.
0

Thoy were, for the time beinP', maatera of the territ.ory of the revolted States, of tbe depou, ar•ennle
and fortilicatious of the Goveroment, nod hacl hign
hopes tbai all the slaveboldiog Border S1n1e11
won!J soon be ouited witb them. Tile facL tbuL"'
many of these Statea bold to-Jov their true !lUd
loyal position in the GoverruneoL ilemonstrato;a tbMt
true patriotism and loyalty not c.inJioed to uoy
e~tion of the couolrv, and gives full nssunu,cc
tbat the Goverowent
be ni111otaioed, its Jariedlclion over ev~ry foot of our terrnory establlilbed,
and our nationality viodicatetl.
The event• of the past two yeart are too freah io
the memories of ail to require recapitulation.

will
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WlL\T THE WAR llA.S ACCO,JPLISIJED.

Your Comruittce will, however, briefly call
attention to tho fact that, from the commencement
of 11ctive military and naval operat1oos in the
\V-10ter and Sprmg of 1862, alm011t noioterropted
auccesa for eight momhsatLeoded all our operation,,
reeulr.illg in vaat conquests. Tbe triumphs of the
nav7 at Hatteru, Port Royal Md Fort Ileory,
were followed by lhe ,cictor!ea and cooqoee\a of the
army at Mill Sprlog, Fort
and Roaooko
lal&od. Misaonr1 waa wrenched from the Rebel
gT&ap, nod tbe Uohel armiea driven into .Arkan8BB,
,vbere they wen, defeated. in a pitched batue at Pea
B1dge.
By the capture of Fort Donelson Kentucky waa
nermaneotly redeemed, the capital of one of tbe
lnrgest revolted States seized, 1ier grant riven, Md
open to our flolillae, aud the war carried to the border. of the Go.IC Su1tee. Tile R~bel stroolfhold on
the lfumBippi, Columbus, Isl11nd No. 10, J:,'ort Pillow, together with Mempbi.£o, tbe most imi>Ortao,
commercial city of the State, fell iDto oar banda.
'l'he autumn of 18Gl bad wiuie'led the important
capture of Hatteraa I\Ild Port Royal by tbe nnvy.
Tl:icae auccesaee were followed through tt,ecombined
opera1ioo1 of tho army aod nuvy, 111 the Winter Rod
Spnng of 1862, by the capture of Roanoke l.al&nd
and Newbern, Beaufort. aud 1,'ort Macon, aud by
the redaction of the important fort, PoL.aki coutrolling the eotrnoce to tbe Savaonuh river;
F.,rt
Clio ch, coutrollinl! t be harbor aud railroad depot of
l,'emaudina; of .l!ort Marion, Rt St.Augustine. Dy
the firat-nawed 0J)<,rallons we acquired control of t~e
1puciooa inland waters of North Carol.iJla (Albelllnrl~
lllld Pamlico r.oonJ•), nnd their ndJaeeot shore,, nnd
of one of her two important 1<oportlr-B.?aufort.
By the wt, we made oaraelvea masters of the rlch
i.Janda and impor.ant harbore extendlo!{ along
tbe coast from Charleston to St.. Johu'e; leanog iu
tbo posaesaion of tbe lwbele, on the Atlantic coaal,
but two harbore, Chartes1<>n nnd Wilmingtou.
Bot the briUiant triumphs of our army and nary
ebewbere wen
by the capture of the
great ciiy of tbe Gui/, the depot ol the great Valley
of the .Miui.laippi-Xew-Orlean,; au achievement
whiob, eetimllted by the impc>Jt1mce of the cooqout
and the noble d11rfol1' of Its 01.eoutlon, ls scarcely aurpaaaed ia history. By this important conque1t we
obtained control of a large portion of LoUbiau, and
IIA:COUJPlli.hed the wo.,t important and difllonlt step
toward obtainmg tbe entire control of the
aippi River, an<l ca1111eJ the eurruoder of the harbor
of Peneacola, with the
yet beld by the
Rebel&,
In tlleae hastily aketcbed militury and naval opert.tiona, extending in the W eiit tbroagli the
of
.Arltan1115, .Mltsaouri, Teone""'e and Kentodrv, and
oo the Atlaut1c lellbow'd from Ilatterd8 to }'lorid3,
and on the Golt from Pensa.oola to the month• ot the
Yilliaippi, we really made cooque.sle ae ,·iut :>.a it
often fat!$ to the lot of the mOd! powerful and warlike notiona to make in eo •bort a period of time.
We poshed our oonqaesta by land through Mil!liOnri,
Kentucky: and Tenuesue to tbe very
of
the Golt Statea; ohtaioed coouol of the
)liver, except &boot 20J !Dile;i; occupied
of
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgilara-e po.rtioo of Loniaiana; fllized every important
fort and harbor 111 the Ilcbel territory, savo tbreo
1Wil.nina-ton, Cbrlo l~stoo a .<I Uobile,) redocit•t• to a
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-corresponding extent the labors of the blockading
aquadrou; captured foor&een vennanen~
fort,, amoug wbtch w ere tbe larges, on the Soulh-ern coast, euch na :Pulaeki, J3nrrancao, .McRae, Jnckeou, nud Sr. Philip. Followmg tbell8 cooquet1ls woa
t he rednction of Yorkto~·n and the e'l'aen:uioo of
NorloJk, by which the wn:.Ord of the J ~mes nnd
York lUvera wero laid open to o ur 11ce~3, nnd the
liebeb d ~privi!d of t he facilnies furni•hed by a gre"
=vy-yard,aud compelledtodo3troytheir onlymcana
-0rmenacing our ileete ia Ilampton Roada-the .Mor-

l'imnc.

WllAT MJGBT DAVE BEEN,

• lfad the succeu of t-he Army of the Potomac dur•
' fog ibie period corrcspo,ided wilb tho sncceaa of our
,. arms in olbcr part, of tho conutry, there is re:iaon
t.o believe t ho, the terminntlou or the campaiJI! of
1~ won ld have ~oeu. tbe Rebellion well-111gh, if
nol tintirely, overthrown.
lll<d Norfolk beon caJ'tnred do.ring the Wmter of
1861~, anti the blemuuo ta.ken possewon of or
ileetrovcd,
t be wn_y to l<lchmond, by moons of the
1
JawuiRiver, would han been op;,n, nod tbe fatal
1 delays of t be l'eniu1nh n~oided; or bad tbe enemy,
wben at l\taoassae llOOle limo during t be Autumn of
l t!Gl or Wiater o? 1861-62, ha'I'& been compelled to
come on, frorn bia iotrwctnneute and give 111
batlle a, be migh& have been, by threatening or
actually 1nterrnp1iog hla commuoicaiion between
Richmond and .r.Innneea~, on ,vbicb ho wholly depended for euppliee-a line so long and difllcul& to
mnintain tbnt we enbeeqnen1ly did not deem it
pr11cticable for uri-we could bavo met him with an
army great~r t han it. wua ever propoeed to take
.ag11nai Ricbmond, and either have opened the way
to the Rebel ca.pi1al or made it. nnneceasary to go
$here.
l o military movement. delaf. ia generally bad--indecision ia almOBt alway• fata • 1n our movements
wo seem 10 have too olten forgotten that. momenu1m
is made up of weight aml fJ<locity ; that the force of
the blow may depend as much u110~ the colerity of
tho moveruen, llil upon the weigbt.o! the boJy moved.
Tho world"a history ebowa that the auccea,:fnl
GeoerLl hll8 met b11 enemy tbe duy l;efore he waa
~ted-uot tho week or month after. Some of
-0nr point& of ntt11ck have been so clearly iodicnted
to tlie enemy beforehand, nnd on.r movements made
-wilh so mucb deuy end ltelitation, that he baa been
able not ooly to fortify bi1 \>OfilU001 end concentrate
Ilia forces, bat even to call 1uto tbe field new armle1
to meet
A, such point, we have failed.
It u rarticularly worthy of note t hat, in the re.
-verooe which follo wed tho fatlnre of ~he Peni111nla
campnign, at the time wbeo the army of the Rebela
had reached ita ,tttatet\ etreng<h aod ite hlgbeat state
-of euthlll!iasm, tbe1 d i,1 not permanently reiain any
territury or roo:ipture and ho1d any of tho important
or CODtrolliug poinlll before held by us on Retie! aoiL
Their =bes upon W .iabington, .Maryland, and
aliO Loui,,ville, were little more than raida1 from
I which they were obliged to retire before our oppoting forcea. 'l'bia fact clearly ehow1 that while it ii
impo.tible for us to constantly rettllll milii.ary poea.eaeion of oll the vast Rebel territory oye.r which we
mny be caUed upon lo pal!S in on.r OJ>erationa 11gain1t
their nrmie@, atill the t-erritory once held or oooop1ed
by 1B caoo01, ba penn'l!lently ttga!ned by tbem-a
sure indication ot our ultimate enccess.
' The p1111t, notwitL1tanding its errore and roveraee,
ill full of encourBgemtnt, nnil gives fnll ia.•nmoce of
final ~uccei,, No p_reat war waa ever condacted by
any people or Oov,mment without gt"eot mistnkeagiviDg to the critic, of the time au<! t boao of enncecding e:eoer:dona a wide and nmple field for their
labon. No people o:i eartb were ever cJl!e.1 eud•
do1!lV intu II grcut war more totally uapropared Lbllll
were the loyii.l people of thie Governmoat. We feh
ro well 38811n!d of on.r po,,ltion among tho powen of
the world that we bad lllmost concluded we bad
fooiht our laet ba~tl~, and our army and navy had
1l0me to ba regard~d by_lDlloy
appendages
to tbe Government. Wo bad concluded that, doin~
j 111tice to the nation, of the w orld, we abonld re•
cei,e justice in rel11r11; and the loyal portion of the
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people were devoting all their energiea and l)OWel'I
to the arts or peace, tho advancement of cM\ozatlon, the development of the rich and variod resources of our now nod gre:it country; 1111d i n tbeee
every m~n fooud full ocenpatton ror bia talent• and
11 wide field for Lie ambition-no man ever dre~minir
t bnt t ho parricidal arm would e,·cr be raised agawet
n Government ao mtld in it, sway, so beuizaanl in
iu, i ollnence o..-er nil its subject.a.
I I w111 Indeed difficuh t or a peopletbne engroeaed,
suddenly nod almost without warning, to turn its
attention to w ar. Tbe R t belt believed os to l>e
entirely det"oted to tho _purenile of peace that we
ebonld yield to tbeir demands rather than be diverted from t hem ; nnd ben,·e their ncfariona attempi to o..-er tbrow this fair Govern111eu•, and
erect on ite rllina that horrid deformity, a free Government with human Slavery for its corner-stone.
How t erriblv they have beenmietakeo, the pUB& bu
ntn,ady abown; and yet the energies and powers
nod reeoarces of the loy11l people havo hardly begun to bo npplled to tho suppression of tho Rebellion. T hey m ust meet aud contend io battle
with t hat strength nud power and intell\gence
which bue built factories and w orkebops, r ailroads
a nd eteawboste, covered the ocun witll ahipe, and
filled the mnrkeh of t he world with the produd of
brsin and h:wda; and they will find these no leea
powerlul for destruction t bau for production, when
once fally npplled in that direction.
All the great indnetrial lnuresta of the l oyal
States were never more active, more prosperous,
than a~ tb1s time. .All that baa been Jost by the
supply of men ~o the army baa been made op l>y in•
creased activity nnd energy, and the 11dapt11Lio11 of
mnchioery to w ork heretofore done by t he bu!IWl
band. 'l'bere ie onlv Lhia marked dift,irence: here•
tofore all t beee great forces have been applied for
tho benellt of.the arta of pence; now they all look
primarily to tbe prosecution of war i and yoan,
would bave co elape&-far more than would be required to cru.b outthe Uebellion- llefore we &llonld
develop our fnll eLrength for war.
Wit6in Iese than two years we have thrown Into
and &tllltained in t he field an &Mlly of a m•llion of
men. We have created a navy with which we have
blookadcd a conat greater in extent than waa ever
attempted by any Government beforo and by on.r
lnveutio111 and i mprovements eo compfetely revolationized naval warfare
to render ihe naviee and
aea-coast defense& of the world well nigh uselel!S,
The efflcieac1 of thia blockade ii attested not onl,:
by the deatltnuon of tbe
in every article of
foreign produolion, bnt by tbe ory that comes to 111
overv day from all parte of the world\ in any degree
depeiident upon tbe products of the b ockaded territory, stimulating us to et11J greater exertion to crn6h
ont tbiJ Rebellion, thot. the blockaded porta may be
thrown open to the legitimate com01erce of the
wodd.
An.1 while, lo on.r eff'orta to maintain our Govern•
ment. and -vmdicate free inatiLutiona, we neither
asked nor desired tbe aid of any foreign nalion or
Gonrnment, we did at lent upec1 of the le11ding
Powera of Enrope that they should refrain from extendi11g oid and encoarogement to allebellioo agalnrt
a friendly Government, thereby prolon.;iog a atrng•
1l'le wbicll C8ll only bnul( mlsery and
upon
the whole civilized w orld..t lllld may ii:, the end lead
to a war between.OW' uovernmeot. ood £Omo ot
t boae Powel"'!, the fall effects of which ilie intare
alone can oiBcloae.
· OUR RESOURCES,

We have carried on, ahall cariy on and conclade
tbl. war, without tonch;ng one dolllrof tbe accoma•
lated capital of tbo conntry, We are already a.titonlBhed at the r evcnne now bfing raued lrom 1bo taJC•
auon of onr daily rmxluctio~, 11Ud ret. wo do not be·
11ln to realize tbu nmonnt to be yielded by the •Y•
t em already adopte~L_or t be extent to w tiell that
1yatem miu- 1,e ew.al"Jl"cd, without. impo:!inc any
grievoU8 burdell8 upon the ptoplc-any burilen to
which they will not checrfally eubmlLto nccompliBh
the object 'intended.
No Oovernment. can 1011g carry on a war which
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mnst ho sustained by the accumulated capital or the
country, and there is scarcely a limit to tbe time war
may be prosecuted by a Government whose credit
is sustained by the re~euuea de1ived from tbe accnmulahng weallh oh!Je couotrv.
REBEL DEFICIENCIES.

Every dollar tbe Rebels have expended or
can expend i1 this Rebellion has been nod
mnst conunne to be drawn from their nccu.nulated c~piul. Their iatercourse with fo1eign nationu
bas been almost wholly enepended nil their industrial iatereste have been paralyzed, and there is no
~ource from which they can dori ve 11weone or ~eiins
1or the mamtenonce of the war, except by depnv1og
the people of their property, day after day, nnd
yoar ulter year, so long as the war shall continue,
thus rednciog them to po\"erty 11Dd w,mt. Thia is
a truth whlcb tbe people in the rovol~d States are
already begioniog to realize. They bad been made
to belien that au export duty on cotton, which tbe
world would be obl,~ed to pa,Y, would yield tbem
tbe ricbeat revenue ever realized by auy Government, nnd that if tbe l,ederal Governwtnt should
attempt int&1ference with its exportutiou, they
conld command the arniiee and navies of Euro~ to
:fight their baules for lbem. Bow bitter mnst be
tlieir disappointment as they apply with their own
handa the torch which conaigoa H to ashes, and then
are compelled to supply to their leaders, from their
other property, tbe means to sustain the Rebellion I
Their currency bes almost ceased to be regarded,
even by themsel vee, as the representative of valne.
Conscription has exhaDSted thetr people, and the
wealth which long years of uninterrupted proeperity
under the best go,,erument the world ever saw, had
placed· in their haude, has already been expended,
aad th"Y are now struggling on with the vain hope
that diaaeotiione among Ouri!<lhes, orforei~iotervention, may save them from tha, ruin ,vhlch they see
cleatly impending over them. Every day must show
them mor~ and more clearlv that on nei,ber of these
1K>nrcee can they rely for help. 'l'he utter scorn and
contempt wi1b wbieb every man in tbe hyal State•
who proposes aoy ndjnetment of tbis contest except
the nbsolme, unqunliJiea, nnd noconditional eub~ugatiou of every l(ebel in tbe land to the Coostit11t10n
and tbe laws, is held by every officer nnd soldier in
our army, and every loyal man in the country, must
banish from th~ir minds the last 1·a y ot hope from
that source, 'l'he reaction wbich followed the recent
slight manifostatione ot n willingnes• on the part of
a few SeceEsion sympathizers to offer terms ot compromise must convince tbem tbnt they hn.vo no alllea
in the loyal States on whom tbey cnn 1-ely; and the
present condition of affairs in Eorope mll8t forever
crnell that fu.l.se and delwtlve hope which they have
heretofore entertained, that t be intervent1Qn of
European powere might enable them to accomplish
whai they know full well they can never attain llll•
aided.
THE TASK DEFORE US.

We now see clearlv wh11t we have to do. We
must obtain uninterrupted control of the Mississippi. We m~t roach those sreat railroad arteries
-the one bordering the Atlantic seaboard, tbe other
stretching through t.be Virginia. and Tennessee valleya to tbe WCJt nnd eoutb. We mast, as soon oa
possible, take the few fo1-tified seaports remaining
m pc;ssosiion of the Rebels, cut· it oil' from all external wurces of food nod n=, and I.lave surrounded it by forces which can prees upon it from any
q_uatter, at the &amo time ecvering 10to i ,olnted port1ons tbe Ue'.Jel territory and deatroying their means
of intercommunication, by wbcb c/one they have
hitherto l)eijn enal,led to meet us m force wherever
we have pr.seated ooraelvea, and by which alone
thi,y hlVO been able to !eed a.11d supply tlleir o.:mies.
BypoSBe1!6io!{ ourselves of, nnd keeping open, the
great natural highways alone (and o. possewiou o! a
llavy by WI Ehoo!d have early suggested this), w11
eever parts ot· their tcrriwry mnuiall,y dependent,
and, while crippliog them, eue.blo onrselves tc,
speedily concentrate on:r forces 11t noy point when,
it m.ay be adviaable to alrike.

These decisi "e measnrea wo nre uctanlly executing or preparing to s.,eeote. Tbe snccesaes and con,
quests we have &lreadv described have curried us
tbrough the f)rel.arln,, ry etogaa, and t he blows we
now strike-eac.h one of them that succeede-will
reach the very ntals of ihe Rebellion. Let any one
cnst hill eye upon t ue n1a1•, u11d the•e troths will be
apparent.
It may be io the fu,ure, as io the p:,e_t; we i!ba!J.
meet with reYerses: thcv nre the ioe,·1taule 1oc1deuts of I\ grent wur exrendiog over 80 V P.St D territory\ and r equiring grea, armies at so widely separatea polllts'. \Ve bave alrei.Jy aeen that i., ill
our.true pohcy to attempt nn actlul military
paiioo ot tb.e Rebel ltrritory, cxc,;pt u~ a 1, w snc,
1mp('tlaot cont.rolling poiut._ We must deslroS
their armies, 110d to uo t hia we mu.st coucrnt1-ate,
not scatter, our for~s. It is I.letter to 0JJ~tJll.e auccesshilly ag&iust ooe strongbold or one arwy thau to
attempt llaee 1tnd fail. Toe iudleationa now clearly
ft~e tba~, bo\h in the E!~rnotl W~st, tlle campai$U0f
1863 will give ua brll 1aut acbteveruent,-dtti.'ive
victoriei. Our Genemls uow in the ftcltl have tile
full coufi<lence of thll eoltliers and the people, and
the armies will 1-io forth, koowiog that t beir 1-anke
are to be m11ile fall I tlJat every day that pag,es will
add to, uot diruini,h, !,heir strength or 11uo.bera.
Never befor~ did ilJe tvodd i;ee EUoh nu army in the
field; never be~ore diJ Geoerul~ lead soc!) men to
battle. Each mun goes fo1th feclkig, nol only that
he hne n soldhr's 1-epot~tion to m111Ut:i.in, lmt ulao
tbat be Loo a country ti) defend ia whicb l>i.a intereGt is a.s great as ihat of tho hlgbest officer i u tho
land. Snell nu army, with its oo.. rgy, J:0wor, intelligence and wiU, properly directed, maat bij invincible. The pnst hasalreadv demonstrated that the true
American soldier cau be relied upon, to dare, do,
and endure oil tbat hnmnn power can attempt, accomplish, or susLniD.
L tt no men be pl<iced or kept in command of such
men who h ave not the nLility to command and the
will to do; tbu.~ ti.le errors aud mi•takes of tbe past
will be avoided in tbe fotare, tile food hopes nud
auticip:mous of a true and loyal peopl~ realized, the
Governmeu t vindie11ted and rebollioo. speedily and
forever crushed.
We know tbut th.is con.teat has cost 09 and will
cost us tre11.awesaud blood-the best bloodever shed
by any people in nu1.inteuauce of their Government
and in d~fensa of fr~einstitutioll.6-tbe blood of the
tlower of our l and. Lehlll not make their lives a
vain offering, by for a moment entertaining the Iden
of a partition of our territory, which would forever
iuvolve us in auarchy nod border ware, or by any
b&lle compromise wah Rebel.e.
We owe it to the noble dead who have shed &heir
blood in founding and defeudinir tbio Government;
we owe it to ourselves; we owe it Lo the countless
millions who are to come after ns, to maintain this
Government and the inatitutiollll we have inherited
from onr fathers-tbe ricbe&t legac_y ever beqneathed
by one generation to anotber-.llld to transmit them
to our posterity, if not improved, certainly unim•
paired.
In conolnsioo, your Committee will only say, that
all the men who hold high positioos in th" army and
navy, und have rendered valuable service• to the
country, with whom they have held iutercourae,
unite in the opinion tha~ fi;l'hting, nnd crity UJ!lltfag,
cau end this Rebellion; that every traiwr 1n tile
lnn.d mn.t and eh:lll be. made to acknowledge ,md
yield absolute, unqualified and uooond.itionul obedience to the Conetmrtion and laws.
And your Committee believe this to be the senti•
• ment1 not only of the army and navy, bat of ev<>ry
mnn 10 the country-traitors ancl coward.a alone e:s:-
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LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL.
The British Envoy at Washington has hitherto had credit for a forbearance and imparti.Blity with
rflo"llrd to our internal qWlrrel whereof Earl Russell has seen :fit suddenly to disrobe him. The followiDg dispatch, written by Lord Lyons to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the I 'Ith of last November, gives an edifying account of a visit by Lord L. to this city O)!- the 8th, and of certaiD remarkable
conferences had by him here with certain persons whom he characterizes as "the conservative
leaders."
much afraid of its coming too soou. It was evident
that they appreuended that a premature proposal of
foreign intervention would afford the Radica.l party
r ultimo, and of the 7th instant, Mr. Stnert reported
a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and ol
to yonr Lordabip the results of the elections for
thus defeating the peacefal plans of the Conservamembers of Congrees and State officers which have
tives. They appeared to regard the present moment
recently taken place in eevera! of the most important
States of the Union. Without repeat1nJl the aetails, •as pecnlia?ly unfavorable for such an offer, and, indeed, to hold that it would be essential to the sucit will be sufficient for me to o~serve tbat the success
cess of any proposal from abroad tllat it should be
of the Democratic or (asit now etyleaiteelf) the Coniservative party, bae been eo great as to manifest a . deferred until the control of the Executive Government should be in the h!llltls of the Convervative
change in public feeling among the most rapid and
ihe moat complete that h\111 ever boen witnel!SOO, even party.
I gave no opinion on tho subject. I did not say
in tbia country.
whether or not I myself thought foreign intervenOn my arrival at New-York on the 8th instant I
tion probable or advisable; but I listened with atfo11Dd the Conservative leaders cxultin~in the crowntention to the account• given me of the plan, and
ing aucceBB achieved by the party 111 that State.
hopes of the Conaervative party. At the bottom I
Tliey appeared to rejoice, above all, in the cou"\"'iction
thought I perceived a deeire to pu'. au end to the
tba, persooal liberty ar.d freedom of s~chhad been
war, even at the ri9k of losiocr the Southern States
secured for the principal State of the Unioo. They
aliogetber; bot it was plain tbat it wae not thought
belieYed thae the Government muet at once desist
prudent to avow this desire.. Indeed, aomo hints of
from exercising in the State of New-York the extra•
it, dropped before the elections, were ao ill received
ordinary (and as they regarded them) illegal and u:ithat a strong deelaration in the contrary seneo wu
conalitutional powen.wbich it had IISllamed. They
deemed neceS8ary I, y the Democratic leadEl3.
were confident that as all eve.ntl after the 1st of
At the present momeut, therefore, the cbiefs of the
January next, on which day the newly-elected
Coueervative party call loudly for a more v;gorous
Governor would come into office, the euepena1on of
prosecution ofthe war, and repronc.b the Government
the writ of habeas corpua could no, be practically
with slackneaa as well as with want of success in its
maintained. They seemed to be persuaded that the
result of the elections would be accepted by the • military measures. Bot they repudiate all idea of
interfering with the institutions of the Sonthern peoPresident as a declaration of the will of the people;
ple, or of waging a war of subjagation or externuoathat ha would increase the moderate and conservation. They maintain that the object of tbe•military
tive element in the Cabinet; that he would seek to
operations sbonld be to place the North in a position
terminate the war, not to push it ,o extremity; that
to demand an armistice with honor and with effect.
be would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with
The armistice ehoold (they hold) be followed by a
the peoJ.>le of the l:ioutb, and renounce the idea of
Coi>.nntion, in which such changes of the Constitu•
subjogatUlg or exterminating them.
tion should be proposed as wonld give the Sooth
On the following moroing, however, iotelligeuce
ample security on the subject of it,s slave property,
arrived from Washington which dashed the rising
and would enable the North nnd the South to reunite
hopes of the Conservatives. H was announced that
and to live together in peace aud harmony. The
Gen. .McClellan bad been dismissed from tbe comConservatives profeSB to think that the South might
JDand of the Army of the P otomac, aud ordered to
be induced to take part in such a Convendon, and
repair to bis home; that he llad, in fact been reJDoved altogether from acli"l"'e service. The General thai a reetoration of the Union would be the result.
The
more sarcious members of the ptirty most,
bad been regaraed as the representative of Co11Ssrhowever, loo upon the proposal of a Convention
vative principles iu the army. Support of him had
merely WI a last ei..l)eriment to test the pouibility of
been made one of tlle · articles of the Conservative
rennion. They are no doubt well aware that the
electoral programme. His dismissal was takeo as a
more probable consequenco of an armistice would be
aigu that the President bad thrown himself entirely
the establishment of Southern independence; bnt
into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and that
they perceive that if the South is to ottel"lyalienated
the attempt to carry out the policy of that
that no poeeible concessions will iudoce it to return
party would be persiated in. The irritation of the
volnntai:ily to the Union, it is wiser to agree to
Conservatives at New-York was certa.inly very
separation than to prosecute a oruol aud hopeleBB
great; it lle<!med, however, to be not unmixed witll.
war.
consternation and despondency.
It is with reference to such an armistice as they
Several of the leaders of the Democratic party'
desire to attain that the leaders of tho Co11Sorvative
eougM iuterviewa with me, both before and after
the arrival of the intelligence of Gen. McClelhw'a
f::;{regard the question of foreign mediation. Thev
· that the otle1• ofmecliation, 1f made, to a. Raddiamissal. 'l'hs subject uppermost iu their minds
ical Administration, would be rejected; that if made
whtle they vrere speaking to me was naturally thllt
at
an unpropitioua moment it migh, increase the
of foreign mediation between the North and Sooth.
1
virnlence with which the war ia prosecnted. If
I Many of them £eemed t<r think that tbis medialioo
thwr own party were m power, or virtwilly con, 10118\ llOWe at last; but they appeared to be very
WASHINGTON, Nov.17, 1862.

MT Loan, In bis dispatches of the 17th and 24th

tr-0Jled t\11~ Adminiatration, 1h y woolJ ntl e, . if
s•'l"ere ncconnt for their exlra leQ'a) proceedings.
'J)oaaible. obtRfo an armistice without the aid of forDuring the ae3aio11 of Congre•s which bel(i.oe next
tiin G,wernment•; but t •ey woul l be dieposed to
month, the present Admini.Lration has indeed reason
ac~ept no offer of medi·uiou if U appearad to be tbe
to expect an uncompromi•ing support from a maouly means of p11tting a stop to hostilitie•. They • jority of both Hou,es of Con?f<!!P. But on the 4th
wonld d~r,ire that the oft', r should come from the
of Much next the existing Hc,uae of Representatives
irreat Powers of Europe oonjoint'y, and in par1ic,ular
is <iusolved by the t.erms of the Consthuti.on, and at
that os little prominence 1\11 possible sbonld be given
the eame time several of the present Senators go ont
to Grca~ Britain.
of ofllce. Tho majority of the memoorachoeen al the
At Waelno""ton I have bad fewer opportnoitiee
~cent elections for the new House of Representathan I bad aiNew-York of uscertaioiog tbe present
tives are of the Democratic or Conservative part1.,
'Viewa of the cLie·s of the politics.I parties. At the
aod in some States Senators of that party will
ior,erview which I had with l\Ir. Seward, one day
be returned lo the room of those whose term,
after my auival, 1::e showed no disposi1ion to enter
?f _oflice e.x pire next March. The new Congre&
upon PoliL1cal ma,te". He did not app,ar to expect 1s m fact lik,l v 10 be hostile to the Adm.lllistration
or to desire to receive from me any special cocnmuni!'nd_to the_ radical party; an~, although it will not,
cation from her Majesty'• Government. 'l'he Pres- 10 toe ordinary course of things, assemble until the
ident, when I waited upon him, talked to me only
last month of '!ex_t ye_ar, the President will hardly
on ordinary topice. I, for my part, gladly shunned
be abl.9 to pera.. t m l,1e present POiicy and in hie 86•
a U allusion to forei_s:n intervention, my principal ob•~mption of 1:i;traordinary powers, unless be cau, in
ject being to avo1a ~aying any!·hilllf w~ich might
virtue of nnhtary oucceeee•, obtain a reputation
embarraas me in carrying out any1n•truct1one.on the
with the J)OOple which will sustain him in a contest
subject which I may receive from your lordsb1p.
with the Legislature.
All ibrnga conaidered, my own opinion certainly is
It would seem, then, to be vain to make an offer
that the nresent moment ia, not a fav_orable one for
of mediation t-0 tbe present Government, in their
making an offer of medlat1on. It Dllgbt embarran
present mood, with any notion that 1t wonld be acthe reace party, and even oblige them, io or_der to
cepted. A clmnge of mood may, howenr tako
maintain their popolaritv, to mt1ke some pnbho deplace after the 4th of March, if no great militar,
darat1oos against it, and thia might make it di.lllcnlt
anccesses occur in the inl<lrval. Snch a change may
for them to accept a similar offer ut a more propitious posaibly be produced sooner by military reverses. A
time. It would in all probability be reje<ited bf the
proposal, however, to mediate, made eveu under
President, who appears t.o have thrown himsel into
present circumetaoces, by three or more of tbe
the arms of the extreme radical party. The vie~s
Great Powers ~f Europ~ conjointly, might not proof that party are clear and definite. They declare that
duce anv great mooovemence.
there is no )lope of 1·econciliation with the Southern
It i~, fodeed, nrged by some people tba.t mediation
eboold be offered, not eo much with a view to i ts bepeople; that the war mu•t bo pursued, 'f)er fas aut
mfas, until the duloyal men of the South are ruined
ing accepted, ae to ill! clearing the way for a recogand subjugated, if no\ exterminated; that not an
nition or the Sontbern Confederacv. And, indeed,
inch of tho old territory of the Republic miut be
if it were determined that the time had come for regiven up; that foreign intervention, 10 any shape,
cognizing that Confederacy, no doubt an offer o(
most be rejected and resented. 'fhia party would
mediation would be n enitable prehminary. But I
desire to turn an offer of mediation to account, for
do uot clearly understand wbat advantage is eltpectthe purpoee of infla.mmg the war spirit nnd prod11c•
ed to resnlt from a simple reco~:ion of the Southiog a reaction sgainet the Conservatives.
ern Government; and I presume that the European
1118 probable, too, that the Government would
Powers do not contemplate breaking np the blockurge, in nnswer to an olfer of mediatioo, that it has
ade by force of arm•, or engaging iu hostilities with
by no means abandoned the hope of patting down
the United States io support of tll.e independeuce of
tbe Rebellion within a reasonable lime; that, at all
tbe South.
events, this is not a moment at which it cau rensonI hnvo, indeed, heard it me,iutainel that Great
:1bh ho called opon to put a stop to hostilities. It
Britain flhonld reco~oize the independence of the
would ob~erve that tho urmi,a of the United Stnte,
South as soon as poSB1ble, with a view to impede the
are e'l'erywbere advancing, and thnt e.'l:peditions ><re
success of the efforts of the Conservative party to
• prepared ngainst Texas, as well as against Charlesreconstruct the Uruon. The advocates of this opinton, l\Iobile, and other poiot.s on the coast. It would
ion consider a reunion a prGbnble event, and apprellOint out that i: had equipped a coneiderabl(I numhend th:1t the firat resnlt of it ,vorild be that the
ber of war ve:iscls, iron-clad ns well as others, nt a
cowbined forces of tho North and South would be
vast expense; that the 88ason haijast nrrived when
let looee upon Canadd. I cerWoly do not at presthe Aut111nn rains would render tbe rivers navigable
ent ebare tbes9 apprehension~ All hope of the reby armed versele, and when tho Southern coaat constructlcn oftbe Union appear! to befadingaway,
would be free from epidemic disease. It migM even even from the mind,i of those who mo•t ardently derepresent an advance of the Army of the Potomae
rue it. But i! the reconstruction be still possible, l
to Richmond as a probable event. Tbo experience
do not think that wo need conclude that it would
of the paet is certdnly- not calculated to 111spire any lead to an invasion of Cau11da, or to noy consequengreat confidence in tho results of these warlike ces iD_jm·ions to Qre9.t Britain. A.t nnyrate1 daogers
l)?eparatioos; but in the polit1cal intereata of tbe of thi.8 kind are remote. The immedia1e ana obv10ns
pa.rty now in power render a continuance of tbo inter..'llt of Great Britain, a, well WI thereat of Euwar a necessity to it. Its only chance of regaining ~ope1 is that peace and prosperity should be reatored
its Josi populsf!ly lies in .successfcl D:1ilitary opef:1• t:> tnia country a, soon n9 possible. Tbe point
tiona. Unless ,t can obtmn a mucll higher place 111 chiefly "'ortby of consideration appeara to be whet.hp11blic ca-.ima.1,ion thllll i, now occupies, not only will er .sePll!attou or renDion be the more likely to eftect
its tenure of power become extremely precarious,
thi.8 ohJect.
I have, &o.,
L YOIIS,
bnt somA or its leading members may be called to 11
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HOW TO PROSECUTE AND HOW TO END THE WAR.
SPE ·E OH
OF

MAJ.-GEN. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
AT 'flIE

ACADEMY OF MUS IC ,
THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 2, 1863.

The magnificel)t assemblage of the choicest of
the city, which 'gathered on Thursday evening,
April 2, in the Academy of Music, to greet the hero
of the Gulf, has seldom been paralleled in the l)istory of this continent. The house was completely
filled in every part long before the hour of commencement. While waiting for that hourMajor-Gen. Wool, upon advancing to take bis
seat on the platform, was recognized by the audience, and greeted with applause, " •bich he acknowledged in a few .firm and patriotic word~.
At 1-2 o'clock precisely Senator Morgan, accompanied by several gentlemen, conducted Gen.
Butler upon the stage. Immediately there began
a cry of enthusiasm and a scene of excitement
which very few people i.n this city have witnessed.
Wjtb the thunde1·s of applause, shouts of admiration, waving of hats, bouquets and handkerchiefs,
the whole interior of the Academy except the
roof was alive and id motion. For several minutes this continued. At last, when it had partially
subsided, Senator Morgan presented Gen. Butler
to the Mayor. The presentation was but a pantomime, for the cheering was yet so great that the
Senator's words could not be heard.
The Mayor then welcomed Gen. Butler, in an
exceedingly .Pertinent and happy address, which
was entbusias~ically ~eceivcd,-the General, who
was in citizen's dress, standing the while. When
the Mayor had concludedGen. BUTLER advanced, and, aft.e r the tumultuous
applause with which he was again greeted had
subsided, he said:
Mr. l\fayor, with the profoundest gratitude for
the too flattering commendation of my administration of the various trusts committed to me by
the Government, which, in behalf of your associates, you have been pleMed to tender me, I ask
you to 1·eceive my most heartfelt thanks. To the

citizens of New York here assembled in kind appreciation of my services supposed to have peen
l'eud.ered to the country, I tender the deepest aoknowledgments
[Applause.] I accept it all;
not for myself, but for my brave oomrades of the
Al'my of the Gulf. [Renewed applause.] I receive it as au earnest of your devotion to _tlie countl'y, au ewdence of your loyalty to the constitution
.under which you live and under which you hope
to die. Io order that the acts of the Army of the
Gulf may be understood, perhaps it would be well,
at a little length, with your permission, that ~ome
detail should be giveu to the thesis upon whi~h we
admini..tered our dnties. The first que!!f.ion then.
to be :i.scertaioed is. What is tbis contest in which
tlie country is engaged I At the risk of being ,.
little tedioi1s, at the risk ev-en of e&Uiag yN1r attention to what might seem otberwiee too elcwn•
tary, I propose to run down tbrou , n the hisfory
of the contest to see what it is ttat the whole
country is about at this daY. and this hour~ That
we are in the midst of civil commotion, alrlrnow.
But what is that commotion I Is it a riot I · Is it
an insurrection I Is it a rebellion f Or is it a
revolution f And pray, sir, althou~h it may .seem
still more elementary, What is a r10t1 A riot, if
I understand it, is simply an outburst of the paasion of men for the momeut in breach of the law,
to be P.ut doJVn and subdued by the civil authorities; if it goes further, to be dealt with by the
military authoritie~. But you say, sir, "Why
tre_at us to a definition of a riot upon this ocoasiob f Why, of all things, should you undertake
to instruct a New York audience in what a riot
is I'' [Laughter.] To that I answer, because the
Administration of ~'\r. Buchanan dealt with this
great change of sffa\rs as if it were a riot; because his Government officer gave the opinion that
in Charleston it was but a riot; and as there was
no civil authority there f,o call out the military,
therefore Sumter must be given over to the riot~
ers; and that was the beginning of this struggle.
Let us see how it grew up. I deal not now in
causes but in effects-in facts. Directly aft.er the
guns of the Rebels h5d turned npon Sumter, the
various States of the South, in Convention assembled, inaugurat ed a series of movements which
took out from the Union divers States; and as
each was attempted to be taken out, the riot waa

I

no.Jonger found in them, but they beeame imur- only that, buf they took at'ms in their hands, and
r ectfonary ;, and the Administration, upon the 15th undertook by force to rend from the Government
of April, 1861, dealt with it as an msunection, what seemed to them the fairest portion of the herand called out tho militia of the United States to itage which my fathers had given t~ me as a rich
eubduenn insurrection. I wns called at that time legacy to my cnildren. When they did that, they
into the service, to administer the laws in putting abrogated, abnegated, and forfeited every conetidown an inaurrection. I found a riot at Balti- tntiooal right, and released me from every oonstitnmore. They burned bl'idges; but they had ha1•dly tional obligation. [Loud cheers.] And when I was
IIJ'isen to the dignity of an insurrection, because thus called upon to say what should be my
the Slate had not moved as an organized ()om- action with regard to slavery, I was left to the
munity. .A. few men were rioting at Baltimore; natural iQstincts of my heart, as prompted by a
and as I marched there at the hend of United Christian education in New England, and I dealt
sta.ies troops, the question came up befo,·e me, with it accordingly, as I was no lo.nger bo,1nd.
whatlutve I ·before IUe. ...:You will remember that [Immense applause.] Then I undertook earnestly
I offered then to put down all kinds of insurrec- and respectfully to maintain, with the same sense
tions so long as the State of Maryland remained of dnty to my ()Onstitutional obligations and to
Joyal to the United States. Transferred from State rights, so long ns they remained under the
thence to a wider sphere at Fortress }ifonroe, I Constitution, that required me to support the sysfound that the State of Vfrgi.rria. through its organ- tom of slavery-and the same sense of duty and
ization. bad taken itself out of the Union. and was right, after they had gone out from nuder that
endeavoring to erect for itself nn Jndependent Gov- Constitution,caused me to follow the dictates of my
ernment; and I dealt wit,b that State us being in own conseiifoce untrammeled. [Cheei-s.] So, my
rebellion, and t.honght the property of the Rebels, friends, you se!l, however :misjudging I_ may have
of whatever name or nature, should be dealt with been-and I speak to my old Democratic friends• as rebellions property and eont1·abaud, (Great I claim we went along, step by step, np to that
applause. l
point, and we shonld still go a]Qng, step by step;
I have "been thus careful in ~tnting the various for, except th() 1·ight to bold slaves was made a
steps, because, although through your kindness part of the ()OIDpromises made by our fathers iu
replying to. eulogy, 1 am here answering every the Constitution, and if their State rights were to
charge of inconsistency and wrong ofiotention for be respected because of our allegiance to the Conmy acts done before the Muntry. Wrong in judg- stitution and our resp~t to State rights, yet, when
ment I may hnve been, bnt, I insist, wrong in in- that sacred obligation was taken away, and we as
tentioa or inconsistent, never. Upod the same well as the negroes were disenthralled, why should
theory upon which I felt n1yself bound to put dowb not -we follow the dictate of God's law and huinsurreotion in Maryland while it remained loyal, manity
(Tremendous applause, and ()ries of
whether that insurrection· consisted of blacks or "Bravo, Bravo."] By the exigencies of the public
-whites, by the same loyalty to the Constitution. servi()e, removed on()e more to another sphere of
sod laws I felt bound to ()oruiscate slave property action, nt New Orleans, I found this problem t(!
in the rebellious Stat11 of Virginia. fApplouse.] come up in another form, and that led me to examPardon me, sir, -if right here I say that nm a little ine and see how fat· had progressed this civil
sensitive upon this suLject. I am an old-fashioned commotion, now carried on by force of arms. I
Andrew Jackson. Democrat of twenty yearii stand- fo1md, under our complex system of States and an
itc . rApplnnse. A voi()e : "The second hero of independent government, and the united States
mw 6rleaus." Renewed applause, culminating in Mvering all, that there can be treason to t.be State
three cheers. J And so far IIB I know, Ittave never and not to the United States, and revolution in the
swerved, so help me God, fro111 one of his teachings. State and not as 1·egards the United States, and loy[Great applause.] Up to the time that disll.lli.on alty to the State and disloyalty to the Union, and
took place, T went as fa!' as the furthest in sustain- loyalty to the Union and disloyalty to the organized
ing the constitutional rights of th.e States, however government" of the State. And, 118 a.n illustration,
bitter or however distnst()fnl to me were the obli- take the troubles which almost lately arose in the
gnti.ons my fathers had mnde fo1• me in the com- State of Rhode Island, where there was an attempt
promises of the Constitution, au<l. among them it to rebel against the S·.ate government, and to
-was not for me to pick out the sweet from the bit- change the form of State government. All of you
ter; and, fellow-Democrat~, I took them all [loud are familiar with the movements of Mr. Dol'l';
oheera], because they were constitutional obliga- there was no intent of disloyalty against the Unitions [applause J; and, taking them all, I stood by ted States, but a great deal against the State govthe South, and by Southern 1-i~hts under the Con- ern.ment. I, therefore, in Louisania, found a State
stitution, until I advanced nnd looked into the very government that had entirely changed its form,
pit of disunion, and not liking the prospect I quiei- and had revolutionized itself w far as she ()Onld;
ly withdrew. [lmmonse applause and laughtei-.7 created courts and imposed taxes; and I found, so
And we were from that hour apart, and how far far as this State government was ()Oncemed, it waa
apart you can jndge when I tell you ~at on the no longer in and of itself one of the United States
28th December, 1860, I shook bands on terms of of America. It had, so far as it could, changed its
personal friendship with Jefferson Davis, and on State government, and by solemn net had forever
the 28th December, 1862, I had the pleasure of seeeded from the United States of America, and
reading his proclamntion tliat 1 ,vas to be bauged attempted to join the Confederate States; and I
at sight. [Great applau~e and laughter.] And found, I respectfullysulimit, a revolutionized State I
now, my friends, if you will allow me to pas.s on T)iere had been a rel"olution beyond an insurrecfor a moment in this line of thought, as we come ;t10n and infraction of the law; beyond the abup to the point of time when their men Jnid clown negation and setting aside of the law, sod a new
their constitutional obUgations: Wh.at were my State government formed, that ,vas heiug supportrights, and wh11t were theirs I .A,t that hour they ed by force of arms.
r epudiated the Cons1Hntion of the Unlteu States,
Now, upon what thesis shall I deal with these
by solemn. vote. in solemn convention; and not people? Organized into e. community under forms
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of Jaw, they bad seized a portion of the territory of
the UI1ited States; and! respectfully submit I must
deal with them as alien enemies. [Greit applause.l
They bad forever passed tbe boundary of wayward
sisters (great laughter and applause], .unless indeed
they erred as Cain did against his brother Abel
They bad passed beyond that and outside of that.
Aye, and Louisiana had done this in tbe strongest
possibc way, for she had seized on territory which
the Government of the U uitcd States had bought
and paid for. Therefore I dealt with them as alien
enemies. [Applause.] And whatrigbts have alien
enemies captured in wnr? They have the right,
so Jong as they behave themselves and are DOD•
combatants, to be free from personal violence; they
have DO other rights; and, therefore, it was my
duty to see to it, and I believe the record willsbow,
I did see to it. (Great applause and lond cheers.]
I did see to it that order ,vas preserved, and that
every man who behaved well, ·and did not aid the
Coofederate States, should not be molested in his
peraon. I held everything else that they had was
at the mercy of the conqueror [cheers]; and to give
you e.n idea of it, permit me to state the method in
which their rights were defined by one gentleman
of my staff. He very coolly paraphrased the Dred
Scott decision, nnd said they had no rigbta which a
negro was bound to respect, (Loud and prolonged
laughter and cheers.] And dealing with them, J
took care to protect all men in personal safe~.
Now I heard a friend behind me say, But how did
that affect loyal men? The difficulty with that
p1·oposition is this: in governmental action the
Government, in making peace and carrying on
war, cannot deal witb. individuals, but with organized communities, whether organized wrongly or
rightly [cheers1, and all I could do, so far as my
judgment taught me, for the loyal citizen, was to
aee to it that no exaction should be put upoa him.
No property should be taken away from him that
was not absolutely necessary for the success of military ope1·ations. I know nothing else that I could
do. I could not alter the carrying on of the war,
because loyal citizens were, unfortunately, like Dog
Tray, found in bad company (laughter]; and to
their persons, and to their property, even, all possible protection I caused to be afforded. , But let me
repeat-forit is quit-0 neceasary to keep it in mind,
and I am afraid that the want of this is why some
of my old Democratic friends have got lost, in get-.
ting from one portion of the country to the other,
in their thoughts and feelings-Jet we t•epeat that,
in making war or making peace, carrying on governmental operations of any sort, governmeots and
their representatives, so far as I am instl'Ucted, can
deal only with organized communities, and men
must fall or rise with the comrannit.ies in which
they are situated. You in New York must follow
the Government, as expressed by the will of the
majority of yonr State, until yon can revolutionize
against tbat Government; and those loyal at the
South must, uotil this contest comes foto process of
settlement, also follow the action of the organized
majorities in which their lot has been cast; nnd no
man, no set of men, can see the solutiod of this or
any other governmental p1•oblem, as effecting
States, except upon this basis. Now, then, to pass
from the particular to the, general, to leave the
detail in Louisiana, wLich I have rnn down the account of rather as illustrating. my meaning than
otherwise, I come to the proposition, What is the
contest with all the States that are banded togethe~
in the so-called Confederate States? 'Into what
fonn has it come ll It Btarted in insurrection ; it

grew up n rebellion ; it bllS become a 1•evolutioi.,
and cnrrying with it all the rights of a revolution.
And 001· Government bas dealt with it upon that
ground. When they blockaded their ports, they
dealt with it as a revolution; when they sent 9ut
ca1·tels of exchange or prisonel'S, they dealt with
these people no long~r as simple iosurrectionists
and traitors, but as organized revolutionist,, who
had set up a gove1•nment fo1· themselves upon the
territory of the United States. Let no man say to
me, sir, let no man say to me, "wl1y tl.ten you acknowledge the right, of revolulion in these men l"
I beg your pardon, sir; I only acknowledge-the
fact of revolution-what had happened. I look
these things in the face, and I do not dodge them
because they a1·e unpleasant; I find this a revolution, and tliese men are no longer, I repent, our
erring brethren, but they are our alien enetnies, foreigners [ cheers] carrying on war against us, at;.
tempting to make alliances against us, attempting
to get into the family of nations. I agree, not a
successful revolution, and a revolution never to be
successful (loud cheers]; pardon me, I waa speak·
ing of a matter of law,-never to Qe successful un•
til acknowledged by the parent State. And now,
then, I am willing to unite with you io your
cheet·a when you say, a revolution which we
never will aoknowledge.
[Cheers.]
Why,
sir, have l been ao careful io bt·ingmg down.
with great distinctness these distinctions I :Because,
in my judgment, there are certain logical consequences following from them· as necessarily as
-various corollaries from a problem in Euclid. If
we are -at war, as I think, with a foreign country
to a.LI intenta and purposes, how can a man here
stand up and say he is on the side of that foreign
country and not be au enemy? [Ohee1-s.] .A. man
must be ,either for bis country or against his
country. [Cheers.] He cannot be throwing jm.
pediments all the time in the way of tbe progress
of his country under pretense tbot he is helping some other portion of his country. If a iw,11
thinks that he must do sometbiog to bring blrck
bis erring'hrethren, if he likes that form of phrase,
at the South, let him take llis musket and ~o down
and try it in that way. [Cheers.] If he is still of
a different opinion, and 't tiinks that is not the best
,vay to bring them back, but he can do it by persuasion and talk, let him go dowu with me to
Louisiana, and I will set 4im over to Mississippi,
and if the Rebels do not feel for his heartstrings,
but not in love, I will bring him back. (Cheers,
load and prolonged. "Send "o/ood down first I"]
Let \IS say to him: "Ohoose ye this day whom ye
will serve. If the Lord thy God be God, serve
him; if Baal be God, serve ye him." [Cheers. J
But uo man cnn sel'\~e two masters, God nad Mammon. [" That's so."] .Agnin, there are other log•
ical consequences to flow from tl.till view which I
have ventured to take of this subject, and that is
with reg1rd to padt political action. If they are
now alien enemies, I am bound to them by no ties
of party fealty. Thcyhavopasscd out of tha,t,and
I think we ought to go back a moment and examine and see if all lies of party allegiance an.d pnrty
fealty as 1·egards them a\·e not broken, and that I
am now to look simply to my country and to its
service, an<l leave thsm to look to tbe country they
are attempting to erect and toils service, and then
let us try the ronelu,;ion betwMn. us. Mark, by
t.his I gave up :QO te1Titory of the United States.
Every foot that was ever circumscribed on the
map by the lines around the Unjted Sta.tea belongs
to us. [ApplaU/)e.J None the less because bad
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men have attempted to organize worse Govern- should eettle South Oat'olina with them, in the
ment '1pon various portions of it. Aud it is to course of n few years I should be quite willing to
be drawn iu under our Jaws and onr Government receive her back into the Union. (Renewed apae soon as the power of tbe United States can be plause.] That leads us to deal with another propexerted for th.at purpose; and therefore, my friends, osition: What shall be done with the slaves 1
you see the next set of logical conseqnences that Here, again, the laws of war have long settled,
must follow: that we have no occasion to carry on with clearness and exactness, that it is for the con•
the fight for the Constitution ns it was. [Cheers.) querol', for the aovernment which has maintained
I beg your pardon, the Constitution as it is. Who or extended its di1·ection over the te1Titory, to deal
i.8 interfering with the Constitution as it \s 1 Who with slaves as it pleases, to free them or not as it
is interfering with the ConstituUon I Who makes chooses. It is not for the conquered to make
any attacks upon tbe Constit\ltion 1 We are fight,. terms, or to send their friends into the conquering
ing with tliose who he.ve gone out and repudiated country to make terms upon the.t snbjeot. [ApAnother oorollary follows from tile
t.he Constitutioq. [Cheers.] And now, my friends, plalll!e-J
l do not know but I shall use some heresy, but proposition that we are fighting with alien enee.s a Democrat, as nu Andrew Jackson l;>emocrat, I mies, which telieves us from another diffi.enlty
am not for the Union as it was. (Great cheering. which seems to t1•ouble some of my old Democratic
"Good I" "Good I") I say, as a Democrat, and nu friends; and that is in relation to the question of
Andre,v Jackson Democrat, I nm not for the Union arming the neg1·0 slaves. If the States are alien
to be again as it was. Underst11nd me: I was for enemies, is there any objection tliat you know of,
the Union as it was, because I saw, or thought I and if so state it, to our 11rming one portion of the
MW, the troubles in the fnture which have burst fo1·eigo conntry against the othe1· while they are
upon us; but having undergone those troubles, tii:,htingus? [Applause,andcriesof" No,'' "No.")
having spent all this blood, aud this treasnre, I do $upposo that we were at war with England. Who
not mean t.o go back again and be cheek by jowl would get up.here in New Yoi:li: and say that we
with South Carolina as I was before, if I can help must not arm the Irish, lest they should hnrt some
it. (Cheer~. "You're right."] :Ma1·kme uow,let of the Englisb1 [Applause.] At one tittie, not
no wan misunderstand me, and I repeat lest I may very fnr gone, all tbose Englishmen were our
be misunderstood-there are none so slow to under- grandfathers' brothers. But we are now separate
stand as those who do not want to-mark me,lsar, nations. The1·e can be no objection, for another
I do not mean to give up a single inch of the soil reason, because there is no international law, or
of South Carolina. If I had been alive at that time, any other Jaw of go;rernment action that I know
and had had the position, the will, and the ability, of, whica prevents the country from arming any
I would have dealt wit.h South Carolina asJaokson portion of ita citizens; and if the slaves do not
did, aud kept her in the Union at all hazards, but take part in the rebellion they become, simply, our
now she has gone out, and I will take care that citizens residi.ng in onr territory, which is at pres•
-when she comes in again she comes in better be- ent usnrped by our enemies. [Applause.1 At this
haved [cheers]; that she shall no longer be the waning hour l do not propose to discuss but merefirebrand of the Union; aye, nnd that she ly to hint at these vnrioussubjects. [Cries of "Go
ebnll enjoy, what her people never yet have e11- on." l There is one question I nm freqll'ently asked
joyed, the blessings of a Republicau form of gov- -"Why, General Butler, what is your experience!
er~ment. [Applause.] And, therefore, in that Will the negroes :fight?" To that I answer, I have
vi'ew, I am not for the reconstrnction of the Union no personal experience, because I left the Depart·
as it was. Yet I have spent treasure and blood ment of the Gulf before they were fairly brought
enough upon it, in conjunction witl1 my fellow- into action. But they did fight, under Jackson, at
citizens, to make it n little better. [Cheers.] It Chalmette. More than that: Jet Napoleon Ill
was good enough if it had been left alone. The answer, who bas hired them to do what the veteold house was gopd enough for me, bqt as they have 1·ans of the Crimea cannot do-to whip the i'lfexipnlled do,vn all the L part, I propose, when we cans. Let the veterans of Napoleon J., under Le
build it up, to build it up witb. all the modern Cleve, who were wl1ipped out from San Domingo,
improvements.
[Prolonged laughter and ap- ~ay whether tl,ey will fight or not. What has been
plause.1
the demoralizing effect upon them, as a race, by
Anotl1er of the logical consequences, it seems to their coot-act with white men, I know not; bnt I
me, that follow with inexorable and not-to-be- cannot forget that their fathers would not have
shunned course upon this proposition that we are been slaves but that they were captives in war.
dealing with alien enemies, is in our duties with re- 1And, if you wunt to know any mo1·e than that, I
gard to the confiscation of t,heir property; nod that enn only advise you to try them. [ Great applause.]
would seem to me to be easy of settlemslnt undei·
Passing to another logical deduction from the
the Constitution, aud without any discussion, if my principle that we are carrying on war against
nrat proposition is light. llis it not been held, alien enemies, I meet the question, whether we
from tl1e ~egioning of the world down to this day, thereby give foreign nations any greater 1·ights
from the time the Israelites took possesSJ.on of the than if we considered them as n Rebellions porLand of Canaan, which they got from alien enc- t1011 of ou1· country. So far as the Rebels are
mies', hns it not been held that the whole proper- concerned, they are estopped from denying that
ty of those alien enemies belonged to the con• they are alien , enemies; and so far as foreign
<J?-eror, and that it has been at bis mercy and nations are concerned, although they are alien to
lils clemency what should be done with it Y For ns, they are upon our territory, and until we
one, I wou_ld take it, and give the loyal mun who acknowledge their independence there is no better
was loyal m the heart of the South enough to make settled rulo in the Ja-w of nations than that foreie-n
him as well as be was before, and I would take the recognition of them is an act of w4r. And uo
baln_nco of it and distribute it among the volunteer country is more sternly bound to th:it view than
aold.iers who have gone-(the :remainder of t.he is England, which held the recognition by Frp.nee
•entenc • w \ drowued in a tremendous burst of of our own independence to be an act of war, and
appll\U$~.] Aud so for as I know them, if we declared war accordingly. What then is the dnty

of neutrals Y Let us take for example the Eoglish man and divorced herself from him; I should be
nation. They have no treaty with the Rebels, no unwilling to take her again to my arms until we
open relations with them. 'fhey have treaties of had gone before the priest and been remarried. I
amity and commerce with us. A contest arises have the same feeling with regard to those people
between ns and our enemies to whom they are who have gone out. When they repent and come
strangers, and they claim to exercise the same back, I am read)" to receive them.; rrnt I am not
neutra.lity as if the contest were between two ready till then. (Applause.)
To your flattering allusions, sir, to my acts in the
nations with which they had treaties of amity.
Let me illustrate: I have two friends who have Department of the Gulf, I will answer a single
word.
When I left that Department, I sat down
got into a figbt. I am on equally good terms with
both, and do not choose to take part in their deliberately, and put in the form of an address to
quarrel. I bold myself neutral. But suppose one the people of that Department an exact account of
of my friends is fighting with a stranger, of whom the acts I ha.d done while there, and I said to tnem :
I know nothing that is good; I have seen nothing Yon know I have done these things; no man can
except that he would figbt i is it my du~ then to deny it. I have waited more than three months,
stand perfectly neutral I It is not the part of a and I have not yet heard any denial from that Dafriend as between men nor between nations. The partment that those thing~ we1·e done. To that
English sa.y, We will not sell you any at·ws, because fact I point as the justification of yotu too flatterwe should have to sell the sa.me to tb.e Confederate ing eulogy, as au answer fore..-er to every slander
Statel!. To that I answer, you have treaties of and every calumny. Tbe ladies of New Orleans
commerce with us by which you agree· to trade knew whether they were safe. Has any one of
witlt us. You have no treaty of commerce with them ever said she was not? Tbe men of New Orthe Rebels. I insist that there is a greater duty leans knew whether their life and property were
to us, considering this as a sepamte nation-n safe. Has any man ever said i_t was not! The
iotedoper tr_yiag to get admitted _into the family poor of New Orleans know whether the money that
of nations. There is still anothe1· logical conse- ,vns taken from the rich rebels was fed out to them.
quence which, in. my judgment, follows from this Hae any one of thetn denied itl (Applause.] To
view of the case. A great question put to me has that record I point as the only aoswer I shall ever
been: "How are we to get those men back 1-liow make to the calumnies that have been poured upon
are we to get this territory back ¥-ho\v are we to me, and vpon the officers everywhere in that De-reconstruct the Union l" I think that is much partmcnt that aided so successfully in carrying_ out
better answered upon th,is hypothesis than upon every effort for the good of the country. LApany other: There are but two ways in which this plause.) I desire now to say a single word upon
contest can be ended. One is by r.erevolutioniz- the question, What are the prospect. of this war I
ing a given portion of this country, and having My opinion would be no better than that of anthem ask to be admitted into the Union; the other other man; but let me show you the 1·eason for the
is to bring it back by the triumphal car of victory. faith that is in me, that this Wat is progresa-Whenever any portion of the inhabi tan ts of the ing steadily to a successful termination. Coll)par11
South shall become again a part of the Union, and the state of tbe country on January 1, 1868, with
shall erect themselves into a State and ask us to the state of the country on January 1, 1862, and
take them back wilh such a Constitution ns they tell me whether there has not been progre85. At
ought to be admitted with, there is no difficulty that time the U niou armies held uo considerable
in. its being done. There is no witchery about it. portion of Missouri, of Kentucky, or of Tennessee;
ll'his p1·e.cise thing has been done in Western none of Virginia except Fortress Monroe and ArVirginia. She went out, and stayed out for a lington Bights; none of North Oarolinn save Hatwhile. By the aid of our armies, and by the teras, and none of South Carolina save Po1·t Royal.
efforts of her citizens, she rerevolutionized and .All the rest was ground of struggle at least, and
threw off the Government of the rest of Virginia, all the rest furnishing , supplies to ihe rebels.
and the Confederate yoke, erected herself into o. Now the:f hold none of Missouri, none of Kentucky,
State, with o. Constitution which I believe is quite none of 'Iennessee for any valuable _purpose of supsatisfactory to you, especially with the amend- plies, because the western po1·tion J.S in our hands,
ment, came back, and has been received again into and the eastern porpion has been so ruo over by
the Union. This is the first, the entering wedge, the contending armi'es that the supplies are gone.
of the series of States which will come back in They hold no portinn of Virginia valuable for supthat way. But if they will not come back, we plies, for that 1s eat-en out by their armies. "We
are bound to subjugate them. What then do t hey hold oue third of Virginia, and half of North Carobecome f Territories of the United States. (Ap- lina. We hold 011r own in South Carolina, and I
plause.) We acquire them precisely as we acquired hope that before the 11th of trus montl1 we shall bold
California and Nevada; not exa~tly as we acquired a little more. (Applanse.7 We hold two thirds
Tex'lls. Was there any difficulty in dealing with of Louisiana in wealth aua population. We hold
the State of California 1 Will there be any diffi- all Arkansas ..nd all Texas, so far as supplies are
culty in our afimitting, as a new State', Nevada, conccru~d, so long as Farrago t is betweel\ Port
when ready t.o come in and ripe to come in 1 Wna Hudson and Vicksburg. (Applause. 7 And I bethere any difficulty in taking in a portion of the lieve the colored troops bold Flori<la at the last
Louisiana. purchase f Will there be auy diffic11lty, accounts. [Applause. l The 1·ebefiion is reduced
when her people are ready, in our taking them to the remainder of V'Irginia., part of North Caroback again f Will there be any diffi,culty in re- lina, the larger part of South Carolina, all of Georconstructing the Union, when those. that hnve gia, Alabama aod J\1.ississippi, nod a small portion
gone out without cause, without right, without of Louisiana and Tennessee-Texas and Arkamas,
grie1·ance, that have formed themselves into new as I said before, being cut off. Why I draw stroug
:::!tates and taken upon themselvn new alliances, hopes from this is that their supplies all came either
are ready to retw·n f I mu not for taking them from Kentucky, Tenncesee, l11isso1ui, Arkansas, or
back without readmitsion. I feel as a husband Texas, and these nre c~mpletely now beyond their
might feel, wbos~ wife had run away with another reach. To that I look largely for the ~uppreBl!iOn
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ofthis rebellion, and the overthrow of this revolution. They have got to the end of their conscription; we have not begun ours. They have got to
the end of their uatione.l credit; we have not put
ours in any market in the world. [Applause.]
Why should we be impatient! The Revolutionary
War lasted seven years. Nations at we.r ever move
slowly. It ha.s seemed strange to me that our
Navy could not catch the steamer .Ale.bame.; but a
friend reminded me the.t Paul Jones, with a sailing
ship even, upon the coast of England, bid defiance
to the whole British navy for many months; and
that Lord Cochrane, with a single ship, held the
whole French coast in terror. So that, if we will
only have a little patience, and possess our B-Ouls
with a little patriotism, we shall have no reason to
complain.
·
B ut there is one thing, I say frankly, that I do
not like the appearance o( I refer to the war made
upon our commerce. It is not the fault of the
Navy, or of any department of the Government;
but it is the fault of our allies. Pardon me a moment, for I am speaking now to €he merchants of
New York, as this is a matter on which I have given some reflection. Pa1·don me while we examine
to see what England has done. She agreed to be
neutral. I tried to demonstrate to you that she
ought to have been a little more. But has she
been! [Cries of "No, no."l Let us sell the evideuce of that "No." In tlie firs~ place, there has
been nothing in the Un.ion cause but what her ore.tors and statesmen have maligned. There has been
nothing ,ve have done that has not been perverted
by her press. The1•e has been nothing of sympathy
or encouragement wbicb she has not afforded our
enemie,. There ha.s been nothing which she conld
do under a co'l"er of neutrality which she has not
done to help Rebels. [" That is true."] Nassau
has been a naya) arsenal fo1· private Rebel boats
to refit in; Kingston has been a coal depot; and
Barbadoes has been a dancing-hall to fete pirate
ehiefte.ins in. (Great applause.] What cause, my
friends, what cause, my countrymen, had she so to
deal with us? Whnt is the reason she has so
dealt with usi Is it because we have never shown
sympathy toward her or love to her people? and
mark me here: 1 dre.w a distinct line betwee11 the
English people, the masses, and the English Govern.ment. I think the heart of her people beats
responsive to ours. [Great applause.] But I
know her Government a nd her aristocracy hate us
with a hate that passeth all understanding. [ Loud
cheers.] I say, let us see if we have giveu any
ca\1se for this: You remember when the famine
overtook the Irishmen in 184'7, and the Macedonian
frigate carried bread to feed the poor when England was starving. And when her favored heir appcared hei:e, in this very house, ,ve assembled and
gave him s11ch a welcome as North~rn gentlemen
give to their friends, and hi~ present admirers nt
Richmond gave him such a ,velcome a:< Southern
gentlemen give to their friends. (Lou<! laughter
aud applause.] And the George Griswold has gone
from the city of New York to feed the starving
poor of Lancashire; and it was only by God's
blessing tbat _she was not overhauled and burned
by the yirate Alabama, fitted out jn an Euglish
port. LApplause.] Yet, to-day we hear that a
•teamer is being built at Glasgo'IV"for the Emperor
of Chion Daughter and applause], and at Liverpool another one for the Emperor of China. But
I don't believe the Emperor of China will buy
m!lnY ships of Great Britain until they bring back
the silks they stole from his palace at Pekin l

[Great l11ugbter.l Now, I learn from the late correspond&nce of E'arl Russell that the British have
pnt two articles of the treo.ty of Pai;is in compact
with the Rebels-first, that enemies' goods shall
l,ie covered by neutrnl flags, and there shall be free
trado at the ports, aud open trade with neutrals.
Why <l!,dn't Great Britain put the other part of the
treaty in compact, namely, that there should be no
more privateering I if sl1e was honest and earnestf
Again, when we tQok from her deck our two Senators and Rebel Embassadors, Slidell and Mason, and
took thei:n, in my judgment, according to the laws
of nations, what did she do but threaten us with
wad I agree that it was wisely done, perhaps,
not to provoke war at that time-we were not
quite in II condition for it-buL I thank God, and
tbnt always, that we are fast getting in a condition
to remember that always and every day I [Tremendous applause, and waving of handkerchiefs,
and cries of "Good I") Why is it all this bas been
done? Because, we alone can be the commercial
rival of Great Britain I
There has been, in my judgment, a deliberate
attempt on the part of Great Britain, under the
plea of neutra!,ity, to allow our commerce to be
rniued. [Cries of "That is so."] It is idle to tell
me Great Brit,ain does not know these vessels are
fitted out in her ports, It is idle and insulting to
tell you that she put the Alabama under $20,000
bonds, not to go into the service ot the ponfederate
States. We did not so deal with her when she
was at war with Russin. On the suggestion-of the
British Minister, our Government stopped, with
the rapidity of lightning, the sailing of a steamer,
until the Minister himself was willing to let her
go. We must take B-Ome means to put a stop to
these proceedings. I was told the other day that
the amount of property already destroyed would
amount to $9,000,000 I Wb~t, then, is our ren'ledy 1 Th13 peaceful and proper r~medy, for we
must look forward to these matt.era. The Governwent is no doubt doing it; but we ourselves must
look at it, for we are the people~we are the Government [applause]; and when our Governmertt
gets ready to take the step we must be ready to
support i~. :England tells us what to do; when
there was a likelihood of war she stopped the exportation of those articles she thought we wanted.
Let us do the same thing. (Great applause and
loud cheers.] Let lll! proclaim non-intercourse, so
that no ounce of food from the United States shall
by any accident ever find its ,vay into an Englishman's mouth until the piracy fa stopped. [Applause and cries of "Good," and voice: "Let us
hear that again."J I never say anything that I am
afraid to say aga10. [Renewed applause.) I say
again, let u$ proclaim non-intercourse, so that no
ounce of food from .America shall ever by any accident find its way to an EogHshman's mouth unti! these piracies are stopped (greet cheering, and
cries of "That's so," autl " Good I"] ; and U.1at we
have a right to do. But I hear some objector say,
If we proclaim non-intercourse England may go to
war[''Lct bergol"); bntl amuot to be frightened twice runnh,g. [Laughter and applause.]
I got frightened a little more than a year ago, but
I have got over it. [Laughter. l It is a necessity,
for we must keep our ships at home to save them
from tf1ese pirates, if a dozen of them get loose
upon the ocean. It becomes a war measure, which
any n11tion under any law would have a ri(:ht to
enforce: and it should bE! made to apply directly
to the English nation, for 1never heard of a blockade runner under the French flag, or Russian, or

Auatrian, or Greek :flag-no, not even the Turke ter.] They can't be Democratic politicians. ['· Of
will do it. [Loud cheers and applause.] There- course they can't."] I shonld like to hear old
fore I have "7entured to suggest this to you as a A.ndrew Jackaon say a few words about such
poasible, aye, as a probable, remedy, unless this politicians, who call themselves Democrats.
,thing is seen to and stopped. We ID\lllt see to it. L" He'd hang them."] No, my friend, I don't
We should protect ourselves, and take a manly think be would hang them. I don't think be
place among the nations of the earth. [Loud ap- would ever catch them. (Lirnghter.] I have felt
plause.] But I hear some say that this will bring it my duty here, nnd now in the city of New
down the price of our provisions, and make our York, from the interest I have in public affnhs,
Western markets more depressed. Allow me to to call attention to this most extraordinary
suggest that the exportation or gold be also p1·0- matter. It is a matter which arrests the attention
hibited, and then there would be nothing to meet more than any other, to wit: that there are men so
our bills of exchange to pay for our goods but our lost to patriotism, and so bound up in the traditions
provisions, and we could pay for our silks and of party, and so sel.fu,h, as to be willing to tamper
satins in butter, lard, corn, beef, and pork, and if with Great Britain for the separation of this
our foir sisters and dau~hters will wear silks, and country! It is the most alarming {act that-I have
satins, and laces, they will feel no trouble because seen. I had rather ace 100,000 men set in the field
a portion of the extra price goes to the W estcrn on the ~ebel side,-aye, I hnd rather see Great
farmer instead of going into the coffers of a Jew Britain herself armed against us openly, if you
banker io. Wall street. [Great applause and cries please, as she haa been covertly,-rather than to feel
that there are men, lineal descendants of JudM
of" Good."]
You will observe, my friends, that in the list of Iscariot, and intermarried with Benedict_ Arnold,
grievances with which I chnite England, I do not who .would thus. betray their country. [Loud cries
charge her with tampering with our "leading of" Fernando Wood," with hisses and cheers. "He
politicians." [Loud laughter.] So fnr as any knows them nll"J That has shown me the great
evidence I hnve, I doo't know that she is guilty. danger-the only dsngcr...-:.we aro in. I call upon
But wbat shall we say of our leading politicians true men to sustain the Government. (Great apwho have tampel'ed with her! (Great applause.] plause.] It is not a Government of my oboice. I
I have read that--whicb surprised me more than rudn't vote for it, or any purt of it; but it is the
any other fact oft.bis war-that here in New York Government of my country ; it is tbe only
leading politicians consulted with the British Min- organ by which I can exert the force of the country
ister as to how this Union should be separated; nnd protect her integrity; and so long as I believe
and when I rend that, every drop of blood in my that nelion is honestly exerted, I ,rill throw the
veins boiled, nod I would have liked to ha,e seen mantle of charity over any mistakes I think 1 may
t,hat "leading politician." [Most enthusiastic ap- see, and support it heartily withha,nd and purse so
plause, the cheers being renewed agnio and again.] long as I live. [ Applause. J
I have no loyalty to anymnn. My loyalty is to
I don't .know thnt Lord Lyons is to blame. I suppose, sir, if a man goes to one of your clerks, and the Government [cheers," That's it''); and it makes
offers to go inw partner6hip with him to rob one no difference to·me who the "eople have pot into
of your neighbors, and he refuses and reports the thnt Government, so long ns it has been properly
matter to you, you don't blrune your '.clork; but and constitutionally done. So long as they hold
what do you do with the man who makes the offer? their seats and hold theh· power I am a traitor
rGreat applause, nnd cries of "Hang him! "l I and a false mnn if I falter in that"support.. This is
think we had better take a lesson from the Gov- whnt I understand to be loyalty to the Governe1·nment of Washington's Administration, though ment. [Cbeers.] And I was sorry to hear the
the case is revet·sed. When the French Minister, other day that th ere was a man in New York who
Citizen Genet, undertook to make an address to professed not to ln1ow the meaning of the word.
the people of the United States, complaint was L"Wbowas it¥" "FeroandoWoodl"l I desire
made to his Government and he was recalled; and to say thnt it is the duty of every man to be loyal ,
a law was passed preventing for aU time to come to the Government., to sustain the Government, to
any interference of foreign ministers in the politics pardon its errors, to help rectify its mis.takes, to
of the United ~tates. 1 want to be under!tood : I press it on to everything that it may do for the
have no evidence that Lord Lyons interfered at nU, country, and let it carry the country on in its
but tl1ecorrespondence says that certain leading pol- course of glory and grandeur on which it was
iticians of New York came to him and desired that placed by our fathers; for let me say to you, my
be should do-what I That he would advise with friends, you young men, that no man yet hns ever
bis Goveroment not to interfere I 'Why not 7 Be- prospered who oppos!!d his country in time of war.
cause it would aid the country-they would spurn lCheers.] The Tory of the Revolution, the Hartit, and would be stronger than ever to crush the ford Conventionist of 1812, the immortal Seven
Rebellion, and "we and our[arty sbltll be crushed that voted. agninst the supplies in the Mexican War,
out!" (Great laughter an cheers.] Mlll'k the all history is against them. And let no politician
insidious point. They knew how the people felt put himself in the way of tl,e march of this counagainst England. They knew the heart of this try to glory and greatne$; for he will be crushed.
• people to be true to the Constitution. They knew lts course is onward and certain, and let him who
the people would not brook any interference from opposes it beware;
Englond, and they ask the Briti sh Minister to use "Tho mower mows on though the adder may writhe,
the power of British diplomacy to get other nations
A.04 t.he Copperhead onrl ronnd the blade or the ecytbe."
to ioterfere, and Great Britain to keep out of sight
(Tremendous
aJ?plouse.]
lest we shoulu ,ree the cat under the meal. (Loud
It only remams for me, sir, to thank you, and
langbter.) I have used the phrase up to tbl8 mo•
ment, as you see, of "politician;" but what kind of the citizens of New York here assembled, for the
politicians are they1 [Cries of "Copperheads," kind attention with which they have listened to
"T1·aitors," from all over the house, amid great me, and with which they have r.eceived me, for
cheer$.) Conservative politicians I [Loud laugh- which please, again and again, necept my thanks.

[Loud a.nd prolonged a.ppla.u1e, a.nd three cheen for
Gen. Butler.]
Gen. Butler was immediately surrounded by the
gentlemen on the etage, which was crowded with
the leading men of the city, all of whom sought to
present to him their thanks a nd congratulations.
For many minutes the audience before the stage
sat in a condition of expectl\ncy. The band played
"The Star-Spangled Banner," and "Yankee Doodle," and the Union Glee Club sang a song in
praise of Gen. Butler.
Con. friend• wbQ !Qve freedQm, and jQln In onr &Ong,
For Country and Union we're marching olong;

Tb& n Oode ,, or onr BuUer ha,~ righted & wrong,
And nnder bis banner we're morcblng along.

Csoaus-

Marcblng along, we're marching along;
For our ~,lag and our Country we-re marchiog &long;
Let us cheer tor our Butler sod Join in the root:;",
For tre&SOn was blighted where he marched along.

Our Army and Navy are moving alonl!',
And our Volunteer SoMiers unite in our eong;
They fl.<:bt for our flag. It can suffer no wrong,
WbUe Butler and Hooker are marching along.
In the West nnd the South we're marching along,
For the thunder of Farragut echoes our song;
And the veterans of Rosecrans elljterly throng
To join tneglad chorus, We'to marcbiag along.

The Mayor then announced that the meeting was
adjoul'lled.
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HOW BULL RUN BATTLE W.AS LOST.

THE BALL'S BLUFF MASSACRE.
DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST-FREMONT.
BIJLL R111',
The Joint Committee on the Condnct of the War
llllbinit the following report, with accompan,iog testimony, in relation to the Battle of Bull Ruo, in
Jnly, 1861:
So long a time bu ela])!ed, and eo many important event<1 hue occo:rred in the pro~eas of the
war, liuce tbe campslgn which ended w1'b the battle of Bnll Ron, in July, 1861, that your Comanttee
do not deem it neceaaary to go very much toto det.ail
in tbeir report. The te.stimooy they submit herewith is very volnminoua, and fully covera all the
poinh of mtereat connected with that campaign.
T hey themore aabrnit a brief report, confining their
attention principall7 to the cau1ea w hich led to tbe
defeat of our army in that baltle.
That which now nppeara to have been the great
error of that campaign wee the failure to occupy
Centreville end Mauassaa at the time Alexandria
wae occupied, in lllay. 'l'be poeilion at JUanaeiaa
controlled tbe railroad communication in all that
~ection of country. The forcea which were opposed
to us at tbe battle of Ball Run were moatly collected and brooullt to Manll8Slls duriog the months or
Jnue aod July, 1'be three months men could have
made the place easily defoneible agai nst .;JY force
t he enemy could bave brought ai;tainet it; and it ia
not at all probable tbat the Rebel forces would have
advanced beyond the line of tbe Ra ppr.bannock had
.Manal!lla1 been occupied by our troops.
The nut caaae of ~:istez w aa the delay in proceeding aga,nel the enemy until the time of the
three montU•' men was so n~arly expired. In that
reepeot the movement w1111 wade too late rather than
too BOoo, and the enemy were a 'lowed time to coll ect tbtir forces at illan888&e and to ttreogtbeo the
J)Ollirioo by defeoeive wor\:1. 1 The re.uoo why
~be moven,eo, wu eo l ong delayed i.e ebowo, to
eome eitteot, by the te&timooy, to which voor Committee would direct the atteunou of those who deijire to examine that point.
And when the movement w11 finally decided opon,
much wu needed to render tbe ,roopa efficient.
1'bere bad been bot little time devoted to d1scip'1ning the troopa nnd instructing them, eTen aa regiments; hardly euy iuetruell9n bed been given them
In reference to brigade mo,•ementa, aod none nt all
aa d1v:i.e1une. When Ger,. McDowell re,•iewed eighl
regiments togelber-tbe only inetance prc,iooa to
the battle, aa the evideoce 1how•, that even thai
n1UDber of troope were maucn,•ered io one body-ho
"'aa cbari:ed w1t'l de!iring lo make a ebow.
<no. AlcDowell was instructed, '<'erbaOv, by Gen.
Scott, to prepare and submit a r,Jan of ·ope,auooa
IIJniasl the c11emy at lllannaaM, l'bia plan was con•
11dered in Cabinet mce1iog, and agreed to; and , he
9th of J oly wu fixed opou by Geu. Scott aa the day
when the arm)' aboald move.
TIie plan of Geo. McDowell was to moYe ont in
the direction of Ceotrev,Ue, and endeavor to tnm
tb.e enemy·• right with a poi-tion of bis force, nnd
destroy bla communicalion by railroad with Richmond. He asked that n certain nnmber of trooP.• be
&ivell 1liln to opera\o agaiius tbe force w llicll it •wu

em'lllated tbat Bt:toregard had nuder bis command.

He waa snored that tte enemy beJo.,.. ehonld be

kept oceopied by Geo: Ilatler, wbo was in command
ac Fortrel!II Monroe; nod t ~at the enemy uodn
Jobnatoa, in tbe Winchester Valley, sboald be held
there by Geo. Patterson. Soo,e onya before the
batLle, upon expretalng eome feare in regard to the
f orce under Johoaton beiog detJined by Pa..teraoo,
be WU lll!Uted by Geo. S:ott tbnt "if John,ton
j oined Beaure,;:nro, he ilioaltl 11ave l'attenoo 011 Iii,
beele."

'l'be movement <lid not commence nntil the lGth of
July, a week later than tbe time llru decided upon.
Tbe transportation WI\& delk1ont, and Gen. McDowell had to depend upon otLe;e to tee tbat aoppliea were forw.n!ed t:> him ID lime. Toe marc11
wae alow, ooe re,.,oo l •iog that, •ince the afl.iur at
Vieuno, near Alex~ndna, autl at Big Bethel, near
l!'ortrebe Monr~e, a fev.r ot "mneked batterict "
cau,1ed hesitation m regard to advancing upon point•
couc~rning which there was o. want of iotormutiou,
'l'bere wa,i ~ome delay, oo the march, m co11Eeqaence
of tbe want of comvMe discipline among aome of
the troop•. 'l'bey 'I\ tre no; ,alllciamly under COD•
trol of officers to i>e 1•1oveottd !row leavwgtherankl
aod strugglmjl'.
'l'be nltair at Dlackborn's Ford on Thursday, the
181b, being more e.!tem,h·e tban Geo. McDowell
bad ordered, drew the atte,,tiou of the enemy to
t bat poiut; and, in conseci~euco or the preparation,
they made ther., to meet eoy attempt ot Gen. AleDowell to taro their JlO~tion iu tll1<t di.rec1iou, ii
became neeeos,iry to nuort ano•h••r line of opera,
tions. Gen. lllclJowell o~termin~d to make tho attempt to tum tbe1r 1 lgbt,, and at8J!S were taken to
@ecure the oeceSllary information. It w,1s not ontll
Satu,duy that the ioformntion which Geo. McDowell de,ind waa obt.ai11ed.
Be then iuotd ordeu for the troops to move lbe
next morning, the 2ht, eome at 2 o'clock and rome
at balf-paat !l. '1110 di'l'i>ion of Gen. Tyler wa1 m
the udv,mee, and was orderea to proceed direc~Jy
out to Stone B,~dgu, oud tl,ke op poeition there.
Goo. Hunter's nud Gen. Reiutzolnulu'a divwon•
were to follow, aod wbeo ttey rc&cl,,.d n road leading to the ritht, n~out a n.ile in 9dvcnee of Gen.
'l') ltr'B camp, tcey ,v.re lo turn ot:· and proceed 10
t lie direction of l:,"Jl•y 8 Chnrcb, 1md euceavor to
turn tbo enomy'e lefc. 'l'ho mc.vtm<"·m to tbe rigbt
wM intended 10 bo rnatle under cover of Gen, 'J.':,l er'R force at S:ono llriui;e.
But there wu much citl-y 111 the movement• of
the trocis tbi,t mcn,;o.l.', '1, l.u'a ol\·leioo 01d not
J'•M tho poii.t, w bere Jlnn:er·e ODO llcinrzumao•,
u1vitlona w,re to turu 1,tf,until af,er t ._e t:a,~ dU•lt·
n11tod. &-n.o uf !IHI tll,ops wc,o del:1y1,,l for three
hourd, nff,rdiog H:u, to t~e .cuco,y tu dis, ovc1· the
n,o~ewc:it and mnke rrernratioua io meei it.
9'1tu•tauding tllefe ni• th nnta ., e, our force,
...atceufal Ga11ogtlle fc:ra ~ t i of tle doy, •l•
n. ..,b lleaoregnnl bd b, e~ r,. Df~rcu, by ~oa,e or
Joau,tou'a for,es from \\"iorh· t;,.r. Oar troop•
were very mace f~tlgu&J. 'l'b• ,ay ,vos exceedinJclY
wa,m, tbo roaaa were Jasty, Abd they had beeo
aome boura fonger uu tl,e m~1cb tl•nu b"d beea an1ic1pntt-d. .IJi tile uftcruoou additioual re•entoroe:

1

m1nti anived from Jobneton'a army1 and 1uddent,
attacked onr right and tbrew it ioto <llllorder.

.Abou, the 1110me time two of onr batteries (Ricken'• and Grillln's) were captured by the enemy, and

our entire force liegan to fall back in gte>1t confusi on. l n regard to the capture o! tbe batteries, it
appe111s by lho testimooy tbat they were ordered. to
\alle an advanced and exposed position, and were
11ot 1nfilciently su~ported. Not long after they
w ere placed in pobltion1 a Rebel regiment appeared
in their immediaie viomity. Capt. Griffin, slate&
lhat he took tbem to be Rebels from the firat. and
directed one of his lientenants to o,een upon tbem
,rith canister. But Major Barry, Chief of Axlillery,
coming up joot &t tbe time, told him the.t they were
some of 0 11.r own troops ooming to the aupport of the
b atteries, and directed him not to fu6 upon them.
The battery WWI accordingly tnroed in enotber direction, and, t.hnoet immediately after, this regiment
of the enemy .opened fire upon 1t, diet.bling the
and killing and woundiotr most of the men
&t t~e gnna. Tllat com_pleted tbe'dbcomiiture of our
trooj)e aod the day wb1cb bad opened upon our encceaa cl:ieed upon a defeated and :retreatiog arm:rA division under Col.. Miles, had been etat1ooed
,., Centreville, partly for the purpose of a reserve,
and partly to guard againsr. any :flank attack. 'fhe
enemv did attempt a movement npon our left, but
were.promptly met and checked by our
there.
The priDcipal caute of the defeat on that day was
Clie failure of Gen, Pattenon to hold the forces of
Johnston in the valley or the Shenandoah. He bad
a force of about 23,000 men; while the force of the
enemy opposed to him, nccording to the best evi•
dence your Commit.tee could obtem, did not exceed
from 1:2,000 to l.~.(100 meD. Geo. Patteraon teetitie,
ibat he w as oatiefied inat Johruton had from 35,000
to 40,000 men, and o,•er tiU it~ns. He a1ao states
\hat a ]&rge number of bil troops WSTI, anxious to
return home; that their time bad about expired, rui<l
he could not perauade them to remain. There is
oonaiderahle testimony to ahow 1bat the troops be•
c:ame die!llltimed, and refused to remai.D. only when
\ hey learned that their movement from Bonker Hill
on ,be 17th of July was a retreat, and not an adTance upon the enemy; that V1:hlle they auppoeed
i hey w ere being led to the attack, little, if aoy,
complaint wu 1.0ade, and they were in e..:celleut
apiri rs,
In rererence to the oTders given to Gen. Patter•
aon, and tbe object to be accomplished by his onera1aon1, there ae&ms' to be no question. "That object
wee to prevent Johnston from joioin!{ B eaur~i::ard
before Gen. McDowell could have an opportunttyto
attack the force8 under the latter. The cbaraoter of
tbe orders is indicated by tbe following telegram of
t he 131b of July (Saturday) from Gen. Scott to Gen.
Patterson:
I telearapb.ed yoa yt!sterdsy, tf not strcm.c enottl:'h to beat
0B~r,10:: :~~.d;~
:!t°a
t:fu~h~~:u:; :nt,;:t~t~~~
totce ,o.,ard
e.nd it. be bazardou1 ,ofollo1"t blw, then

eon:r.ider tho route 'Yia Keyea'1 Ferry, Leeabur1. &0.

Gen. Scolt had, tbe day before, conveyed to Gen.
P Qtteraon tbe i.a.timation that Ger,. McDowell would
commence
movement on tbe 16th ot Joly, and on
i he 15th Gen. P11tterson sdvaueed froin ~[artinsbu:rg
to Bonlrnr Hill, remaining there the 16th.
On the 17th Gen. Scott telegraphs to Gen. Patter-

aon:

I btve uothinroffieial Crom you since Sonday, bti:tam ,:lad
to loam from PhiladeJpbta p$p&n that you haV'e. ad•ancad. Do

,

1lOl let the enemy ama116 and delay 'JOU with a aman !o.rce in
front., whl' e be :re-eoforota thu Junction ,:~1th hb moin be-dy.
McD owell'• fint d~y'11 work .ha.a driven tho OQeto::, be1011d
1'&1'-ru: Court•.Bou.oe. 'l'be J11Dc<lon will probably bo carried
to•motrow.

There is no evidence at what time thai dispatch/
-wae receiv~d. But i t could not have beeu reoeived
before the movement from Bunker .llill to Ch~ stown wa.. made by Gen. Patteraoo, for that
•
111ent commenced very eal'ly in tne worniDg o , o
17th, tbe date of the d.ispn1cb:
On tbe 18th Gen. Scott telegraphs:
1 b ne c•rl41nly beeo exp~tmg you tu beat the enemy. It
ao,. tb.;.t y-ou ba.d (eJt him .:trODt:ly, or at lc-111t had occupied
bim by U,.rea.tl and derr.on•ln.tiom. Yon have beeu. at leut

1'11 oq.al, Oll\l, I ••PPO.., lilt ••»erior UlllUlllbor, 11..11• Jl0$

••ht

I

-

atolen a march, and
r&-Oll!<ll'c~monEr toward lfa11u...
Junction'? A week it enona:b to wiu a vietory.

To this Gen, Patteraon replies on tbe same day:

The enemy hu 1tolen 110 march Dl)On me. I have kel)t him

actively eu.ployed,

...,d,

by th,.._ti u,4 reeonnoioance

force, caa1ed him to be te•euforced.

Ill,

Gen Patterson testifies as follows:

:::a~e!:~:[.~uh~:tl~ ti·: :~at~th;t wi::b:l:r~·::t:~b;

Q.oeation. Duritlg all thi.a time yon k:oew- that Gett- Scott
0

0

ettnt that. he ahoald come down by a route wbero yoo eouJd
not. follow blm. tba~ yoQ tbooJd f@Uow him "Viii Ke1et'1 J?e.rry

a»1~'
::;~ ¥e!, Str.
Q.ueli-tioo.. Ana yet, when you were nt
0

Chatletlown, y ou
found l'ourulf not in a condition. to rlo either. Now my
que,tion ii: Wby did yoa uot communiute that fact to Gen.
Seoll?
AD1wer. There w11 no occulon for n. iD my 1odrment. He

!:::~{.';i°!~i~~~ub~ned;:e~&:e ~:.~: t:ft~;11~d';~!:. h;

bad informed hlm or my conditfon, and U
bis bu1Ul:eu
to order me wba.t to do. I be.d a!-ked him: u Sba.U I a.itact. 1"
it waa not m1 bnaineu to ••Y au1thioe beyond that.

When asked if tbe telegum of the ll>tb, n-orn Geo.
Scott, did not show tbat be still deemed it waa of
the firet importance that he (Pattenont sbonld detaio Joboston there, Gen. Patteraon replies:
I looked upon tht1t tel9Gta_ph. and
upon my 1tri.if. a, uotbiDC- 1llOl6 nor

e very "entlema
tba.n an exhibition of

110 did

b•U:::'.'iatterson also testifies:

...

Qa..tlon. Yoo ••Y you could have attacked 011 the 18th If
ordered to do ,o. :You kn~w Che neu11sity o{ deu,.ioi.og John~
•ton. and you wu,t bavo inferred from the tetegraph or Geo.

~:::t~~~bin°:c::~fre:~,~~~~~;'did";~: !:~:::11h~i

,ou eonld to detaio hl'o1 whbo'Qt an otder1
.An&wer. Because I could not goup there without fighting,
u I eoa.1d not fall baol.:- &p,"aio. 1 ha.d 110 reason to believe that
that uharam wa~uot. written in the moruing io Tepb to mine
oftbat mon1in1, ll.30 a. m., uiJ:ng "Shall l attack 1"J Gen.
Scott did not fight tbat day. 4Dd there wu 110 more oecufoo.
fot my go1ag up u:&d petlliiJill: my men withotit a.n order, t.bau
of doiu~ anythi.tlg enLi:ely uncalled for-1101 the 1ll&hte1I 01>
euioo !orit.
•
•
•
•
*
*
•
Ir G••· Scott. did not 5~bt, sod..,., the neoe,lily for 017 aoltn1. 1 repeal. it
his baslltou to give tho order.

w.,.

ln S?J->ther place be teft:tle~:

Qofll- 'tio;i... ,:.t~~'.1

)•t;U J'utn,J

v .r; "-"ero ln

oondiUon to d4-

~11~t,_!~\b~~o:~~
could not deUiL b1m

t~:e1be~~i~o~::i;~a~1!~ ~!.;JS::,~~

could not fi,bt
but tbi,.t J011
&hat yonr tt.rengtb was in1:.Jffi.cio1Jt for that. od that ha couJd.
not rely upon bi• being kept ba,ckt
A.mwM, I nove.r 15upposed, !or a momeut, that Gen. Scott.
b eUeve4 for I.he llfl1•filth pan of a ,econcl thal l could hold

hit,,.

Gen. Patterson ra~ther testifies:

Que.ti.on. Yoo U""E-re not thr~ateniui
at Charle,.
town sou to preveut bh joiubur Beaor~&td atMa.ouH,t1
No, iSir. I r emaioed then, Deeaote l wu o.-deted.
to re main tn frout of him until be Jeft.
Question. You knew at that time that you were not off'erlna
0
1
sn_r:~~~~ i,!°1'f~U;~iDi ::;;
mean, U> do tt.
Que,tiob. 'Why did. you aot communicate that !act to O•u
Scott Immediately 1
.An1wer. 1 did commUDlcate m,y000dition. and where I \'n.1.
Q.oe,tlon. W hon 1
Anowor. On the JGtb I ..-rote him 1n detail f'rom Bonht
HiU. o,. tbe 11th I wroto ai,am. And ou tho 18th I gave him
a U t11e information JJeceu.a.ry. .And it. was hi.I bn,,dne..;e. to or•
aer me, and not lily bu.Wleu to mak.e any f.ariher •~li6titloJ1•
to him.
~::!~~"c;~~;,eoi,r:::ii:::,,ot~;~~tei:g~!bo~ th&
aamedu.
Queation. On what day?
Antwe-r. On the J8th, at U in the momfog, I telegrtphed
him .my cond,tion. ftlld uketfhlm it I abonld attack. '110 ha:•o
fierit tu.1ther infc,rmatioo. to him would ha•e been ratterJm..
per~toent, and ha would baVe 10 coD.lidercd it. * • • *
Que1tion. \\Thy did you 13ot inform blm tbat :,oc were not
then in a eooditi9n to offer any obataole to John11t,on'1 joi.o.iJl.c

t h5.a:!1'::!

B e•nreJ{Ud T

Au-wer. 1 would bave conri.dered it rather a reflection oo.
hlrn to h&Ye told hJm .go. litt knew my condition.

Gen. Scott teetifiea:

to~:~~i\~ !!e'!e;.·:O•::!ag:rw:i1,.~:r~ul!xct;!1l~J~:!:!
if with iur~rior nu.ED.ban, to bold the Rebel army 10 b.1J t.rout
0

8

en the alert, aud to prevent. it fr"w re--enforcfog
Junction, b,- mean• ot thr66teniog meneu1'cn1 and dew.on~
,tutiooi'.- telults often attained in war with L&lf DUm'ber&

l n&tead of doing tbi!t bowever, Gen. Patterson
came down to Banker .ttill, remRined there over the
dav ,vhen be had been given to tlnderetand the advance wonld be commenced by Geo. McDowell;
and ~ly the nen morning, without waiting to hear
how far Gen. McDowell had advunced, or whether
be lu1<I adV&ll«:d at :iU, left lbe 11oigb.borllood of

Wioobeeler. where the enemy was, and turned off
Cbarleetown, where, 811 ha himself saya, be bad
no means to offer any ooatacle to John1ton'1 join111g
Beanre.llllM wbet1ever he cho.e. Jobneton at once
took advantage of tbe opportnn.ity thua aff_ord_ed
him, apd re-enforced Beauregard ID 1ea&0n to 1uliict
.defeat upon oar forcH at Ball Ron.
John.ton !tarted the area<er portion of bis force1
lrom ,vmcboster on tLe 181h; 1ome Qf the testimony
a bowe tha& a portion 1tarted on the aftel'uoon of the
l7tb. Geo. Pa~r.on, though only eome tw11nty
miles di!tan, from Wioche.ter, and DDder ordera to
prevent the eoemv from re-ellforcinir Boan.regard, did
not oiscover tbat Jobuaton had lef& .Vincbo,ter un&U
·two day1 afterward, when be tele>:upbed, on tbo
201b, to Gen. Scott, thl.t re-cuf.>ree.n.c,ntl bad len
\0

lhera.

In reference t<J deferring the attn.clr upon Beauregard, when the arrival ot Johneton'a forces had bacom"' known, Gen. McDowell
thflt the inform..iion tbal ne received was too 1ndelinlteJ mere rumor, and be could no, tell bow mnch cNdit to giv&
,o it. 'l'he arrival of the care du dog tho night preceding the battle wi8 uo~ certain e,•,deoce oi the ar1'iva1 of Jobobton's forces; for it w,111 upected that
rel!nforcement• won Id be tinrried np to tbe enem1
from every direction po,-1ble. 4,nd be h11d been aJ1ure~ tbai "if John•on joined Be11111ega.1d, Pattel'IIOu
should be on his beele."
Geo. Scott tu1ili~1 on tb9t poiat:

A. coooeclod wltb thu ••bJ•ct, l oope 1 .,,.1 be permitted
-io notice the c1iar;e mi.do a,;atnu me OD. U>e floor• of Conrreu.
1llat 1 did not ,top Bri,.•Oon. ltcDowftll', movement upijD
ltt.nau'8 JuoatJoo aner 1 b1.d beeu loformt!.d of cbe Te-en•
uot tldthet trcu;n \V'ioebt•ter. tooa;b Ur.lled to do
to by oa.e or wo,e muubc:u of th6
how. it
aL
the r~oD of tba.t bt'WI to• l...c.e to "11 olf tbo troops from
the at.tack.. Aud. beside, tb0lllh
to &he m0Teme.1n M
fint, we lJa.d all b&come aui01t4ed ond nt13uinn of aucoi.,u.
And h t1 r:ot trot tbat l wu ar•ed. by anybody Jn autb.otity to

wa,.

J

itt ~~~:r,.~ wllloJ> WU COllUDeo;~t•~W~E~
BALL•8 BL11PP.

The J oin\ Committee on the Conduct of the War
anbmi, the followfog report, with tbe aceo1Dpanying teatimony, in relation to tho battle of Ball'•
Bluff:
On tbe morning of SatOl'day, the 19th of October,
1861, Gen. McCall, comm11ndilllt a divi•lon in the vicmity of \Vaehingtoo, moved hi• entire command,
under ordere f1·om Geu. MeClellau, to Draiuenille
and ito immedinte neighborhood. .A portion of bi•
force ...-a, moved l!Ome milee b~yond Dmineaville
and within eight or ten mile, of Loesbnrjl', but wo1
recalled to Draioesviile, h).: order of Gen. McClellan,
about s11naet of that day. rhe cntiredivllion of Gen.
Wm. F. Smi1b wrui alao tent out within aupporl.ing
diatance of Geo. McCall.
G n. McCall 1111tlfies that be wae directed to mako
reconnoi11110cea in nil directionij for three or four
mtl,s from Draioeavillo, noting particnl1uly tbe character of tbe couotr1, About JO o'clock on Sunday
mon,ing, he informed Geo. :MeClellan that he abould
not be able to get tbroogh
work that dnv, and
l·eceived in reply, '' If yon fiDieh iD the morlllllll, re-

turn."

On Sunday, the 20th G~. !1cClellan directed a
telegram to hH fieot t,a,Ckn. Stone, at Poolea\'ille, of
w~loh the following is a copy furnished your Com-

wuee:

=~~~

ll«<tve<I Oc~ :zo. toot, tx,,m Camp Griffl11,
G~.• M:cCl•u•c de'tlre1 me to in.form you tbat Qn )le.Ct.JI
oceul)1•d Dr•ln•tvlllo l'8Jterd-.y, and f• •till tl,ore; will 1eud

1h~ei:a!c:!.i ::~!~!~l:t:,1:u al~.:;re:t~:IJ•dt\-r:~:::
ari••
~!::lb:.;~
:o
1

0

1

qp•P L~ba.rf; tn aea if t.hh moveme-Dt h• tbe eff•CI to
th•4"~::
t;_:;.o"tution on )'our pan
A. V, COLHUltl'I, A.a,Mao\ Adjalaol•G•nerol.
Brlc.-Gcn. S1'0H::S, PooJenllle.

On Sond&f afternoon Gen. Stone· moved tome
foNles to the baa-.: of the river a, Edward•'s Ferry,
and cro,.ed o,·11r one or two compamea to Lhe Vir•
g,pia aide, bu, very •oon recalled them.
Col. De,·•n& of the 15th llb6Sftcbu!ett1 testifies
11at be 1e.:.,1ved from Geo. Slone, about l o'clock on
,uay, the follo,v'..I:g ordilr:
f

.Ra.t.l)Q.tr.1.ana1

Coua o• Os121tTAT10:s, }

PooLUTILLW,

Ooto~u llu, 111111. I

Coi.oss1.,: Yoo wDl p1eu.e ucd. ord~n to tbe c.a.aal ta ba,e
the two new flat-boats uo.., tbtre oppo11te tee iliand (Bar•
rl1011,,) trau,ferred to thti rl••r; attd will, &\ 3 o'eJoak, p. m,.,
h•'Te the
re,11nforc.nd byaH of your re1lwent iaow- oo
dqty ai tbe canal a ad at the New-Yori: batt.e.rT. Tbe pla.tet•
wtll be r,pl&oed by Ibo co=p•aiu of U.e t9tla MunolluelU
th•N- Very retveC!,f~, 1oar ob.di•~&. •~•.a"CIU$. P. ST01'"E, Brl~d.ior-Oen•nl.
Ulb
MaMo,
0

Col. ~::.,~t';"-JoY::i!!:;,Comma~a

lle;imoo•

About dark • verbal order ...,u rent to Col.
Devon, to eend Capt, Philbrick, of bia regiment,
with a miall party, acl'Ol!a the t1nr frolD
Harrieon's bland, with directions to pneb ont to
witbin a mile of Leesburg, if poeoible, wltbouL
being discovered, and tben ret'OJ'll and reporl. Cap~
Philbrick accordingly crossed, with, perbap11, 15 or
20 meo, at a place where b.e had croS1Jed eome time
previou,ly, wlieo he bad diacovered that the river
at that point wu not l)ic!reted by the en•my. He
landed at t.lle foot of the bloll', oppo~ite ll1rriaon'1
l&and, known ae Ball'• Bluff' 91,eoded bv a path
that led to the top, and proc;;A,ed to reconnoiter u
directed.
B•fore Capt. Pbilbric'lt returned, Gen. Stone oe11t
the folloui.111t diapatch to Geo. McClellan, a cop7 of
which was furni1hed ;your Committee:

tt• TB& Pcrroxic,

th:=:: [:f!~j .=u:J~~:or::~:i~~r:;:n..c:1:;:~
H1u»Qu.A.I1TB1\1 A111n

t

Rtce!Ted \\ &1tblngtoo, Oct. 20, 1261. from Pooltniu._ 5

1

bare !rorn Hanhon I Illand. l!t1emy'1 plc~<!:tl retired to In•
tre.acla11entt. Report of reeoanolterla1: pm1 not )'8C. reeeiv...
I hue lll4UUll of 41011l:n1 ]2S P1flQ O'HI 1D JO m.iD.ote, ai eac:11 ot
two poh.ta. Rlrar falli,,s olowl,r.

C. P. STONE, Brl&-•G-

!bJ •Gu. McCLU.Lll.

C11pt. 'Pbilbrlck pru,bed ont !ome clietance from \be
bluff, and then returned ond reported dist they had
discovered a 1mo.ll camp of Ule eoemy that did not
appear to be very well auardod.
report wu
eeot to Gen. Stone.
Col. Devens ropor!!I that about midnight he nceived the following order from Gen. Stone:
B&.u.Qt'J.JtttR• Con• 01' OBSl'R"TA.Tlf)...
Poounn..t.s, Oct. 2-0, 1861-I0j p. m. f
De•on• Will lan~ oppoalle
lel1t.nd with five cotnpanle, ot bh n,a\mtnt, end
ptoct•d to au!t_rl•• tlle e.amp or the •oemy 4,laro11.red b.1
Sl'llCUL Olll>~t. No.

-.-CoL

~f~D!~~b~I 1,!~};~i:://:0a11~c~e.:l~1clii~.• ledlnc

.tt<;1c~u!e~~:.·:;~1:iu:~~.t.o!:!u;t•~':~:T.-r.~~ia:i~

four con1p11oiea or bh J'f'gbmtnt, an~ "'ill cause the fo•r•oared:
boat lo be taba acroH the hland to t.be polDt of 41,uture o.f

Col. DH'ec,. Oo• compaoy ....u1 be tbrow11 acrou to occun
tho blah,. on Ibo Vtrcmia ,bor., al'ter Col. Deno••• clepanu:re, to COTnr hb return.

Two mountatri
wtll be tU'eD eUently •p thetowpalh and carried to the oppotlte lid• o! lbe ulad, 1111du Ille
orden of Col. LH.
CoL Donna will •lt•elt the eamp or th• oum:, at daybreak.
and. ba•lo& rou.t~d, will paua:e the.m aa fir u be deeou pn.den~ .,.4 "111 clnl.rp:, the camp, If v,oellcable, before
.returning:. Be will make all the ob1orntton1 po11lbl• on the
coautr1; will, uader all clreumlta.nc.e,. k'e.ep
oomaaaul
well lo band, end not 11cri6c• thtm to &Dy 1appot,N &d.-1111~
••• o(rapid puriulL
Huloc aceoo,pll1bed lllh duty. CoL
will rf'han le
hi.a prereat position,
lit
... one on th• Vlrcinfa
!Id.de, m!lar r.be rlvor, which be can undoubted!{ hold ut1tU

i:;::t;i•,~iJ:~
:::ib=b
J! ,!:n ::•:'~ h!11: !:~
re~on.
C.EIAS. P. STONE, Brlpdiar-GeaeraL
0

G~t care •ill be oRd by Col. De•e:o, to pre•eat &11J'
ll'DDftCelMry iDJi:uy of priv•t• property; aud any officer or
50Jdior •treulio1 zrom tho comma.ud for corloaity or plander
will bo
allot.

C!lAS. P. STOX£, Bn,adltr•G«nenl.
Col. Deven1commeooed croseiog his force betweea
12 and 1 o'clock at niA'bt, ond about 4 o'clock in the
morning had cro6l!ed his five cornpanieL Ile pro•
ceeded op ~be bl oft' and formed ha command on the
top or the bluff' ond remained thel'!I until it was li$b:~
enough to find hie way. Col Lee also croued witb
abou, 100 men, and toolr position upon the blaff'.
Col. Devens ,eat out ecouts to tbe right and lefi,
repol'ted tbat they ~ould fuid no enemy.
"IL tbe Ji.raL dawn of b 6 ht, Col. Devens mo•ed bi&
command out in the direction of the
camp.
Upon re,chiag the point to which tbo reconnoiterinir
puty of t.bo night btilore bad proceeded, it was diacov,·r.!d lhat wblit bed "e~n \liken for a camp wae •
tiot<le ,ow or truea, thH<iiru light of the1110011 ,hining

4:
b&tween tbem, below tho br1111chea, preaei:mog tho
appearance of a row of unt,.
Col. Devcu~bad edvanco.l with bl1 forco to'l'l'ilhln
about n mile of ~e•bn~_; be hnlLed hie n,en there,
and 1>roceedeJ to exauuue the coamry abou, bi.a
poaltioo sa fnr as prac1icoble. llo ,ent word to
Gen. Stone tbat there had been a miah1ke nboat the
camp orthe enemy; that be wu well po1ted m a
wood and eonce,il•d, and waited turtber orders.

N ot far from 7 o'clock' in the moro!Qg a body of

R ebel riflemen wu di&0ovoreJ to the tight of Col.
D evene'• posilion, In tbe dir,ction of
J'ury; Capt, Philbrick: w1th lua c3mpany advauc,;d
t oward tbem, when they fell back until they reached
a ditch, under cover ot which tboy hltod and
opened fire npoa our men; thev were soon driven
out or the ditch io1,0 a corn-field where they obtained cover behiud 1ome etucka of corn. Another
compnuy WIil! ordered by Col. DeYene to tho enpport
of Capt. Philbrick: but liefore tbey reached lum
eomo o( the euemy's cavalry made tbe,r appcuanco
from tho direclion of L.,.,.i,nrg. The iwo companica were ~b.en orderud t.o f,ili back to tbe '1l8in
body.
About 8o'oloek Col. D evens dcte1mined to faU
back to tbe bluff, where Col. Lee w.., wnicb wu
done iu perfect order, Bo then reconno11ercd the
wood, to his rfl\'bt and left, and discovering no &J;>pearance ~I. Ille enemy, moved forwar<1 to his
former poMLtou.
Bet9\'een 8 and 9 o'rloek the mc•senger of Col.
Deven, re1nroeJ from Gen. l:itone w1tb
t o him to remo.iu ,vbere IJo was, nod he would be
11npportcd. Col. Deveoe
tbnt it wne either
U,en or IOOil &fl.:r that be wns told tbn, Col. Baker
was to come over and take command. He sens
word to Gen. s,0110 that be was diec:m,red by the
enemy, but could atill llold his old poeition, Abont
10 o'clock the me81!8ng-er ro111rl!.ed wilh tbia meaaage:
"Verv well; Col, B..i.er v.ill como 1111d "'ko coin-

mand:"

Col. Dnene ii.Ille• that wbilo awaiting fartber in•
etrnctione be directed hi• ndjn~ant to ascertain tile
amount of the force with lu.m; tho 1'9por, was 28
and 625 men. He Ee»' once or twico 10 the
river to ascertain if re-enforcemeute were coming,
and wbut he w11e to do, Lut be r~ccived no rorther
order or mees11ge.
A.boo, 12 or 1 o'clock en attark was made upon
Col, De•en•'• force, which lasted rome lU 01 15
miuutes, Receiving no orden t>r message from tbe
river, be fell back: Hbout CO yarda, :reformed hia line
and m.ide dispo6ition• to retire 6tlll fo1ther it neastaJY, And in poriup1 KD hour he lcll back to the
fiel!I juet in trout of t11e blufF, "Where t4e main action
afterward took place. '£here be met Col, Balter,
who coogratnbt~d him npun the IAIUIIler ill wluell
!WI men bad coac11,~1~o1 tbe1u,1:.l-n.,.
In relation to· the oruua to Col. Biil.er, Gen.
Stone te•tdies:
I can &he :;011 all the ..,1,- o•d•'" t~ Col, Ba~cr. I awt b!m

a11 order, about. 1JJI01i;a!Jt 00 the .!ah. to .,...,J. tbo CohfoniJA
Rec:1meut to Cou..a-. Fury, ~u h••• U.Qm t~~• atda.J•

bnat. to aw,ic. o-:d.:r. t ;icre : to hl'o tbe
ma.inder or
bri:,ade rouaod
early ;
bu·• •
comfortable
br1akrui..
and
be
in
n-,odlne••
1
1,o mo"• ~t 1 0 c:o.::t So the moz 11lu,r.
Late 1n the ulJbt-it.
mf1bt hne bee,n bttwetia 2 and 3 o'clock ta. u,e monii.t1c,-l
sell, a ceuiloc.uy orJ.er to C"1. BUH. kllo,.-lu: Ula\. vulo.o~
moke too much 11ohfli 1otne-thu,u, to b..a.1'.t ti1u regi.meht ru.arall
wit.h ellorice aDd wltb utJ,..a.ded 11.1u1. J;1'1om tLat tune l 1100~
aim no order.

Gen. Stone testifies tbnt between 8 ond !Ii o'clock,
when Col. Baker waa v,i;b b1m, and they aw:1 dis•
cneaed tbe whol~ n,attor for eo,nl ilme, he ~ave him
a written order to take t tu, entirt!I command of the
!right ut Ball'• Blol!'. 'l'bM ordor, with a commnni•
"8lion from Gen. l:itone to Col. .Cal.er, sent some
time later, wa.e found 11J'OD hia budy after he waa
killed. 'file 1wo papere >1rc as followa:
0

llJUI>QU>;,ttJ:~·A~~:r4s;:n~~-~t~~TJ~!'fies1. l

COlA>:rIL: Jo ciu-e of b(lj.'VJ n ir,t' 10 f;-oot ot lt1un.1on'1
l,lu.d you ,...u1 t1.1lvuee tbe Cahfor11 :\ r...;im,..llt n( your
11

b-rip.de, or retuu the Tflcimet111 u.oce.r C,,1-. l.6, • •ad Deve1111

now on tbe \'tre,lul• 1ldt1 of Ula i-;-;ier, kt
1a.cntn1 001.11maud on turlnJ.

3,01.ir

«hiet.:Uo.a, o.s-

.. v~=-'clti~eL~~~~~STO~~l. ~~1~Gt.°o~J:~~;
1

0

" Ccl, J:.. ,D, l l ~ , COtwz>UJcUll5 .Ill

-.•4"-"

o !hAIIQVA'llTB&t COi.it& OS 0BtW8YA1101t'.
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am
•nomy
!!f~~~'b~!°~!tro~~,~~np::rthi:.,::..u,Jy7od:
t:~b~:;
::~1::::e o:~dissJ~:'1t~~~~:~J[1 !'!:'roC
fu, but. aelic the fint 100d po•f~on t.o eovor that Toad. Tbalr
~ 10:r~!~:!!d r:!:'>i!,r::,::
and hne a ,tron: ~ltioo..
•• J!!inw..11..1>1'1 l'• ••T. Oa.t. 22, 1861-11,so. J
"CoLOftl.: I
informed tb.&t the Coroe of tbe
ta

"Report f1equently, 10 t.bat wben they are puhed GonP11
can oowe in on their 6.anL
u Youn re~tfollyand t.roly,
"CEt.utLES.P. STONE, Brif:.-0.n. Commaa~
,~ Cot £. D. 8.Ar&a, ComOlacclinc Brlirad.."

Col. Baker l)roceeded to Harriaon'a Itland, and
finally cooclnded to send over troops to re-enforce
Col. D evene and Col. Lee. One of the witnewoa
in dnaM for a tiwe
aiatee tbat Col. Baker
whether IA) recall tbe troope already over, or to reenforce tbem; but, npon heariog some one on the
Virginia allore call out that tbey needed a11ia1ance,
as the enemy were coming, he determined to reenforce tbem, and proceeded buiaelt to t be Vlraioia
aide, and aHomed command. Col. Btker direo'<!d
the force• to croaa at the JlOint where Col. Dovena
and Col. Loe had cro88&d w1Lh their forces.
The means of tran@portin,ll
at Ban•, B lnJI'
was exceediogly limited. Between the Marylend
abore and Harrison's Itland were only thtte ftatboate or scow•, all together cauable of crossing about
125 men at a time. On tbo Virginia ai<le of the latand
there were at fim only a Francia metallic life-boat
and two email skiff,, t"Ogetber incapable of e&rl"Jlllg
from 25 to 30 men at a time. After a time, one of
tbe scowe, or flatboats, wae tnkeu 1rom tho Maryland to tile Vir&"lola side of the il!land.
The landing on 1he Vu:ginia-eide w. . at the too~
of a very steep blnft~ up wb1eh a uBrTow path, widening toward the top, wound ita ,vay; and 00 the
top of the blntf waa a cleared space or field, bordered b,1 wooch, which afforded a cover to the enemy
until Wltbin n abor; diet1111co of ,-vhere Olli' troops
were formed.
Col. Baker, according to tbo teimmon::,, arrived on
the field be""een 1 and 2 o'clock:, and J>roceecled at
once to form II line of ball le oPon the field at the
top of tbe blo1l'. The amoaot o! tbe force engaged
upon our eide was betweon 1,700 and 1,800 men,
coosiotiog of abont one ball' of tho 15th Mauachneetta Regimeni. uoclu Col. Devena; a Jl()rlion (317
men) ot the 20th Ala.sachneettt, nuder Col. Lee; tho
Tammany Relriment, under Col. Cog1weU; and tbe
Cahfoeo,a Regiment, nndor Lrnot.-Col. Wiet:u·. •r ho
enemy'• !orcea were about 4,000 moo.
Tbe enemy b@gan t&e attack-eome of the mtneua• say betw~en 2 and 3 o'clock.
aG 3
o'clock-at fl.rat heavily, 011 tbe right of our Ima,
then n,oviDg alonl( toward the center and left,
where the hirdei.t fialrnn~ took place.
Your Comaliuoe do not deem it nec-ary to go
into the detiws ot ihe action. H cootinoed for over
t wo honra, our troops contending most bravely
ay&inat greatly 10perior numbers. Col. Baker feU
betweeo. 4 and 5 o cloclr, having been most coospic•
non• for Jii.s bravery and almost I"eCGleaa dann,.
Wbou be fell the line began to waver, and ,01110 1iortlone of it gave way before the destrnctivo !lro of
the enemy.
After the de.eth of Col. Daker, the commaud devolved npon Col. Co~well QI the Tll\(lmuny Rogiment, who proposed to uttempt to cnt tbrou~b 10
Edwards'• Ferry, which wae Bllleutod to bv the
other regimental comm..ndere. Upon ateempiing a
movemeo, in that direction, they were met b.y a
Missiesxppi regiment comiog from below, which
opened a moat deatractivo fire upon them. Our
tr00pa gave way, ana retreated down the bluff
toward we river. 'l'bis wa1 about daak, so tbat our
troops were somewhat concealed by the boahee on
the eide of the bluff. The enemy continued to fire
upoo them frem tho top of tbe blu.lf. Tbe men attemp~d IO "scape to tbe bland in the boats and by
awi,nmlog, being eitno.e.t all the time to the ti.re of
tbe enemy. Tlio fta~boat waa soon ridd.l ed and
nnlc, the life-boat drifted down the sLream, and the
akilfi were lost. l\lany were abot willle in the
wa~; otbere 1ucceeded in l\'filnmiDg to the illana:

tome !aw, aJ)der oonr of tba dnkn-, 111oc-1ed ill
eaeao111g a.long the bank or \he n,,er, and fuuilly
reached oor lmee. :Bu, tbe greater portion wen
killed or taken prisonero.
In r elation to the operation• at Edwarde'e Ferry,
ooder tbe enpervi,ioo of Geo, Stone nod tbe immediate command of Geo. Gorman, aa there wu no
•rioua fighting there, i t may no, be oeceaeary lo go
mocb into dei:ail. The croesiug wae commenced
about daybreak by t.h e !orcee under Col. Dana of
the lat lllinoeaota Regiment, and waa contioned
ontil some 2,500 men were croeeed over that dny.
The means oC crossing ,ve1e very limited, aa at Harrl10o's Lllodiog, coosisliog of tbr~ or foor Aat-boats
or sco"'a, propelled acro,a by poles. The place of
landing waa very good, and co•ered by our artillery
on ibe .Maryland Bide. Thero were no impor$8o,
demoostrat1ooa made bv our forces on tho V11ginia
&de of Edwnrds's Ferry. • Some roeonnoiamnces
were made /or a abort dietance, and one regiment of
tbe enemy seen, probably the Missis,ippi regiment
tha, arrived on the field at Ball's Bluff', bear the
cloae ot the aclion uiere.
Geo. McCall'• diviaion bad remained at Drainesville all or Sonday an.d Sunday night. Gen. Mo-·
Call teatifioe:
•1

,

I

At 6

!!':u1~:r:.:~~~~::r:: :,u:~~~,_reio~;_~

0 1 clock

on Monday morrtlll,:_I reported to btm (Gan.

!e!;~e~baaa,)
ihu: erpr.n to Gea. lalcClell~o at 6 o'o.loet_ aad 10&. bl.I nply,
dJ.led 8 o'clocc• U1ll1u,i: me lO ruum IP eoou u tb• work wu
fioitbed. I sut b11 uawer be1.weeo 9 and JU o'cJock.. 1 ot•
dcr.d the troop• &hen to be read7 to m0•e, and II toon u th•
work wu tinl•btd. l retuYued to w1 camp wder order•."

Both Gen. McClellan and Gen, McCall testify
that tbe movement to Droioenille waa for the pnrpo,,e of recoUD01tering \be country in that direction.
:Bot Geo. Stone received no iutlmatioo or tbe object
of 1be movement. On tbe contrary, the language of
,be dispatch of Sunday migM well lead bim to believe that tho movement bad reference to drivini
the enemy from Leesburg. The ruspatch oontaioed
no intimation that Gen. McCall waa to be soon
withdrawn from Uraineevllle. He wu diroo,ed
" to ket:p a good lookout upon Leeaburg to oee if
t his movement bas the eft'ect to dnve them (lhe enemy) away. Perhaps a •ligbl demoostra1ioo on your
pi.rl wonld bave the effoct t<, move tbem." Gen.
S:.one made demoustrarfona botb at Edwarda's Ferry
&:nd at llall'e Bluff, and prowptly notified Gen. MQI.
Clellao oC wbat he had done. lie sent thllt intorlnatioo on Sunday nigbt, and be ~sllliea that he received no io11maoon from Gen. McClellan u to
wbat be ehonld c!o, whether to continue 1be demon11rauons or not; anrl received oo intimation that
Gen. McCall wae not close at band to come to bis
1111aistaoce uubl abont 11 o'clook on Monduy night.
It wae a vuri l(enerul impre...ion among tbe officers
-<nd men at Edwlll'd•'• l<'erry during Monday tbz.1
Geo. llcCaU would come to their Hniataoce; a:od
Geo. S:.one te,lliliea tlun he caatiooed bis artillery
abont tiring upon any troop, that migh1 abow tbem..elvee io tbet direcuon, 18/lt they might 1lre npon
oor own torcee.
,
Io regard to that matter, Geo. McClellan teeti6.e1
llsfol10W11:
·• Q.u.1uo11. Do 7011 reme.mbetwbMher or not yoa informed
hl.w. (0.-n. ""'"•) c,( tbo wirlulnwal ot SmiUi aad McCall <o

rt:'i'!fr11.t•,

Geo. Stone (l•'eb. ZT, 18G3), after stating that upon
hoariog of the deatb of Col. D>1ker be proceeded to
Ball'• lllufl', where be learu~d the full eucot of the
diiiaster, and at once det•rmined to withdraw tbe
INOJ)8 a~ Edwarch'e Ferry, teatiliea a, folluw11:

•• And i!ae,,, ka(.1-wu,c ,tau l could. £0 IJU'tel! qul,:ker tlran
u,booy I co1.1ld KDiJ, I tun,ec:i a,y bwae aqQ plloped dO"'-'"D
,o witbdr•w rny uoopt, et Edward:11 1 i·erry back to 1.ne Ma,,...
land ahore. l •uppo.ed. at th,, lime tb.u I had about 2,~
'ff e n

aa1:011 tho rl\er; and thtt r.-port• I had hcJtd. oppoalto

13,tl.Pi. Blutfwore tbat the etuuoy )11U be.ell lar;:~ly ro•eutoroe.d,
Wld thc,y w.,ro lbtu about 111.c,oo "·'oog. I HW that then,wu

°"

.,.rfeoll7 lhe po-al>d U.. Vlfsb>la ,be,., ana U ,,.,.,14 b..,.
uaeedl.o cl1 clu>sero11t lhio1 ror uoopt lo o4nnce aad attack
aa7 bod,: of men on &be Virguda 1bor9. directly at .!!chruda'•
Feny, wbllo cbe Muytuid thore wu well beld by •rtlllery',
Th• momenl T b ad 1tvt11 \he order for the -redrin1 of tbo••
troop,, J reporlod b7 telog,apb to Goa. McClellan, at Wub•
tn,ctou th&t we had mtci Wlth a rt-pialee oa our rtg,ht but I
wu doiog tho be•t 1 could to aecuro tho Jen, acid. c.o re\.rlo.,.,.
J am Dot qatte 1ure iaow whet.her I telearapbed to O••· Moc1.-111nd before I woul ap to Harrhoo•, lJ_Ja.nd. that Cfll, Ba,..
IA
Ibo Ame .U.BaTilll aeot tb•\ lotormat.ion. \0 Oeo. M.cClellaa, I OO'ClUoned. w itbdnwia; lb& ttoop11 wucblng carefully,
u
to DH the all.Ulery tor their proteattou it Deo«!JJary. .tlt6r
too:ae Ume-1 aaonot tell bow lon1, tor oae take• but JltUo
?lot• of time uoder 1ucb circo1:111t.snce1, bot 1ppate•tly u
eo.-n u a me.ua:,e coa.ld co to \Vaahi.a&tOtl aud ao 1n1we¥ be,
Nturned (bdnc carried by a eoorle.r ou bonebaD.t foar mUu
•eb. wa,- from tb-e &ele,:,.pb ttatloa co E d ~ • Pe,rry>-I
TtcefYed orders ffom Oen. McClell&.D to tbia effeec 1 .. Hol4
all tbe groaod you now haTe on the Vlrdm& 1.bore ii your
mon. will 6sbt, h1trenoh.l:nr, if DtO(t.fllUJ, Yon wnt bo " '"
eoforced." Perbapt ,be worda "lf :,our men w lU flaht"

:::J: ~?etv;:,:;:,,-;:tf:!'o}li,~ '*~~.!_•

~:1u

;8iJ~~~b! :~:,~r.:~&~t~~e•::,f:l;r !f:lt:!:~d!~c

0 8 0
,: {

were a•ed IA the cllrectloa to h old all lhe i'OllDd OD lhe VirPDJ• abore.
lam IORJ' that 1 h•n not poaHll.on of • slacle paper, tel•
:,:11pb or oibuwl1e, or the -record, connected witb my cll-

co~~0!~nl.Otll

~= ~~~;:a i:o~~:o~ :;::u,~::?1Z
1

0

~a':l.

1Ugton, at oi,cei a.ad huing not tho ,tr1bte1t 1u1picion of why
I WH req,aired nero. 1 le.ft all my papor• I woald ba?a donv
bid I bMn 1oing out for a two boun' rldo; and from that.

!L':: ::»tt°;,~bmf \~.;:eJ1:1 •~~tn!:ro: •:Go,!l»J11!
~~:1
..; { .=:::.'::r::~~~•T:;::r;
u.actwords..
0

1 1-•w all the Ch1>1er io which my trool)I ,..en, on the Vlr•
rluia tide, but ( •u~po,ed et that t1me tha, Oen. McCall was
-.uy uea.r tbere, aud T took it for granltd wben Geo. MoClel·
l&u telegraphed nie lo bold m7 polltioo OG tbs Vir(inla tide at
aU baurJ,, and <ball 1boold be N-.nforoed, that be ba<l lhe
meau1 or im.rdeolateh .ecurlnar me.
I c.,.Dol ,bte pocl!ITeh wbeb 1, wu the& J telograpbed to
Gen, B&D.b.. Bol r.ny lmpreulon now U tb11l Jud u 11\att.d

!:.!t:/
~:t~'ie~:~h:l~: 1t:.0B:n°k~,~~u!~::tr:·~
1eod up a brlguJe. When I JO~ to B1ni•oo'• bland, and be,.

r:r:i;::~~:::.~~i~,::J!~o!es?o~d:r::fb.e!d.m:~·:~:~

!u~~:Y'1:!~:b~:r&;b~B=.o~~!~ard1'• ~~err,. trom
And my iruptt&elOD i, lb•t wben I retarued to Zdward•'•
::.::-.tit'.t;~•fi!°,i,•t
~"e~:;.::t~~·:~~~;~~~-'~it
th&~ he had better bda1 op hit whole dtVi1ioo. l koow I 1eot
Oe.n. Bank.I

a tilearam i bot '" wb•t. time"'l wW oot b•

po•ILlvo.

Somo time wu loft in oomtountc1.Un1 with Gen. :McClellon, by n,y rerei<!na a dlopet.ch, la clpbor, oCwblch I bad uot
•be ke7,
hJa,
hi, CWd SWT. Whal lbe oooteni.t oft.bat ditpe.tGb wen. I hav" 11evtr levned. I im1t1•
dla1ely rup<tnded to it. : •• I baTe R!C~aTed th@ box, but ha,..
nr. ke7.11 \Vbat tba\ di1pa!ch wu. I
no taowJed•• of
what•,.er; bot I prHome that tbe d~aicbe. which ea,m-, aJ.
tcrward oOTered the tame lfOuod.

Ciom

or from

of

wl,~tA~::: 1•:t:,~;b~lfo•Oe~ At~i1:ii.~!~;:1

~att!~~:
be tent to Oooff Cr&ek, oa tbe Virainta

enforCf!lmenta

1Sde1 1oppo1iDg all the lime tbai Oeb. McCall wu not tu oU:
'J'lJ:e r11:1ponse to th«.. wbicb J tht.ak J n.cel•ed aboae, 11

o'dock oo lfoud.ay 1>liht. wa tbe fint latlmaticn I e,et re,,
c olv..t lh&I McColl bad aot all the llme ~n • - ua. Thu
diJpatch informed me
no rei!nforcemenla could ru.cb. me
11-om Ibo Vlr~nla 1ldo, but lhal Ueu. Baa.Ir.a would N&ruorce
mti trom tho Marylaod atde.
Qoe1tion. How
Ge.n. Baoi1 from you?

fa '"'"
11

:r~

~=:~~BDld"t~:: ~;::i.-v,o: oen. MeCl•Uan,
promi.1101 you relnforcem.Bll~ coawmrlate tw they •boald
111

come from Oen. BI.W l
Amwer. Yea,.Slr.
but at the time myidM
wu that McCall wu clo1.- by mlil.. And I wa, led tuto aa
enor, late in th• evftnln1, by receivi.us a di1_pal.c.h trow
Geo. McCltllan'• heaJqnuter1, wbot.bor 11kned by him or

b ra chief of 1ta..tf, l do 11ot now reoolleut, HD.Ilg: me It tbftR

:;.::
't!'!!'~:cb ~f.::•~e.:'o:a~.t'u:~f•b!:~{nfh"°;
" Dnloeuille.,, And b&vioc io my JD,nd tb&.t Mc.Call w._.
a1

Dralne,YilJ~ I took 1t for granted ch.at cbe ope.zator b:.d PJade
a 111Utlle-1 a.ad bad OH&D' DraiuN-\>ille iua&ead of
towo." which wat uu, nune or a pl•ee in ~farJlaod, a.ad
which proTed to be tbe place mean'-' l replied t.o t b1t dia-J)lttb to the beet of •uy nicoJleccioo. that there w11 1 100d
1h11,
rorul from Dra.ineri:vlllu to Edw-.rd•'• Ferr7. I
oau1od eouie llll•concept.ion at bo dqoa.rtera, 'beeaaN

tb1t

:!t ~~h~::!,~
gi~~u~ :! tf::::1~ fill•"
~; in uy m.iodh~~~:.»:,t.Jj~~~
: te~~&~:::
•i#t him or noL. l wu
nu.or 110011Uice 1D tefe:r.1.00 to him
wbeo I
Dan)e&Y{ll,o u t u th• dlf.

f~~.~•J

i.D.

ort.~1ition.
·•1 a, 01.10411 aonuueoced Telirlac my h'OOF• u qa!ttl,1 bot u
rapla1)" a1 l cnutd, taking tbe pr•e&utlon to b~•• o-1y artillery
11

p.telh Bta ,1w

II no,

'"°'",aw
imporl.&O<, o.<&ly <o .bow how
•j

e.r~ ,hi::!::~~
my unpleu•
~lt.:1~,,.!U~ Ttt:1·~:::!!~::-~~i:d'leo~°::~:t~~~: ::~=~'-!tnEJ~b..;x:~dF:;;~ !i:a~:~'!!fed1:~:fJ::i~
0

1
:',;;, 1t•lflment l mn1,

t~mOYe

otnoct!on or m,- t111>rrfor olllcers an4 wounder Ibo tmprea110·11 thll- oar forct11 under Gen. McCall were near u, on the
Vlrlinla tldo of Edwardo'• i'orr,-.
(to.. Uoo. Ho., bappeud It th&l ;roo f•ll• d to mat• thll

9tawm6DI., c.onctrAlD& c.bose orden,. ou yoa.r folmer •um.lo&•

don t

tb!·:::~!'ofB:no-.::• e~od/!£:!!:i;rc~ t:P:~cf'forehf':Jsejf

Jte.T1.ou•b pubtf.hef or authorlaed mo to ue. The morulns
tba&. I Nto• before yoor Commttue l WH inat.n:1cted et Gen.
MeClellao'1 httdqaanera tbtl It,._. tb• dettre or Ibo G,oeual
that oOlc~r• pnu4 tatimoo:, before tho Commlu.ee
110, 1tato, without hi• authortt.1t &nytb.io1 re1ardl111 bis plan, ,
~• order• for tbe moveme11t:1 o t.roopa, or- bi..t order1 coucein•

iD~~e~S:::liDldf:r•::0J:tu'!':!~'l~1'~:~:~j;a;,,epul or-den

u d &n.Da&etiou, H well . . those to bf'!: e..z.e~uled in the futoTo1
An1wor. I did: because I could no~ know, and dfd ooL
know, wbd otdera t:o otbere were Qiw-o u cc.terupotaneoua
with ,boN I r~he;I, &ad 1 mf&bt. cr~ate wrong J..QJprt'nlon•
'b1 &i.-01 the order• I had nceil'ed from wy comm.. udi.D1
General. unteN tbere were at the ame lime prodar.ed ut.e.m~
pora.o.oc,1 ordera &l'HD to otber Ge.oetall. And 1 pre.nm•
tbd the Cbdtmao will remember that l •t•led, when 1tnng

=~::,~~!:·::1m:el:::e:~is!;::,~~:Ue~~,~·:.S~eir'::J•z!:::
1

po~~lloo. Did Goo. lllcCiellon •1>rr••• or tho c ,o,.lnc ai
EdwarJa>1 Ferry and lh.ll'• ~latt. c.a. tbe 21., or October,
1
~~ewor. 1 recol•ed a dl,pateb from Gen. Mc0leUan ill
tepl,- to otlif'I wbtcb 1 b$d ,.DC. brm, ioforuilo; him of the
oro.alo1 of Gen. Oormll..Q. and Cot "bu.u. T!l.t di1patch to
me commeuced with these word1: ·• I cot2,ral•l1.te you. and.
J'0 1lr command." l toot that eo»rrat.u'atfon, on lbe fact or
m1 ha1'Utl ecoued, u au appro,ra_l ol the croulog; auJ u (
bid recehed no lb(orm&Lio.a. wbatover concerntnc Oi!n • .Mc,,
can. tu my owa ml.ad 1 •appo,ed tW le. wu but. a l'lmple
lhio1 of Oen. llct.J..11.n i.a. co.11:.otctioo, witb any oto•r mo•e-=nu be m\l:bl be ma.tins,
Q o.utlon Wa, C;on. btcClelhm taformecl of your mea.n• of
tra.01pottatJon for cro1dng trooos 1
An•w•r. bome time dudo1 u,e das-ana I think it WH in
ihe u.me d-1- p.:atoh in "'hicb he uked me (or itJormalioa or
~ • eaemr...ad L 111-,otd thia.k th.c. tlat Jhra.te.b mo,L ha-,.•
reaebed me about 0000- Gen. McClellaa Ha.ed wb,t IDNDI
oftr•n•porta~ion 1 bad. I replied to bfm by r.elecraph, sta\•

!-:\:•:::,~~!fei!;::J~cltr~i~~~ b1:J~•~d~ each oro11lng1

Gen. McClellan t.e«tifi•9 in ri!ference to the crosaing or Gdo. St.ooe a forcea into Virginia:
I h••e no Teeolltctlo11 of any ordeT which Jn1U6ed the pa.
aa1e of Uie rlY6r in force. J am ame thac I had Do UlUm.•
tiO{J tbal he oLoold do that.

The eventa that occnl'Nld Bllbwqoently ~o the
operations <>f Monday-the arrival of Geo. D•nki,
with !Ji8 forcu, the al'l'i\'al of Gen • .atcCltllan,
and the fioal withdrawal of all our force¥ t.o tbe
l!uylund fide of 1be river-are fluly eat forth m tbe
tatunooy herewith sabwitted, and your Committee
do aot deem auy commellll b.J' t!Jem to be aece,sary.
In connection wir.b the battle of Ball's Blu1f, two
pointa remain to be conaidered: l<'mt, wbttber a
c=t.iog wu joa·ifiabla under any circumataocu,
oons1doriog the verv ioso fficient me.ua of trausportad on '" the commund of Geo. Stone. Soeond, whether
the forcea nod~r Col. BIiker could, and ahould, ba'<'e
been, r.Goforced from tbe Virginia sloe of J::awnni'•
Ferry, when it was known that the troopa uoder hill
comm1<nd were eugaged with tbe enemy.
I n regard to the lint point, nll tbe lutimooy goea
to prov" 1 bat the me,wa of tronapori.nion were very_
inaileqnate. Tllo tesuwouy of Gon. Stone would
eeem to iodicate tbat, wbile he wua iuchoed to deem
it sufilcicnt, Ullder w ha~ b@ u nderttood to bo the circnm11aoc<:S uoder which toe moYement w111 made,
be left much to toe judgn,eot of others; and lbiJ
much can be auid for him, that be reo.ived no intimation t hat a movement acroaa tba river wonld be
expected from l,im, or would be juehfied, until the
day before (Sundlly) it waa actoally made. ADIi the
re..aou1 th .., he uali for •uppo•iuir that other forces
were w1thln a ehort diotnnce t-0 re11der llim uui11auoe
are eet forth in tbe pre;•ious portion of tbia report.
In reference to re-enforciog Col. Baker, the testimony ia very cooflictiog. Tuere ia no qne,tioo that
it
known th~~ the !orecs nt Bull's Bluff were
engaged with the enemy. 'l'bo lldog of mu•ketry
waa ,h,tinctly bei.l'<l "" ~dwarde·~ l!'~rry, on both
aides of tbe nver. The only qnestlon 18 whether reenforcementa sbonld bav• h.:eu
und"' the cironmstancee, and woetoer th.ere ffils any au1llcient
r eason wbv they w1>1'8 no, sent. Geo. Stoue testlfie• that
rec~1ve<1 no mnmation lrom Col. Baker
th» he needtd re-ellforcemon111; tbat he ~ived fa.

be

de, if any, information from Col. Baker in .refer•
ence to the condition and proi,-reu of alf,lra at. B all'•
BlaJF; and he ..l8o teotifieo Uiat, e,•en if re-enforce.
Jl!ente hod been needed, they coold not have been
Mnt up on the Virg oia oide; that the eoem,: bad
eartbwo, le& and butteries between Edwardo's Ferry
and Ball's Bluff', which would have made 1t extremely hlWlrlioua, if notimpoll&ible, tobavesentan:,
re-eoforcerueota b7 that rooto. Somo of Lhe 01ber
witne~ea hstifv to •be same effect. Othera test,i fy
moat positively tbat, so fur os they were able to
judge, 1bere was no obstacle wbate\'er 1n tbe way of
onr trooj>tl pa68ing op on the Vir¢nia oido from .Edward&'B l!'erry.
11 caonot be denied thnt bad re-eoforcemeots
promp1lv arrind llt
DlnJf from Edwarda'a
E'erry, iiie r6$uli of the batile there would, in all
probability, have be•11 greatly to onr advanta,e,
rnatead ot belnl( a most mel•ncholy disaster. The
evidonc~ 1a ao very coutmdlut.ory tb11.t your Committee rerram frow ex preseiog any ro.inve oplniou
upon thaL point, bot 11Uow each ooe to form bla own
conelarion from tho testimony they have been able
. to obtain,
•
One other ,mbject remaioa to be coneidered before
clo.iug tbia report-the arre.ot and iU1priaonmeo1 of
Gen. l:itooe. Your Committee would ba"e made no
reference to tbaL 1uhject, bat bave eubmitted the
teot.imooy withoul comment npQn their part. bad it
not been for the
that ba•e been maae by
Jl!aDJ to bold tbe111 reeponmbte for all t ba~ bu taken
place in reference to tbe arreat of Geo. Stone.
In tbo coarse of their ioveatigutioo coocernicg the
~oseo of the d,easter at D•ll'• Bluff they obuiloed
uatimony, me!!\ unexpectedly t<> them all, which,
witbont explanation, seemed to impeactl tbe mililar,
capacity nod the loyaltv of Gen. ::lto1Je. i 't1a1 te1L1mooy, us in every oLber inatance that they deemed
of imoor1anee, was brought to the at tention or the
p roper 11otboritie1 here, and tbe War Department
w as informed that, in tbe op•nion of tbe Committee,
a prompt iuve.tigution should be iu.etituted. Firat,
Secretury Cameron, and afterward Secretary Stanton, were informed t~at the te,stimony before youz
Collllllittee wu ot inch a character that eome uplaoation by Geo. Stone wna re9.uired.
Gen. Stoue was called to thi• c1Ly, and on the 31st
of J auu•ty, 18(;2 appeared before your Committee,
at th! iost,oce of G.n. AlcCl6llan, and otated that
he bad been intormed tbnt certam testimony before
this Committee ntfocted !Jim iu. aucb a way 111 to
nquire bis exp!Jrnntion. lie ww, informed that
there
Wl\8
te11timooy wbicb millht t11>pear
to impeach bi9 coo;!oct in the Ball'a Bluff
affair; to ahow that be bad had undue interooorsa with the enemy, lJotb by letter and by per1onal interconne with their offlc•ra; aod also that
be had permitted the enemr to erec1 formidable forlificatiooe and bat1erie1 within reach of hia guna,
and which be oould have prevented. The statement
was made in general term, to Gen. Stone, and w itbout iod,ciitmg who were tbe witnea•u who had tefl..
ttfied, 10 onler that they 1bould not be called t.o acconnt by their commanding geoerul for st11temeots
made before a c.ommiuee of Congreea,
In reply to tbl>1 general statement npon the pm
ofyonr Committee Geo. Stone proceeded to make an
explaoallon in geuel'111 terms. They then reported
to the Secretary of War that the tearimooy upon the
points to which bis attention bad been calJed wu
conflicting. They made. no recommendation 118 to
what ebould be done, one wa:, or the other; merely
nported to biin that the t.ea•1monv waa cooflicting.
Not loog aftenvard they lenrotid through tho press
tbai Gen. Stone bad been nrreet<id, and sent to .l,'01'$
Lafayette. 'l'be immed1>1te cans., of hie arrea1 they
did noL know. Thov were aali•lied that the lllformation which tbev L!ld fnmbhcd t.o the d&partment bad
in al, probtlbilii y furnisbed some of the grounds upon
whicu !Jle nm,.t bad been mud~; but they did not
learn nnt!I mo,., tbao a year afte,vard what Wilt the
imwedi&(" c1111>.e of his 11l'res1 at the time it waa
wule.
Gen. Stone was arrested on the 8th of February,
1862. On the 28th of February, 11>63, Geo. McClellan teatilied be1ore your Conunitte6 aa t ollowt:

7
Abo•t t<,11 a,:,a o, two we,,b beto,e Gon. Stone wu 1otuall1

State, arsenal, when threatened by the traitor Gov•
ernor of tbe Ctate, and ditperaed the Rebel troope
wbo were collected nnder the apecioua name of Sr.a'°
ibe members o f ~ ComadUM oa the Conduct of the \Var
Guards iu a camp of ioatruction near St. Lo11ia.
that they bed tab-o t~timony a,,ln• to show th&, Gen. Stoue
bad beeu goUty of eoodu.c, oot cou.111.ent with losalty. Gen.
The difficulty under which our commandoni there
Stone wu removed from bh, co.aun1LDd, a.nd, l a.11de.ratood., ,p-labored in obtaining aoppliea of arme, clo1h1oir, &.c.,
poar~d before thit Contmittte..
for
vol !lnteere, waa far Kreater than waa felt 10 any
ane,t.. a written reportwa1
~ioa.lly. on the ,·ery 6.ay
other part of tho country. Dist&nt from all tbe
made to me of tbe u&mlcuiJon of • re-t'bc:ee from Leeal>ur,.
wb~ ao far u •ucb • tniaccoald. tendal cocorrobor1teaobi".
principal depote, at a time when tho ability of the
ofthe cbuaes made q.Una.1. Ofn. StollW 1 utided my owo.
Go-rernmem was taxed to the ut111oa1 to _,m and
mind of the 1iocertt.1 oftbU refu1eo by pa1'1-0na.l u•mtoatloo,
equip tbe large number or volnnteeni culled into the
and then 1howed the ata.teme,u, to lbe Seorot.Gry of \Var, upon
field, thoae wbo were, from time to time, placed i.n
wblob be dlrected mo to it•e tbe order to arrell Ge.n. Stone
immedl.tely, and IO ,end hfm iande.r 1uard lo Fott La/17of thnt department, were compelled to acl
•:t._ ~h• order wu eani.ed i.a.t.o execution tbe nm• ••lll- ehllrgo
uoder the greateel <fuadvaotages.
lnr.
J oat previou to lbe appolntmenl of Gen. Fremont
Since the release of Gen. Stone he bas been perto the command of tba, Department. the 1tate of
mitted by your CommiUee, in consideration of the
atlai rs iu Jlllssouri bai become very nlarming. Io
pecnliar ci.rcumsl.tlncea attending hie arrest, to exameveryJ>Orlloo of the S1.nte the Rebet forces llad apine all the teanmonv which your Committee have
peared and uawned the offooaiYe; nll tbrough Uie
\Aken in referenee to tbe admiojstration of hi! deStata they were commit1iog tbeu depredauoue and
partment, and to make n foll a trtateuient to the
Jackson, the Governor, hod ap11eared with a largo
Comm.it tee ae he considered neceasarv. That atutoforce of troopi furru•bed by the ltebel an$orltle1
ment, together with all the testimony, is herewit~
from .Arkansua and Texa1, in adt!ltioo to t'hose be
•nbm1tted,
had been able to collert in lli&SOuri. Pillow and
It ia due to Oen. Stone that your Committee
other Rebel Generala had coUected a large force
ehenld state tbnt it appears, from th~ documents be·
from. Tennenee, Keolocky1 &c., and were tbre11,·enfore your Colllmhtee, that Immediately uuon hie aring the •ooth-wettem ('Ott1on of Lbe State and Ca.iro
reat he demanded that he should be foruiiibed with a
at tho mouth of the Ohio. Gen. Lyon, who wae the
copy of the chRrge. &JlRinst bun, and bo Rllowed the
bi~hest officer in command after the removal of Oen.
opportunity of promptly meet10g them; why bia
H aroev, had, with IDA llmiled meane, been moaL ac:request WllB not granted your Commlltee have
t.ive, and bad taken the field for ,be purpose of 11,._
never been informed.
B. F. W.rne, Chairman.
venting Jaelc&oo, wiLh hie auperior forCtle, from getting poeEeaaion of the uorthero portion of the State.
fo Jilly, Gen. Fremont wn• aSBigned to that comDEP.&BTIIIE:VT OP TIIE WEST.
manct. lie,ttroceeded to New-York IJity, where be
The Joint Committee on the Cond11ct of the War
1>peot some day•, endeavoring to arraniie for aupplJ•
1111hmit the following report, with tho accompsnymg
in1r hi• Department w1tb tbe arms, &c., wbiob were
&llsolntely req uieite. He reached St. Lonie on the 25tb
teatlmouy in relation to tbe Department of the Weat:
of J uly. Geu. Pope, who bad beeu assigned the
Your Committee have been unable to take :ill tho
comwllDd in Nortoern Mlaaonri, waa callin.it fOJ
teatimooy neceaary to enable them to pt'el!ent a comtroops to enable him to take the field; Gen, Lyoo,
tn tlie eontb-we,tern portion of the State, hnd bee11
prebeoaive reJ)Ort in relation to the ndmioi•tral ion of
eallin!f for ro•enforcement.e for ao1,11e time; Geo.
nft'aira m the Department of the West, more partlonPrennse, at Cairo, wwi aleo askiog for re-enforcelarly while on<ler the command of Gen. John C.
mcnte. Gen. }'remont tlut re-enforced C,uro, a.a
Fremont. Compelled to ~main in attendance opon
befog the most im.oortaot point, situated,
ii wu
Coo1,"""' durinl! it• ,ea.io.,,,, thev were unabls to
at I be junction ur tbe Ob10 aod llia.l111npp1, and con'vi&it tbe Depni-lment in order to take the teatinionv
trolling t he navigation of those two rivera. The
of wituesees tbere. AuJ tl,oy did not feel willing
oumbt1r of troopa that he could obtoln for tbat pw-•
to cull from BO 11reL.t IL dl•1«11c,, the wi(oesses ,vhoee
J)Olle was l!ID:lll; but the enemy were led to behove,
testimony waa u•cd•lil-Y t,, fully elucidate oU tb<oy tbe 1= number of 1tcamboa11 tlat went down
facu, 88 their 11<:n·icea wcru cotJatantly require;! in
from St. Lollie ihat the re-eofore•meot wu far
the lleld. Tl11ou,::hoo, their inv•••i.(lltiooe yowgreater
than It really
and Pillow, whu
Committee haw strictly adh•i-ed to tho rule ndoptcd
bad n foroo estimated at 12,000 men, waa deby tliem from the first, to n•k tile attendance of
tef'l'ed from making tho ntt~ck he had cootemploted.
th<>&$ in the n:ilitary service only when no detriment to the public int~reet~ wuu·d rcaolt from a
Cairo bein~ re-,,nforced, Gen. Fremont at once
t-emporarv nb.eoce from their cc>mru:.utl. \Vhen
took atep• to .end troo?• to Gen. Lyon. Tbe nom•
ber of the enemy opposed to Gen. Lyon was almo1,
Congress· clo,cJ
its
se,siou la.HI Sumu,~-.
overwhelm,ng. It was eappoaed by mMy that Le
many
of
those who
bad
been
most
wonld retire before them 11ut1l he sbou.ld meet 1upactively en!{aged in tbft operntiona I e which
por1e. He Wmtelf seemo to h11ve contemplated Bocll
your l,;ommittee Jeaired i.o liiree~ 1bcir attention bud
a
movemea t, for, after Lhe affair of Uag 8pr10i;1, ho
been or~e,.,d to o.ber ra,td of tha couutry; eome
retired to Sprin~lleld; lilld Gen. Sturgio temli~B •bat
were ln 'l'enM888o sud ~her i~~ippi, somo in .Arkansas,
~ome in the ,\1•my o! the t>ot-oinuc, and others in tbo
at tbat t1mo, Gen. Lyon exvreeaed bl8 convictioo•
that re-enforcement• could nol be sent to bim.
Department of tloe South under ~n. Huuler. Such
Upon reaching Springfield, Geo. Lyon bnlt.ed
testimony as "''"'·"lthio rcueh )·our CommiJ;te, ha,·e
taken. lht th~y IIN fully awu.re that thtir i uv,tti•
for~3, and, atier wi,iLiug there some four or five
g«tion noou UJ bnbject baa batn fa, !rum complete;
daye, announced his intention to mareh oa, and attack the enemy. Wbat reneona ioll.aeoced blm in
aml tLey, 1bor11fore, pre,;ent bot " briet ri,riort.
tO,i,-ir-th<,,· witb 1-:nch t.:~\tUlon}' tl! LUt;), bs,-~ uo,.auu~~.
forn,h,g that determination are Dot woll establliwed
\\'bell tbc U :.rllivu 4,oa,m,uced llt•e<>uri was c,oe
by tte te,uwooy.
Some of tbe oillcers ha,·o ez:.
ol ,:),., u:<n-~ lJJt,'h. ,,, iUUd•.( tbo!a Dlat•.:8 ·w hfob u,e
pren•d their cu11\;ctioo that he ai,pr~hendsd lhat
the ensm.y, ehouJd ha retire fnrtbcr from them,
!(ebL•I le lllara a,ou·,ht to g:u1.1. c>vei "' their "'10M by
~ue cvu1<iYanco untl treach,.rv of the Slate ou1 nun. would fall upon bis rMr nud cripple him, or force
ti•&. I ud by the prei!Cilce of t<rtned ro,-c.. to opcrato
biru to 1ight a battle under great disadvantages.
..van the fear,, ur the i,eoplc. TbP ltllcilu•~ or l,'cd- bra\'e spirit, doubtless, le<! him 10 meet the enemy ho
eral troope ia cha~ regioh ,vae Tor} i,.u.;tll; u. b"':'•11t
.bad 11one so for t<> r~acb, aud endeavor to inWct nch
portion of our troop,, bU~a.,n...J in_ th, rcrncur,G. u1c1
a blow ae woultl lead th•m Dot to p,eu very clotel,at out· milir.ary pO,td u~ou 1b11 WeaLiru 1ronrie• 110,
upou him. \VLute\'er hie reasons u111v have ueeu,
beeu b•goly sum,11d11'ed ~y 'l'wiir• ~" th• Rehr11 ,.,
''" <1ote1nnned upon tho attack. 'l'be battle ,va,
Te.s-a,. St. Louis, t~o icre,1t <"<nn•n~rd!!t >rnpvu,,r:i
fon~bt nt Wil,ou·s Cre~k. ou the 10th of Auguat,
ot tba St:11e, waa 1:reeerve<l 1t'Dill L
Ir.to~• e 1
aua, though tlte enemy outnumbered 011r force• foar
control ooly oy 1hu pro11111 ur:d fe •• · ,, coun.c r;r
,o "uo. our r.nny was emmeotty ,uccca.tul
~ned by General, tllen Cspluin, J,you, wb.- ,,.,
O.iu. Lyon fell la:tdlng ou a regimuut to the attack.
waitit1g tor order• 01· aut11ortt1, occny1ed tba Uuttcu
[ha l9f@ M tlJat liµio W113 11108\ dce)lly Mt. Dyi~&
-.netted, lbe S1en1tar, of \Vu save me• written order to u•
,..,t
Ou Stone, for tbe reuon 1b•t. be had been informed b7

I
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brave soldier would wish to die fighting for the
against those who we~e eeeking
its deetroctioo, bi.a example h1111 exerC18ed its influence
npon those who have since won the 11lorious victoriea
which have made om armies in lbe West so illus•
moos.
Af«.r that battle our forcee retired to Rolla, the
enemv beiu~ so severely punished that they followed
only a distance. A, Rolla thby were jomed by
\be troops ~hat had been started to their relief, but
had been delayed for want of transportation.
In Septem'ber, Col. Mnllig!ln, who bad been upon
an expedition io the northern part of the State, waa
obliged to fall back before tlie forcee of the enemy
advancing against b1m undo• Gen. Price, Col . .Mulligan ma<le a
at Lexington, and prepared to
remt them, sending for re-enforcements. Gen.
Frewoot, upon bearing of Col. Mulligan' a situation,
illade arrangements to send troope to bis aasistance;
bot from various causes they were unable to reach
him, and the enemy succeed10g in cntllng off biB
Rpply Gf water, be wee compelled to Slll'reuder.
Snortl,: after this, Gen. Fremont determined to
take the field 10 person, with all tbe forces he could
collect 10gether. He W88 deficient in ttaneportatioo; so m ncb so tbat the Adjutant-General of the
army .reported to the Secretury of War tbat Gen.
Fremont would lie unable to move. Re did move,
however, and by Nov. 1 succeeded in Nachiog
Springfield. The enemy, some 2,000 stron~, had
be.en driven from tbatJplace by .Major Za!_lony1, who,
~th barely 100 cavalry, made tbe most brilliant
char11e of tbe war.
Preparation, were made to enjlllge the enemy,
who were understood to be in force in the iromedinte
neigbborhood of Springfield. The day was fixed,
and the order of the attack determined upon. J oat
then Geo. Fremont wa1 removed from the comxnand, and Geo. Hunter appowted as hia succeosor.
Gen. Hunter teetifiea that he became satisfied that
Uie enemy were not so near as Gen. Fremom bad
lie determined, therefore, to withdraw
St. Louis, which was dooe1 and active operatioDB
JD. tbe State were snopended tor some tlme.
In relation to the a.ihnioistration of Gen. Fremont,
much has been said about the high prices paid by
him for arms and other eupolies; the nonecessary
fonilication of St. LoDlB; • delay in re-enforcing
pointa threatened by the euemy; undue assnmption
of antbority, &c, Yonr Committee can but briefly
notice those dtfferent points, on account of their in.a.biljty to obtain.foll evidence in relation to them.
TWs much, at least, appeara w be eetabluhed:
Gen. Fre_lDont, upon taking the command, was
elolbed w1tb the most ample authority, and tbe exigenciea of the Department were such t.hat much
ehould be pardoned in one comoelled to act so
promptly, and with so little a, his command.
Whether that authority wua exercised, in all reepecta, ea it should bave ~n-whetber Gen. Fremont was jnotified in all that he did by tJie circnm•
stances under which be was called upon to l!Cty~m C~~mittee do not undertake to express a p011lt1ve op111100.
In relation to the purchase of al'lOs, &c., it ap•
peafll that tbe Department Willi very deet1tn'8 of
supplies of all kinda; the dew and was most prcs,iog,
and the Government was nnable to aupp\y 1t. Soma
of the arms eogaged by Gen, Fremont for the solCliers in bis deoartment were diverted to the Army
of the Potomac-the primary object of tbe Govemroent then heiog to collect and equip an army at
W88bington as "°on as could possibly be dooe. Thu
rendered it the more important tliat other arm•
ahollld b& obtained. Yet with all that Geo, Fre·
moot deemed it proper to do, hia department long
felt the want of adequate supplies,
1n refore11ce to tbe fortifications about St. Louis,
Geu. F1·emoot but carried out what Gen. Lyon before him ha1 deemed nece,sa,y. 1u reference to
the manner in wb.icb it waa done-as the ~verament has had its ngeots to examine t.he contracts
far thllt work, as well as other contracts, your Com•
mittee forbear expressing an opinion.
In regard to re-enforcing promptly those point•
threatened by the enomy, ao far aa your ColllUUtlea
ea11A of hie country

at

have the evidenee before them, they believe that
Geo. Fremont ncted with el)erl!'Y and promptneu.
He was peculiarly situated. The first call-that of
Gen. Lyon-was pressed upon him so ,oon after
he took commaud of the department, and
he Willi compell~d to act so baatily, without
time for folly surveying the field before him, and
ascertaining the ext.ent of the resources at hie com•
mand, that even • e failed to do all that one under
other circumstances might have done, still yon,
Committee can discover no caoee of censure ngai.w,t
him, ButJn regard to both Gen. Lyon and Col. Molli,
gan, your Committee have diacovered no evidence
of any disregard for the public interest, or want ol
energy or inclination npon the pan of Gen. Fremont. '.rroops were collected by him ae soon 11.1
collld be done, and they were promptly sent wbere
the exigencies of the service d~mauded. Some ot
them were diverted to other purposes than those for
wb1cb Geu, Fremont desi.llned them. Tile GoveroIllBUt enu..d upon him ror '<oops to be sent to the
east, at a iune when be wn most eamestly eoJ;?aged
in procuring forces for V•• U"8ietance of Col. Mulli
g11u. Those tba, wen )~I~ were sent promptly, and
only failed to render 1b ~ aaeistaoce needed from
cause$ ov~r wbich Gen. .ll'r:emoot bad no coutrol.
Gen. Fremont early turned his attention to the
building of gouboats tor oar Western rivers. Wlloever ia entitled to the credit of ,originAting the idea
of employinlt such means of warfare"in ttrnt section
of country, 1t is not to he denied that Geo. Fremont
puceived the adv~ntage to realllt ft-001 them. Oar
·brilliant victories in tlle West will bea~ eodnring
testimony to the correotnes.s of hie j ndgmeot in that
respect.
_
But that featnre of Gen. Fremont's adminietration
which attracted the most attention at the time, and
which will ever Ile most prominent among 1he many
points of interest connected with the history of tbat
Department, is his l'r<,clamation of Emancipation.
Whatever opinion nlay be entertained in relereoce
to the Ume when tbe po!icy of Emancipation ahould
have been inaugurated, or by whose eutbority ic
•honld have been promlllgated, there can be no doubt
that Gen. Fremont at that early day rightly judged
in regard to tile most effective mean• of subdumg
tb.ie Rebellion. In proof of t hat it is ooly nece•eary
to refer to the fact that bis anccessor, when tren&•
ferred to another departmeol1 usaed a proclamation.
embodyioir the same nrincipte. And the President,
ea Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, hae
applied the same :{)rinciple to all tbe rebelliona
States, and fow will deny that it moat be adhered
to uoUJ the last veuige of treason and rebellioo is
deatroyed.
· Tne administration of Gen. Fremont was eminently characterized by earoeatness, ability, and the
most onquestiooable loyalty. In the exercise ot
the almost nulimited power deltgated to him, tbere
wee no evidence of nny tenderness toward treaaon1
~r auy fatlate to fully aesert the dignity and power
of the Government o! which be was the represencative.
'1'be manner in which tllat power was exercieed
was to be jndged by the reaol,e, and the pol.icy of •
comioutng him 10 command w1u a matter for the
authorit ies above him to determine,
Io order to pronounce a final judgment npon all
the attairll in the Western Department, much more
joformation ia necessary than is in the posseuioo of
your Committee. l 'llay bave undertaken merely to
state what seems to be borne out by such testimony
ae they have been·able to obtain.
0

B. F. WADE, CbulrmAII,
z. CIIAN!Jr..ER.
JOHN COVOD:£.

As the te!ti on which tb~E&~~dt~~~\;mit in
relation to th~ estern Department is so incom•
plete, the testimony of so many wime~ses, deemed
lnalerial by the whole Committee, being wantiug,
the und.e raigned decliue to concur in th" above report, an~, for themselves, pre.fer to submit the testimony w1tbou, comment.
·

D. W. GOOCH,
ll.. F. ODELL,

